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“...a man, being just as hungry as thirsty, and placed in between food and drink, 
must necessarily remain where he is and starve to death.” 
 
Aristotle, On the Heavens 295b, c. 350 BC 
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"For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the brute!' 
But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot." 
                                                
Rudyard Kipling, Tommy. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
 This thesis focusses on how individuals make hard choices. Specifically, it focusses on the 
cognitive conflict that emerges when members of the Armed Forces are presented with two options 
that are equally adverse during combat operations. Such decisions are often high-risk and any 
resulting decision inertia (a form of “indecision” that I pay special attention to throughout this 
thesis) can be costly. The issue, however, is that, to date, psychology has done little to explore 
least-worst decision-making and decision inertia in military populations. To understand the 
psychological processes behind these types of decisions, this thesis presents qualitative data 
collected from Soldiers who have combat experience (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq). Through my 
analysis of this data, I then focus on values, and specifically the importance of “sacred” values, as 
predictors of decision-making in conditions of high-consequence, uncertainty, and least-worst 
options. I then take a step back, and examine what separates military and non-military decision-
making and decision-makers, by studying the decision-making of Soldiers, police officers and 
students within a series of simulated military and non-military scenarios. Through these 
experimental studies, I am then able to empirically test the role of value systems in decision-
making within and between these groups. Overall, as well as identifying several domain-specific 
and domain-general correlates of least-worst decision-making, I identify two “clusters” of values 
(egocentric and empathetic) which, I feel, hold special importance when considering how least-
worst decisions are, and are not, made.  
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PREFACE 
 
“I would rather go down this street and get in a firefight than go back and get blown up 
by an IED. This thought was resounding, and I would not forget it, I would rather get in a firefight 
than face an IED” 
 
This quote was recounted to me in one of the first interviews I conducted for this thesis, 
and it describes the dilemma of a convoy leader in Iraq. While providing security for a convoy 
running between Baghdad and a forward operating base, he found that his planned routes (route 
A; preferred, and route B; not ideal, but workable) had been blocked, randomly, as often occurs in 
Iraq. A quick decision was needed since they were fast approaching the roundabout. Option 1 was 
to take route “C,” a new, unplanned route that would lead directly through a troubled part of 
town—meaning that it was a known hotspot for insurgent fighters, and most times coalition forces 
had navigated this part of town they had come under fire. Option 2 was to turn around, backtrack 
and then go around the center of the city (rather than through it via route C, which was both shorter 
and faster, getting them and their cargo back to base sooner). A further wrinkle was that the convoy 
leader knew insurgent fighters laid improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on common coalition 
routes, meaning there was a high chance the route they had just travelled (and were now 
considering backtracking through) would be laced with IEDs. So, in incredibly challenging 
physiological and psychological conditions, he was forced to make a decision that had high 
consequences; there was no “right” answer (at least not a right answer that would be apparent until 
after the decision was made), high uncertainty, and little time. He was unlikely to have made this 
specific decision in training, nor had he faced this decision during his previous tours of 
Afghanistan. So, how did this Soldier make this decision? And, crucially, how can psychologists 
better understand the processes people use to make these seemingly impossible decisions in 
challenging environments? 
These were the questions in my mind when I began looking at military decision-making. I 
have often felt that the current theories (rational, economic and recognition-primed) do not 
satisfactorily explain (some) of the decisions people face in high-risk, high consequences 
situations. In working under the supervision of Prof. Alison, I became specifically interested in 
what he called “least-worst decisions,” something he had observed extensively in his research on 
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police and Emergency service decision-making that he had been conducting over the past few 
decades. Strangely though, very little work had explored least-worst decisions in a military 
context. Given this, we set out on a journey to understand what least-worst decisions in the time-
limited, information-starved, inveterately-ambiguous heat of battle mean for the decision-maker, 
and how they perform the calculus needed to commit to a decision and accept a (potentially) bad 
outcome. We were also very committed to ensuring we collected data from real decisions made in 
the heat of battle because the existing research has often studied how Soldiers1 are trained to make 
decisions or how they make decisions in training. Very rarely does research collect data from the 
points at which real decisions are made and the types of decisions made when it counts: at war.  
My early research as part of this thesis unearthed several interesting findings about the 
process of military decision-making. Firstly, the types of decisions that Soldiers struggled with 
continued to surprise us. The decisions that were discussed, while often high-risk, and involving 
issues of life and death for their forces and civilians, were rarely “kinetic” (meaning that they were 
not decisions faced in combat), but more often they were encountered during the mission planning 
process. Furthermore, these decisions were often not merely “hard” because of the costs 
(something which has always intrinsically been linked to the difficulty a decision poses, as covered 
in Chapter 1). More often they were hard because they came from “left field” -- meaning that the 
decision was completely unexpected; one that they had never trained for, and a situation they 
usually did not expect to encounter. There are some decisions that time and time again caused 
Soldiers difficulties, such as how to determine a threat, but strikingly the decisions we examined 
arose in unique situations that posed unique decisions.  
One of the things that also struck me throughout this research was the vividness with which 
the Soldiers remembered these types of decisions. During any operation, on any given day, on any 
deployment, a Soldier can make hundred (one even said millions) of decisions, yet our participants 
could always recall a least-worst decision in incredible detail, as many as 15 years after it first 
occurred. While this provided much-needed detail to the qualitative data, this highlights serious 
concerns about the enduring effects on Soldiers of making these kinds of decisions. So, while they 
tolerated a bad outcome during goal-directed, short-term actions, are the long-term consequences 
potentially intolerable? In discussing this research with a trained veterans’ counselor, she said we 
                                                 
1 While the term “Soldier” typically denotes members of the Army in using this term here, and 
throughout this thesis, I am referring to members of all branches of the Armed Forces. 
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were studying “shoulda, woulda, coulda” decisions; decisions that haunt the Soldiers and “come 
back with them.” From this research, we can confirm that, in many cases, decision-makers 
continued to ruminate on the outcome of a decision years after it had originally occurred. While 
this thesis is not focused on issues of post-traumatic stress disorder in combat veterans, this 
reinforces the importance of understanding both the short-term process of making, and the long-
term psychological consequences of living with, least-worst decisions.  
Through a series of qualitative interviews with veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq this thesis describes the processes that make choice selection so difficult, the psychology of 
decisional conflict, and the immediate, short-term behavioral consequences of experiencing this 
conflict. Special attention is directed to the concept of ‘decision inertia’ – one of several kinds of 
‘failures to act’ in which decision-makers are unable to calculate and/or commit to a least-worst 
course of action. Emergency services and law enforcement personnel seem especially prone to the 
inability to tolerate any bad outcome —the military far less so. While this assertion was originally 
just an observation made after conducting the interviews, we test this assertion in the later chapters 
of this thesis. Hence, in the final chapters of this thesis, I expand this analysis. We use experimental 
methods, to investigate if Soldiers are more tolerant of a least-worst option, and thus less prone to 
decision inertia. We also look to universal predictors of performance to identify what makes a 
good “least-worst” decision-maker, and what makes a bad one. Here we pay critical attention to 
individuals’ value systems; arguing that it is the presence of values that best explain the processes 
underpinning least-worst decision-making.  
Overall, this thesis is about difficult decisions. It sought to identify, and then explore the 
cognitive and affective conflict that people experience when faced with choices where all 
outcomes look adverse. It draws on interviews that we conducted with real Soldiers in real 
situations and focuses specifically on the seemingly impossible choices that they had to make – 
choices that were vivid and sometimes upsetting for them and yet were part of their experience of 
war and which have stayed with them throughout their lives. Hence, while this thesis is primarily 
about the psychology of making choices, we hope that this work increasingly becomes entwined 
with the psychological consequences of living with the outcomes of hard choices.  
 
Neil Shortland 
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CHAPTER 1: DECISION-MAKING: FROM BEST TO “LEAST-WORST” 
 
Between two evils, choose neither; between two goods, choose both.  
 
- Tryon Edwards 
 
This thesis is about difficult decisions. Specifically, it is about the cognitive and affective 
conflict that occurs when choosing between difficult options.  
This thesis starts by looking at what we know; that is, it is examine the current 
understanding of how general, and military decisions are made. After analyzing these multiple 
perspectives and highlighting some issues with both as they relate to decisions made my members 
of the military, operating in extreme environments, it moves on to examining research on how 
other extreme decisions are made, namely those within critical and major incidents. From here, we 
identify several psychological factors that are highly relevant to military decisions, but currently 
ignored. Furthermore, we discuss the importance of decision inertia and the overlap between the 
environments within which inertia emerges and the environment within which military decisions 
are made. From this standpoint, and using primary source data collected from soldiers who have 
operated in war, we explore the manifestation of inertia within military decision-making finding, 
to our surprise, that it is a rarity and that in the face of critical least-worst decisions, members of 
the military are often able to maintain relatively robust decision making. Through further primary 
source data collection we then explore the psychological underpinnings of this finding, centering 
on the importance of values and value systems. Finally, and as the final piece of this thesis, we use 
experimental scenario-based methods to explore the values and decision-making of Soldiers, and 
several unique control groups (namely members of the Police and a undergraduate student sample). 
In this chapter, I will discuss what is a decision, what makes decisions “hard,” and crucially 
what makes decisions “good” or “bad.” I will critically address what is referred to as the “decision 
quality thesis” and the idea that there are “better decisions… that have quality superior to that 
possessed by “worse decisions” (Yates, Veinot & Patalano, 2003, p. 14). I will pay special attention 
to this assumption because while there are better outcomes to decisions, these outcomes are not 
always directly correlated to better decision-making (i.e., bad decision-making can have good 
outcomes, and good decision-making can still result in bad outcomes). As an important pillar 
Conflict 
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throughout the rest of this thesis, at the end of this chapter I seek to define what is a “hard” decision 
as well as a “quality” decision within a military decision-making environment. In this chapter, I 
also outline the concept of decisional conflict. Decision conflict occurs when we have two (or 
more) similarly attractive (or unattractive) options to choose from and it can often lead to 
suboptimal decision-making (Pochon et al., 2008). Decision conflict has been observed and studied 
since the 1970s (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977), yet has been almost exclusively applied to consumer 
decision-making. Hence, it has not been applied to decision-making in high-stakes, uncertain 
critical or military incidents. Given the central importance of decision conflict to this thesis in this 
chapter I will also discuss the psychological issues underpinning decisional conflict, as well as the 
consequences of experiencing it.  
 
What is a “Hard” Decision 
 
Over the past several decades, many fields of study have concerned themselves with how 
people make decisions. Philosophers, mathematicians, economists, psychologists, political 
scientists have each attempted to understand how people make decisions in various domains and 
under various conditions (e.g., Payne, 1976; Plous, 1993). Synthesizing how the term “decision-
making” is used across and between these many fields Yates, Veinott and Patalano (2003; see also 
Yates & Patalano, 1999) defined a “decision” as “a commitment to a course of action that is 
intended to produce a satisfying state of affairs” (p. 15). However, not all actions are as easy to 
commit to as others, henceforth the harder it is to commit to a course of action, the harder the 
decision is to make. In line with this view, Yates and colleagues (2003) asked the simple question 
of what makes decisions “hard” or “easy” to 93 undergraduates psychology students. He asked 
them to “imagine hard and easy decisions that you have made within the last year” and write down 
three decisions that were hard and three decisions that were easy. They were asked to describe the 
circumstances around the decision, explain why it was hard (or easy) and then outline how they 
solve a given problem. Finally, they were asked to highlight how many options they could choose 
from, how long the decision took, the degree of difficulty they experienced making the decision, 
how satisfied they were with the outcome and the extent to which they felt that the decision they 
made was the best possible decision given the circumstances. This method, while arguably quite 
simplistic, is not that dissimilar from the method that I used later in this thesis to collect narrative 
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accounts from Soldiers’ about difficult decisions they made while on deployed duty in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  
In total Yates’ research resulted in an outline of 212 “hard” decision and 200 “easy” 
decisions. Given that the sample was entirely college undergraduates, it is not surprising that 
decisions defined as “hard” centered on academic issues (what college to attend); social issues 
(who should I date/not date) and financial matters (should I buy a car, and if so, which one). 
However, given that Yates’ also sought to understand why decisions are hard (rather what decisions 
are hard) they coded the participants’ responses for the attributions they assigned to hard decisions. 
From this analysis, the authors identified 7 supercategories (an amalgamation of the 29 “hardness” 
categories) which could be used to categorize a given form of hardness. These seven categories 
are outlined below: 
 
Hardness Factor 1. Outcomes - Serious: Decisions in which the outcome could result in 
a “serious loss of some kind.” Participants most often cited losses which were “long-term, 
with potentially irreversible, effects, ones that entailed hurting another person, ones that 
required violating personal (e.g., moral) principles.” Outcomes that involved significant 
risks were also within this supercategory.  
Hardness Factor 2. Options: Decisions that burdened the decision-maker with the number 
and/or nature of the choices available to them. Decisions therefore that had either too many 
or too few options, as well as those which had comparisons on too many factors, were 
viewed as hard.   
Hardness Factor 3. Process – Onerous: Participants in Yates’ study stated that decisions 
were hard if the amount of effort required to make the decision was high, there were 
emotional circumstances, time pressure, uncertainty and a feeling that they (the decision-
maker) lacked the experience of expertise.  
Hardness Factor 4. Possibilities: Decisions were viewed as hard if it was difficult to 
imagine, or predict, what the possible outcomes could be. This was especially relevant for 
decisions in which the decision-maker had little experience of the type of decision they 
were making (e.g., buying your fist house/car/choosing college). 
Hardness Factor 5. Clarity: Decisions were viewed as hard if it was unclear which 
possibility was superior in relation to the others it was being compared against.  
Conflict 
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Hardness Factor 6. Value: Decisions were perceived as hard if the decision-maker was 
unsure how they would feel about a given potential outcome. For example, they may have 
never experienced that outcome (e.g., being a doctor or lawyer) and therefore they were 
unsure whether (and the degree to which) this would be a pleasurable outcome and is worth 
the costs (several more years of college and incurring increased debt). 
Hardness Factor 7. Advisors: Participants said that decisions became hard when they 
either had opposing advice from advisors, or the advice being pushed from the advisor 
contradicts the decision-maker’s preference.  
 
Contrary to this then, “easy” decisions were (logically) defined as those with mild outcomes, a 
clear optimal option, little effort is required to decide, predictable outcomes (and predictable 
personal responses to these outcomes), and the ability to defer (and follow) an advisor. 
 
Finally, Yates coded for the presence of hardness and easiness factors within the 412 
decisions reported by his participants. This was done to understand what most commonly makes 
decisions hard or easy. The results of this analysis are displayed in full (from Yates et al., 2003, 
p.24) in Table 1 but of central importance here is that the most common reason a decision was 
viewed as “hard” was because there were serious outcomes to the decision. What this means then 
is that even research that specifically seeks to understand what makes decisions hard (i.e., choosing 
a course of action and implementing it) remains pre-occupied with defining decisions based solely 
on the outcomes of the decision. This finding has two implications; Firstly, it belittles the 
challenges that are posed by the choice itself (i.e., the independent metrics of each course of action 
and the difficulties that can stem from evaluating them). Secondly, by its very nature, this means 
that all decisions with serious consequences are ipso facto hard. While this makes intuitive sense, 
it is not reflective of the fact that, in many high-risk and high consequence situations, individuals 
in many fields can (with relative ease) make decisions. Furthermore, given that Yates’ research 
found that hard decisions demanded more time to solve, this means that decisions with high-risk 
outcomes will take more time. Not only is this not the case, but in such situations taking more time 
is a significant issue, hence why we so often value those who can make high-consequence 
decisions in time-short environments. For example, as the surgeon James Bonnar wrote in 1824 
(Bonnar, 1824, p. 33);  
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“A hesitating practitioner, who takes a few hours only to make up his mind 
respecting the course he is to pursue in the treatment of a doubtful disease, may 
often thus doom his patient to an irretrievable state. I hold it as a maxim, that it is 
more culpable for a physician to lose his patient by neglect or indecision when it 
might be in his power to save him, than it is one who hurries on the fatal termination 
by the use of desperate measures in a desperate disease.” 
 
Thus, decisions cannot be viewed as hard solely on the consequences of their outcomes 
because for many individuals there are serious consequences to all decisions. In addition, in such 
situations, the decision-maker does not have the luxury of time, and in fact taking too much time 
can only lead to further harm. Given this then, it is important that we create a double dissociation 
between hard decisions and high consequences because (while acknowledging that outcome 
severity is one of many factors that can make decisions “hard”) decisions with high-consequences 
can be made with relative ease, and decisions with low consequences can equally be incredibly 
tough to make (for example picking a main course at a restaurant, or deciding which item of 
clothing to wear on a date). Thus, if we move the concept of “hard” decisions away from simply 
the outcomes of decisions and towards the factors within the decision itself (and the nature of the 
choices on offer) we can expand our conceptualization of hard decisions, showing how decisions 
with both low and high consequences can be hard to make. 
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Supercategory  Percentage  
Outcomes  
 
Hard (Serious loss potential) 69.8% 
Easy (Insignificant) 17.5% 
Options  
 
Hard (Too many/few, Character) 10.8% 
Easy (Minimal reflection required  21.0% 
Process  
 
Hard (onerous) 22.1% 
Easy (apparent) 31.0% 
Possibilities  
 
Hard (Obscure) 8.0% 
Easy (Apparent) 15.0% 
Clarity  
 
Hard (Ambiguous superiority) 23.1% 
Easy (Obvious superiority) 41.5% 
Value  
 
Hard (Uncertain) 7.5% 
Easy (Clear cut) 21.5% 
Advisors  
 
Hard (Disagree)  5.1% 
Easy (Recommend, Encourage) 4.5% 
Note: Hard and easy supercategory percentages sum to more than 100% because 
participants typically cited more than one reason that a given decision was hard or 
easy.  
 
Table 1: The prevalence of harness and easiness supercategories across “easy” and “hard” 
decisions.  
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Decisions in “Hard” Environments  
 
For the past 20 years Alison and colleagues have been using naturalistic observation and 
conducting anonymous debriefs of critical incidents to better understand the factors present within 
the decision-making environment that are repeatedly present in “hard” decisions (see Alison & 
Crego, 2008). In their work with Emergency services, two factors continually separate hard 
choices from easy ones; task ambiguity (not being clear on exactly what the task at hand is) and 
outcome uncertainty (not being clear on what the precise consequences of your decision will be). 
This can be mapped out in two orthogonal dimensions (see Table 2).  
 
 Clear task Ambiguous Task 
Certain Outcome Easy decision  Hard decision  
Uncertain Outcome Hard decision  Very hard decision  
 
Table 2: Task Ambiguity-Clarity and Outcome Uncertainty-Certainty and decision hardness.  
 
Hence, in their work, it is not the costs of the outcome that define decision difficulty, but 
the degree of certainty with which we can be sure that a certain outcome will occur. Furthermore, 
and not captured in Yates’ work above, the second dimension of decision difficulty is the degree 
to which we are clear of what our task is within a given environment is. Hence it is these factors, 
rather than merely a high-cost outcome, that defines “hard” decisions. To put this point in 
perspective, consider Table 2 as part of an imagined ‘bomb’ paradigm where options available to 
you are cutting a red or blue wire to disable a bomb (see Table 3). Now, the outcomes of the 
decision are high (a bomb going off), but if you know that you are supposed to cut the red wire, 
and you know that this will disable the bomb, this decision becomes quite easy. However, if you 
are unsure which wire you are supposed to be cutting, and unsure if cutting either wire will disable 
(or in fact trigger) the bomb, the decision is much tougher to make. What this example seeks to 
show is that outcomes and decision difficulty must be de-coupled, and that whether a decision is 
challenging or not is a result, not of consequences (although they do play a role), but of the degree 
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of certainty with which we can be sure about a: what we are supposed to be do, and b: what will 
happen if we do it.  
 
 Clear task Ambiguous Task 
Certain Outcome A. Cutting the red wire disables 
bomb 
B. Cutting the red OR blue wire 
will disable bomb  
Uncertain Outcome C. Cutting the red wire may 
disable or may detonate bomb 
D. cutting the red OR blue wire 
may (or may not) disable or 
detonate bomb 
 
Table 3: Task Ambiguity-Clarity and Outcome Uncertainty-Certainty regarding a hypothetical 
bomb paradigm. 
 
Least-Worst Decisions  
 
“A hungry donkey stands between two identical hay piles. The donkey always 
chooses whichever hay is closest to him. Both piles are exactly the same distance 
apart, one on his right, one on his left, and they are identical in every way. Which 
pile of hay will the donkey choose to eat?” 
 
The above paradox, while originally proposed by Aristotle (see the quote at the start of this 
thesis), was made famous by the French Philosopher Jean Buridan as a central argument against 
free will. According to this paradox, the donkey will be unable to choose and will, in turn, starve 
to death in the paralysis of choice. While commonly used in political satire, this philosophical 
conundrum reflects a common observation that when people face equally attractive (or 
unattractive) choices they can become paralyzed.  
In naturalistic fields, based on findings from research on decisions in real-life critical 
incidents, researchers have called these types of decisions “least-worst” (see Alison, Power, van 
den Heuvel, Palasinski & Crego, 2015). Least-worst decisions are those in which every course of 
action is high-risk, and could (potentially) have negative consequences that are equal to the 
negative consequences that could result from selection another course of action. What defines 
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least-worst decisions is that all courses of action are adverse. Such decisions pose a significant 
problem to current perspectives on decision-making that hold that there is an ideal, best, or 
workable solution to a problem (see Chapter 2 for an expanded discussion of this). Let us consider, 
for example, the decision-making of President Obama surrounding intervention in Syria. Since the 
emergence of unrest in March 2011, the Syrian conflict seemed in an inevitable descent into civil 
war (Nicoll & Delaney, 2012). The case of Syria is not unique but reflects a growing trend in 
international security of failed (or failing) states (that is those in which there is ethnic and sectarian 
violence, weak institutions that are unable to exert control and little rule of law) that potentially 
require third-party intervention.  Decisive action to mitigate the emergence (or spreading) of 
violence did not occur in Syria, and levels of violence have not only escalated throughout the last 
five years but spread into Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon. The Syrian conflict has also threatened the 
peace between Syria and Israel, increased fears for the proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMDs) by terrorist organizations and exacerbated the United States and Russian 
international relations (Allison, 2013; McComb, 2013). While many have been quick to lament 
the indecision of the Obama Administration, when you look at the options available, none of them 
offered much promise. As (then Secretary of Defense) Hillary Clinton (2014) states “Do nothing, 
and a humanitarian disaster envelops the region.” However intervention opened a “Pandora’s box” 
and arms given to the rebels could end up in the hands of extremists. Diplomacy would, in her 
mind, “run head-first into a Russian veto.” None of these offered much hope of success (p. 461).  
 
The United States Senator John Kerry defined Syria as a “wicked problem” in that it 
presented a situation that has innumerable causes that are hard to describe and have no “right 
answer.” (Kerry 2013). While the case of Syria (as well as many other intervene/not intervene 
decisions such as Iraq – both in 2003 and 2015) represents a very strategic-level least-worst 
decisions; these types of “damned if you do; damned if you don’t” decisions are equally likely to 
emerge at the tactical level, especially in a conflict environment. Consider, for example, the 
following situation encountered by a Marine Officer (recounted in Friedman 2007): 
 
“Suddenly the guy reached down and picked the object up. “Hey what the fuck! 
Drop that motherfucker!” I screamed, raising my weapon.  I started moving 
backward. Mohamed started shouting at the guy and the guy started talking back to 
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him, all the while smiling and shaking the yellow object… In my mind, I quickly 
started to work out the combat calculus that would tell me how to deal with this…. 
Everyone was yelling at the same time. I didn’t want to have to shoot this guy over 
a misunderstanding, but dying for this guy’s stupidity was not an option either. This 
was the same thing that happened to Charlie Company and the Iraqi who died right 
in front of me. Given the choice, I would shoot first and ask questions later. This 
was not how I was going to die” (p. 162 - 163) 
 
While this presents a simple tactical shoot/don’t shoot scenario, neither option is 
(potentially) workable as the decision-maker risks either a: shooting an unarmed civilian, or b: 
putting the lives of himself and fellow Soldiers at risk by not taking offensive action. This type of 
situation (cultural misunderstandings leading to a least-worst decision) was also, arguably, quite 
common in Afghanistan given the significant cultural differences, and language barriers between 
troops and the civilian population. Either decision could have resulted in significant negative 
repercussions.  
What this tactical decision and the overarching global political decisions surrounding 
intervention in Syria have in common is that the decision-maker faces multiple high-risk courses 
of action, all of which could, potentially, have adverse consequences for the decision-maker, their 
organization, and civilians. In such instances, they are not selecting a “best,” or even “workable” 
course of action, but instead they must select the “least-worst.” These types of decisions place the 
decision-maker in a very challenging position because, when considering option comparison, there 
is no better solution, yet they are required (due to the nature of the environment in that is time-
pressured) to decide.  
The reason least-worst decisions are so challenging, both for the decision-maker and the 
those who study decision-making is that they violate the fundamental principles of optimization 
and satisficing. Those who study organizational decision-making have long described the 
optimizing strategy of selecting courses of action which provide the greatest payoff (e.g., Svenson, 
1979). Such economic models propose that humans make decisions based on expected benefits 
(this is discussed in detail in Chapter 2) however, as argued by Simon (1976) humans do not have 
the “wits” to maximize (p. xxviii). As Simon argues, determining all the (potential) favorable and 
unfavorable consequences of all feasible actions would over-stretch the limited cognitive 
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capabilities of humans. Instead, Simon (1955, 1956, 1957) proposed that decision-makers satisfice. 
This approach is more cognizant of cognitive limitations in that we do not need to search for (and 
select) the optimal choice, but rather we have a threshold of acceptability. Once the decision-maker 
finds an option that exceeds this threshold it is chosen. Such strategies are beneficial if they save 
enough cognitive effort to justify any (potential) loss in the payoff (Simon, 1955, 1956, 1957). 
Satisfying has been the topic of scholarly investigations for several decades and is supported by 
the oft-espoused view that we are “cognitive misers” who try to good decisions while expending 
minimal cognitive effort (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
Satisficing is a central facet of current perspectives of decision-making but least-worst 
situations often present with no “workable” option, or options that are equally “unworkable” (none 
of which would be viewed as “ideal” and all of which have an unpalatable outcome). Furthermore, 
if a course of action would meet a “threshold of acceptance” is often something, in high-risk 
adaptive environments, that could only be known after the decision is made. It is in situations such 
as this, decision-makers often struggle to select between equally bad options. In Chapter 2 I discuss 
in detail the recognition-primed model of decision-making (RPD; in which you use previous 
experience to help you identify workable courses of action). However, again, such perspectives 
remain almost silent on what to do when no option is workable.  RPD researchers call facing 
equally adverse options the “zone of indifference”. Within the zone of indifference, the closer the 
advantages and disadvantages of two options, the harder a decision is to make, and the less an 
evaluation of the options will matter (Klein, 1998, p. 103). As such, in such instances, decision-
makers should stop ruminating, make an “arbitrary choice,” and move on (Klein, 2011, p. 87). The 
issue then, is that when in the “zone of indifference,” and especially within a high-stakes decision-
making environment, decision-makers rarely make an “arbitrary” choice. Instead, and as shown 
by Alison et al. (2015) and van den Heuvel et al. (2012) decision-making is usually derailed when 
individuals find themselves in the zone of indifference. Moreover, the term “arbitrary” sits 
uncomfortably when it comes to, for example, shoot/no-shoot decisions, or the decision to deploy 
troops to Syria (or don’t). These difficult to calculate options, in which it is hard to discriminate 
the least-worst long-term outcome cannot really be considered as arbitrary because they are often 
fundamental, life-shaping events for victims, communities, countries, Governments and Soldiers.  
To re-frame all of this in Buridan’s terms; the donkey starves because it becomes paralyzed 
in the face of a least-worst decision due to a zone of indifference between the two bales of hay. It 
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is here then, at the junction of least-worst decisions, where decision-making is at its hardest and 
where our current conceptualizations of decision-making falter.  
 
Decision Conflict  
 
Least-worst decisions create decision conflict. Janis and Mann (1977) argued that decision-
makers experience intense conflict when facing opposing tendencies to accept or reject a given 
course of action. Such opposing tendencies result in hesitation, feelings of uncertainty, and acute 
emotional stress (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 46; see also Tversky & Shafir, 1992). When making such 
decisions common symptoms include apprehensiveness and a desire to escape from the choice 
dilemma. In Simon’s analysis of emotion in controlling cognitive processes anxiety, while 
unpleasant, allows the processor to adapt adaptively to urgent needs. However, when the emotional 
arousal is extremely intense (and hence unpleasant) it becomes disruptive and produces non-
adaptive behavior. The view that adaptive emotional processes become maladaptive at under 
conditions of heightened arousal is the central tenet of Janis and Mann’s “conflict theory of 
decision-making” which outlines the conditions under which stress caused by decisional conflict 
will interfere with good decision-making (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 49).  
Physiologically, people show an increased stress reaction when they are required to choose 
between two alternatives that can have unpleasant consequences (Mann, Janis & Chaplin, 1969). 
Specifically, participants showed the greatest levels of autonomic stress arousal during the time 
when they were deciding between the two (unpleasant) alternatives and when they were expected 
to announce their decision (see also; Gerard, 1967). Epstein and Fenz (1965), for example, found 
that the greatest levels of stress for parachute jumpers was not during the ascent and prior to the 
jump, but at the point in which they made the original decision to participate. Furthermore, the 
degree of physiological and psychological stress symptoms experienced is directly related to the 
perceived magnitude of the anticipated losses (Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 49).  
Extending this analysis Janis and Mann (1977) examined the different decision strategies 
that can be employed when experiencing “conflict.” Vigilance, they argue, is the adaptive decision-
making strategy, involving “a thorough information search, unbiased assimilation of new 
information and other qualities of high-quality decision-making” (p.52). Vigilance, however, is 
only one possible outcome, the other outcomes “though occasionally adaptive in saving time, 
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effort, emotional wear and tear …. often result in defective decision-making when the decision-
maker is confronted with a vital choice that has serious consequences for himself, for his family, 
or for the organization” (p. 52). The first defective outcome identified by Janis and Mann is 
unconflicted inertia; in which a decision raises little emotional arousal and the decision-maker 
maintains the status quo (i.e., they engage in no decision-making process). The second possible 
outcome, unconflicted change, occurs when the decision-maker, after deciding to consider other 
courses of action find that the alternative course of action offers no serious risks. In those instances, 
in which a new course of action carries with it a degree of risk the individual will continue to 
search for new alternatives, if, however, they feel that there are no good alternatives open to them 
they will give up on the search, entering a state of defensive avoidance, in which they minimize 
threat cues or develop “fatalistic beliefs that support a precariously optimistic outcome” (p. 58). 
Finally, if the decision-maker continues to engage in a vigilant search and evaluation of new 
courses of action, but does not have the time to do so, they can enter a state of hypervigilance. 
When a threat is highly imminent there is a heightened emotional arousal (Kelly, Condry, Dahlke 
& Hill, 1965; Monat, Averill & Lazarus, 1972), lowering the efficiency of cognitive functioning 
leading to constriction and errors in judgment that accompanies high emotional arousal 
(Easterbrook, 1959). This model is therefore centered around a subjects’ perceptions of three 
antecedent conditions; (1) awareness of risk if no decision is made, (2) the hope of finding a better 
alternative and (3) perceptions of the quantity of available time to choose the best alternative; their 
perception of which will dictate the decisional conflict pattern than emerges. Based on their 
perception of these factors the individual may (a) engage in a vigilant information search and solve 
the problem, (b) become hypervigilant and search for a solution in a state of panic, (c) defer the 
responsibility for the decision to others, or (d) procrastinate and escape the conflict. Decisional 
conflict, therefore, creates intrapersonal tension between what people want to do versus what they 
think they should do (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997). 
 Janis and Mann’s conflict model of decision-making has been used to study decision-
making in a range of context, from student procrastination (Beswick, Rothblum & Mann, 2011), 
to decisions surrounding safe sex (Chambers & Rew, 2006). In addition, by using the Melbourne 
Decision-making Questionnaire (a measure of an individuals’ preference to engage in vigilance, 
hypervigilance, buck-passing or avoidance: Mann et al., 1997), researchers have now been able to 
not only confirm the relevance of these four basic coping strategies in Australia, New Zealand, the 
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United States, Japan and Hong Kong (Mann et al., 1997) but researchers have also begun to 
identify individual differences that can predict which type of behavior an individual will engage 
in when experiencing decision conflict. Bouckenooghe and colleagues (2007), for example, found 
that individuals who scored highly on measures for “Need for Cognition” (i.e., defined as “the 
tendency of an individual to engage and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982 p. 116) were 
less likely to pass the buck.   
More recent naturalistic research also reflects many aspects of the conflict Janis and 
Mann’s model. Firstly, naturalistic observation of decisions that are made by police officers, 
emergency planners, and members of the Armed Forces supports that individuals experience 
conflict when presented with equally attractive (or more often unattractive) options (Alison et al., 
2015). Furthermore, and as shown in research using a simulated counter-terrorism operation, when 
decision-makers are under states of decisional and interpersonal conflict they act in a maladaptive 
manner. I expand further on the consequences of decision conflict (specifically as it relates to 
indecision) in Chapter 3.  
 
Decision Error: Outcomes vs., Processes  
 
Before going forward, it is prudent that we critically discuss the terms “errors” and 
“maladaptive” as they refer to decision-making because it is important that we de-couple errors in 
the decision-making process with errors in the outcome of a decision.  The definition forwarded at 
the start of this chapter states that a course of action is “intended to produce a satisfying state of 
affairs.” Within this definition then quality central to the very idea of a decision (Yates et al., 
2003). So, what makes one decision “better” than another? This issue is of further importance 
given that the wealth of psychological (and economic) literature that then aims to identify who is 
a “better” decision-maker or produce aids that “create” “better” decision-making. This is widely 
referred to as the “quality thesis” in that it implicitly states that there are “good decisions” and 
“bad decisions,” and that these can be assessed by the choice of action chosen. Thus, we hold that 
in most cases one decision has a higher quality than it’s competing alternative. Such outcomes, 
therefore, have an implicit “superior” quality to those within (what is viewed as) the “worse 
decision.” However, what makes a quality decision is not a unitary construct, instead it consists of 
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several distinct facets, each of which consists of a individuals own notion of success (Yates et al., 
2003, p. 15). 
Below I discuss this issue of “better” decisions (and hence, “better” decision-makers) with 
special reference to decisions made in uncertain, complex environments (such as those made in 
war). Furthermore, I propose that, often, “better” decisions are only known in hindsight, but they 
are often in no small part the result of external (uncontrollable) factors such as the behavior of an 
opposing force and (sometimes) luck. As such I advocate that a more pressing concern is to focus 
on better decision-making; as a process, rather than an outcome. In doing so I outline the work of 
others on inertia, a cognitive phenomenon of indecision which results in a failure to act. This, I 
(and they) argue, often results in far worse outcomes.  
 This view that there exist “better” decisions stems from an exclusive focus on decisions in 
economic, multi-attribute situations. For example, Consider, for a moment, a paradigm commonly 
used in traditional lab-based studies of decision-making:  
 
“A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost?”   
 
Because the sum $1.10 separates naturally into $1 and 10 cents and because 10 cents is around the 
right magnitude, people tend to answer “10 cents”. This is clearly a wrong answer (although 50% 
of Princeton students gave the wrong answer when presented with this exact conundrum; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003). This example was developed by Nobel-prize 
winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and shows the role of heuristics and biases in 
decision-making (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of this). But, importantly, in this 
case, the “wrong” decision is clear. Furthermore, in those who gave the wrong answer we can 
clearly infer that they engaged in an incorrect decision-making process; namely that they let their 
“System 1” (the brain’s fast, automatic and intuitive processor) provide the answer, rather than 
engaging in a more deliberate analysis that employed “System 2” (the slower, analytical, more 
reasoned processing center; see Kahneman, 2011). So here we have a clear wrong decision that is 
evidence of a worse underlying decision-making process.  
A more complicated type of decision is a multi-attribute decision but one within which we 
can equally attribute “error” is multi-attribute decisions. Multi-attribute decisions are a class of 
Conflict 
 16 
decision in which the outcomes have several different dimensions of value (Schmitt, 1994). To 
navigate multi-attribute problems a decision-maker must navigate preferences over a series of 
outcome variables; the best decision then is that which, across all outcome variables, has the best 
outcome vector. In mathematical terms, if the notation xi denotes the i
th attribute of a decision, then 
the total outcome vector (V) for a course of action is x1 + x2 +…. x3. Thus, for an outcome to be 
preferable, it’s vector should be greater than the alternative (V1 > V2). Choosing a car is a 
prototypical multi-attribute decision. When choosing a car, we juggle with several different 
criteria; numbers of seats, price, economy, insurance costs. The best decision here is thus the one 
that, overall, has the highest evaluation across all variables. Choosing a house is a similar decision. 
Multi-attribute decisions have several important differences to the kind of decision presented 
above. Firstly, the best choice is (to varying degrees) not absolute, and can differ between 
individuals. For example, the “utility” of a car is dictated by the needs and values of the decision-
maker; a two-seater sports car has little utility for a family of four; whereas a family sports utility 
vehicle offers redundant space for a couple with no children (nor the want for any soon). Secondly, 
vectors for a given choice can change based on time and the environment; meaning that the “ideal” 
decision is time-bound. For example, the price may be a vital attribute in a decision-makers’ 
calculus, however, if they suddenly come into a significant quantity of money that attribute will 
change. Thus, within multi-attribute decisions, the best decision is that which has the highest vector 
score at that time and in that situation.  Multi-attribute decision-making is therefore very effective 
in instances in which the decision-maker has sufficient information and the attributes with which 
they compare options are both known, and comparable (Shoffner, 2000). In these types of 
decisions an error (or worse decision) is one in which the course of action chosen reflects a lesser 
vector score than an alternative that was available to the decision-maker at that time. Yet, while 
we can still identify errors in decisions that have multiple (and subjective) factors, such approaches 
to error, clearly, do not work in complex environments.  
 The issue with such research perspectives (and this is covered in greater detail in Chapter 
2) is that as psychologists continued to study decision-making it become increasingly apparent that 
the way people made decisions “in the lab” was very different to the ways in which they made 
decisions in the real world. Hence Naturalistic Decision-making emerged (NDM) “to understand 
how people make decisions in real-world contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them” 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas, 2001, p. 332). The assumptions of NDM and the predominant 
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theories in this field are presented in detail in Chapter 2, however how NDM researchers treat 
“errors” is worthy of discussion here. Contrary to the lab studies cited above, NDM rejects the 
notion of “right” and “wrong” decisions. Instead, NDM researchers seek to understand the 
cognitive processes associated with decision-making “in the wild” (Gore, Banks, Millward, & 
Kyraikidou, 2006;). This rejection of “error” has oft been viewed as a criticism of the NDM 
perspective. As highlighted above, in traditional and behavioral decision theories (BDT), errors 
are operationalized as failures to adhere to normative models (i.e., the outcomes predicted by 
Expected Utility and Bayesian statistics; Lipshitz et al., 2001). Doherty (1993) on the other hand 
argues that naturalistic perspectives are stay “simply silent” on what constitutes an error (p. 380).  
Specifically, Doherty (a laboratory psychologist) levied three challenges to the naturalistic 
community; 1) What is an error? 2) What has naturalistic research contributed to how we 
understand of error? 3) Can naturalistic researchers detect errors without hindsight? In response to 
these challenges, Lipshitz highlighted that understanding error is one of the cornerstones of the 
naturalistic framework. Furthermore behavioral decision-making theories generally try to 
understand error as the result of faulty decision processes, NDM sees errors within their wider 
context (Lipshitz et al., 2001, p. 340). In fact, he challenged the traditional view of error, in that 
the commission of errors is not necessarily a problem and that striving for “error-free performance” 
may, in fact, be maladaptive. Instead, Lipshitz et al. argue that we need to think about the 
consequences of errors, not just the reasoning processes (p. 340).  
Using the naturalistic perspective Orasanu, Martn and Davidson (1998) sought to explain 
the role of decision processes in negative outcomes. Crucially then, and contrary to the approaches 
above, the researchers sought to explore the relationship between negative outcomes and negative 
decision-making processes; rather than view negative outcomes as a reflection of a bad decision-
making process. As argued by Orasanu “FACT: Sometimes people, even experts, make decisions 
that turn out badly. To what degree are these bad outcomes a function of inadequate decision-
making processes?” (Orasanu et al., 1998, p. 2). In a naturalistic setting, there are two issues that 
preclude the study of “errors.” The first is that, as seen above with BDT, errors are usually defined 
as a deviation from a “best” decisions. However, in naturalistic settings, the “best” decision may 
not well be defined in the same way it is in a laboratory. Secondly, there is a looser coupling of 
decisions made and outcomes. What this means is that outcomes cannot be used as an indicator of 
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decision-making quality. This is what Baruch Fischhoff and others have referred to as “hindsight 
bias;” the propensity to define errors by consequences (Fischhoff, 1975).  
In Doherty’s original criticism of the naturalistic paradigm, he called for a normative 
process for evaluating the quality of decision-making. The issue then is that, as Lipshitz argues, 
there is not a “normative” process from which deviations can be identified. Instead standards for 
identifying errors relate to errors in situation assessment, mental models, and option 
generation/evaluation. Not concurrent choice (Zsambok & Klein, 2014, p. 158). Orasanu and 
colleagues, in seeking to explain the decision-making of aviation pilots, described a decision 
process that involved two steps: situation assessment (SA) and course of action (CoA) selection 
(Orasanu et al., 1998). Situation assessment involves defining the problem (as well as an 
assessment of risk and time available to decide). Once the problem was defined, courses of action 
could be chosen based on options available. Given this then, there were two key ways a pilot could 
make an error. Firstly, they could misinterpret the situation (an SA error). SA errors include 
misdiagnosing or ignoring cues, resulting in an inaccurate picture of the problem. They could also 
under or overestimate the levels of risk or time available. In complex, dynamic events the decision-
maker can fail to update their assessment as the situation unfolds, or they gain new information. 
The second type of error is that inspire of a could correct interpretation of the situation the decision-
maker can choose an inappropriate course of action (a CoA error). Orasanu and her colleagues 
examined 37 aviation incidents in which crew behavior played caused an error (as determined by 
the National Transportation Safety Board). In examining these aviation errors Orasanu found that 
the most common error was to “continue with the original plan of action in the face of cues that 
suggested changing the course of action.” These plan-continuation errors accounted for almost 
75% of all tactical decision-making errors. What this means is that most errors stemmed from an 
inability to either 1: update SA, or 2: re-evaluate an already-selected CoA based on a new SA.  
 In exploring why these errors occurred Orasanu (in line with Gary Klein) identified three 
causes of decision error: i) lack of information; ii) lack of knowledge; and, iii) a failure to simulate 
the potential outcomes of a situation. These causes strongly aligned with the view that decision-
making is “bounded.” Bounded rationality, as proposed by Herbert Simon in 1957, is, simply, that 
the choices people make are determined by overall goals, which are then bounded by the 
knowledge that decision-maker does, and does not, have of the world. The final decision is 
therefore dictated by their ability (or inability) to obtain relevant knowledge, to calculate 
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consequences, develop courses of actions, and cope with uncertainty. Overall rationality is 
bounded because these abilities are severely limited. As Simon states, behavior in the real world 
is determined by the "inner environment" of people's minds (memory contents and processes) just 
as much as it is the "outer environment" (Simon, 2000, p. 55). In line with this recognition of the 
role of the environment in decision errors, Oranasu identified “error-inducing contexts” that played 
a role in aviation errors. Error-inducing contexts, Orasanu argues are those in  which the features 
of the environment are likely to induce error. These contexts are ambiguity (i.e., people do not 
have good enough information to diagnose, identify CoAs, anticipate consequences and 
understand risk) and goal conflict (in which organizational and social factors do not align meaning 
that the decision-maker tries to meet a goal by deviating from an optimal course of action). I 
elaborate further on what, within the environment, can create error in Chapter 3.  
Lipshitz et al. (2001, p. 339) argues that it is our treatment of errors that distinguishes NDM 
from BDT. Specifically, NDM researchers do not couple errors in the outcome as indicative of 
errors in the decision-making process. While this is not to say that errors in decision-making do 
not lead to errors in the outcome, the two are not ontologically dependent. Given this then as I 
move forward with this thesis, I will be increasingly focused on what causes deviation in the 
decision-making processes; specifically, how the decision-making process becomes derailed from 
an “optimum” decision-making process.  
 
Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, I defined, and then critically analyzed what I mean by “a decision”. I looked 
at what “hard” decisions are, and specifically what makes decisions hard. Rather than focusing 
exclusively on the idea that high-stakes outcomes dictate decision difficulty I instead focused our 
attention on the problems of the choice itself (namely, task and outcome uncertainty) as common 
features that define hard choices. In addition to this, I outlined least-worst decisions that challenge 
our common conceptions of how decisions are made. In addition, and central to least-worst 
decisions, I looked at what “good” and “bad” decisions are, orientating our perspective to focus 
on decision-making processes, rather than outcomes. In my view and, as will become a consistent 
feature of the thesis, part of what makes decisions good is that when all options look bad; “good” 
meaning least-worst or most tolerable given the circumstances. Having established then that these 
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types of decisions are poorly explained by common multi-attribute or economic theories of 
decision-making, I will not look to theories (and doctrinal perspectives) that seek to explain how 
Soldiers make decisions in high-uncertainty, time critical situations. After outlining these 
perspectives (Chapter 2) I will present a model that I feel supplements NDM approaches insofar 
as it is a phased based model built from observations with experienced practitioners (Chapter 3). I 
will then seek to apply this model to the decision-making of military personnel (Chapter 4).
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CHAPTER 2: MILITARY DECISION-MAKING: DOCTRINE, RATIONALITY 
AND FIELD BASED APPROACHES 
 
Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the 
kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of Generals. 
 
- T. E. Lawrence 
 
“The most extreme scenario was north of Konduz, Afghanistan. There was a village 
up there called Barouc and we knew the Taliban were amassing in this town and 
estimates were in the low thousands…So we sent in one of our Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) teams to get into position to get a better sense of who was in there, 
maybe call in some airstrikes on some of the perimeter elements that were isolated 
from this town to minimize the collateral damage and also just to probe to see what 
was going on in there to see if we could draw them out. So, we had essentially four 
or five guys. A couple of Americans and a few northern alliance guys driving up in 
close proximity a few kilometers away from what we thought was a couple 
thousand Taliban. Not very good odds, but they had a decent escape route and 
thought it was relatively clear. So, they go in, isolate a couple of areas that are 
confirmed Taliban, call in a couple of airstrikes; all hell breaks loose. The enemy 
pretty much determined where the airstrikes were being called in from and decided 
to attack. This team had been working a couple of fighters (planes) as they were 
probing these targets and essentially the next radio call is  
 
“Oh geez, here they come,”  
“How many?”  
“There’s a thousand to fifteen hundred, all of them coming at me”  
“How far away are they?”  
“Three kilometers”  
“What’s their speed?”  
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They are passing this information back and forth.  
 
“Okay SOLAR (the Air Support Operation Centers’ call sign) what have 
you got for me? I need something right now?”  
“We got another formation of fighters”  
“That’s not going to cut it, I need something to take out essentially a grid.”  
 
The formation of this valley as they were coming up to the post nicely funneled all 
these guys coming at him. He saw this as hitting a home run, and said “I’m going 
to stay here and set this trap, draw them up to me.” We told him we had B-52s 
available but it was going to take 20-30 minutes for them to get there. He said 
“great… what have you got in the meantime?” He got a couple more fighters and 
we did some harassment bombing. He built a bomber box, set up like a grid pattern 
to match this area in this valley, he did a very nice job of forming it. We put him in 
contact with the B-52s and they did their coordination, but as they were getting 
closer, from the tempo and the excitement in his voice, you could tell things were 
getting dicey. He said “okay I can only stay here for 10 more minutes. Oh, I’m 
taking some shots from some guys coming in from the side. I can only stay 5 more 
minutes to control this air.” Then the last transmission was essentially “I don’t 
know if I can get out of here, I think my escape route might have been cut,” so his 
last request was “if you do not hear from me, bomb the bomber box that I gave 
you.” The implication was “they got me, and you might as well bomb it anyway, 
because it is the end of the game for me.” So, at this point we get the commander, 
explain to him the situation and tell him that this guy had requested to execute this 
mission even without his final control because the mere fact that we had not talked 
to him tells us he has probably been captured or killed. This is a very tough decision 
for the commander, and it is his alone to make. So, a pretty tough three or four 
minutes. Seemed like an eternity, as the airplane is checking in with no contact from 
the ground, and the last thing you hear is kind of like ricocheting and bad stuff 
going on. So, we are all sitting there, your stomach is getting tied up in knots, the 
whole tent is silent and all eyes on three of four folks staring at the radio with the 
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commander making this decision. Finally, he said “alright, do it.” We relayed to 
the B-52s, “missions’ a go clearance given on our order, no final contact required.” 
So, the mission goes. We still don’t hear anything from the SOF team. Every minute 
that goes by we think we probably just killed our own guys. Probably ten minutes 
later we get a radio call “SOLAR, SOLAR, team XX, thank you, thank you. We 
are all fine.” And that is as close as I ever want to see it again.” 
 
The above extract comes from Call’s (2007) interviews with tactical air controllers in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. This decision epitomizes the types of choices that this thesis is interested in 
understanding. Both options are adverse; don’t call in the airstrike and leave your officers on the 
ground without any support and under attack by Taliban forces. Do call in the air strikes and you 
will likely kill your own Soldiers. The decision-making, while it involves multiple actors, comes 
down to a single binary do/don’t decision. The decision is very time-pressured (meaning you 
cannot procrastinate or buck-pass) and there is social, organizational, and personal accountability.  
In an effort to understand current psychological theories on how decisions such as this are 
made, in this chapter I explore and discuss three broad approaches to understanding military 
decision-making: (i) the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), based largely on historical 
experience and, arguably, best described as the nearest thing to a doctrine-based approach; (ii) 
rational-cognitive approaches, and the literature on heuristics and biases and the means to try and 
optimize decision-making and (iii) so-called ‘naturalistic decision-making’ approaches (NDM) – 
based largely on observations of decision-making in the field and thus perhaps best considered as 
a descriptive observation-based framework. I will show how these approaches each contain 
strengths and weaknesses, and that each weakness reveals considerable gaps in our knowledge 
about the specific nature of the impossible decisions that Soldiers face.  In brief, MDMP is labor-
intensive, extremely difficult to enact in time-critical situations and has little empirical support – 
either in terms of it being observed in real settings or in terms of its efficacy. That is, it neither 
descriptively catches what does happen, nor prescriptively catches what should happen. The 
rational-optimal approaches are somewhat naïve about what is possible in real-world decision-
making and fail to consider either expertise or the notion that calculating optimality is not always 
possible. This approach falls in failing to catch what people actually do when making decisions, 
even though it provides a useful prescriptive approach about what they should do, in the ideal. 
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Finally, the NDM approach is somewhat piecemeal in its application, and although powerful in 
helping identify how actual decisions are made, has neglected to examine concepts such as inertia, 
accountability, and the pitfalls that decision-makers are prone to falling into (and why). In Chapter 
3, I summarize the developments that have built upon each of these approaches. The SAFE-T 
model (Situation Assessment, Formulate Plan, Execute Plan, Team Learning) has the benefits of 
phased-based models (that align with what NDM has identified as a common feature of real-world 
decision-making) but is far more streamlined than the MDMP. In addition, it recognizes the very 
real ‘error spots’ within and across these phases – spots that have much in common with traditional, 
rational approaches to decision-making that have identified how and when an error occurs. 
However, before describing SAFE-T, it is important that I fully explore these three strands of 
thinking that I have drawn on to inform its genesis.  
 
The Military Decision-Making Process  
 
The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is the rational-methodological tool used 
by military personnel to solve tactical problems and make military plans. As such, it represents the 
Army’s formal methodology for making tactical decisions (Burwell, 2001).  When followed 
correctly it should “lead to the best (or at least a better) decision given the degree of uncertainty 
and complexity of the situation” (Allen & Gerras, 2009). The MDMP itself stems from the original 
Army process of “estimating the situation” (Michel, 1990): The first documented instance of this 
was Maj. Von Steuben’s “estimation of the situation” produced for General Washington regarding 
how to attack British forces at Stony Point during the Revolutionary War (Hittle, 1975). The 
process of estimating the situation became formalized in a 1910 Field Service Regulation 
prescribing that: 
 
To frame a suitable field order the commander must make an estimate of the 
situation, culminating in a decision upon a definite plan of action. He must then 
actually draft or word the orders which will carry his decision into effect. An 
estimate of the situation involves a careful consideration from the commander's 
viewpoint, of all the circumstances affecting the particular problem. In making this 
estimate he considers his mission as set forth in the orders or instructions under 
Shortland Thesis (2017)  
 25 
which he is acting, or as deduced by him from his knowledge of the situation, all 
available information of the enemy (strength, position, movements, probable 
intents, etc.), conditions affecting his own command (strength, position, supporting 
troops, etc.) and the terrain insofar as it affects the particular military situation. 
 
The MDMP today reflects generations of experienced officers’ years of adaptation since this 
original doctrinal conceptualization (Michel, 1990).  
  
The current MDMP, as detailed in ATTP 5-0.1 (2011) is an iterative planning methodology 
that seeks to integrate and streamline the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other 
partners to understand the situation and mission. It requires them, as a singular unit, to develop 
and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; 
and produce an operation plan or order for execution. (ATTP 5-0.1, 4-1). This version of the 
MDMP (as with previous versions) contains seven steps, each of which begins with certain inputs 
and results in certain outputs. As such, the MDMP is a linear process in which each step is 
sequential, building on the previous steps. The first step in the MDMP is the receipt of the mission, 
after which the staff prepares for mission analysis and conducts a quick initial assessment that 
determines (1) the time available from receipt to mission execution (2) the time needed to plan, 
prepare and execute the mission, (3) the intelligence preparation, (4) staff estimates available to 
assist planning, (5) staff experience, cohesiveness and level of rest and stress (ATTP 5-0, 4-19 – 4 
- 20). The second step is mission analysis. Mission analysis allows the commander to, “gather, 
analyze, and synthesize information to orient themselves on the current conditions of the 
operational environment” (ATTP 5-0, 4-25). As such, mission analysis involves the commander 
and staff working to better understand the situation and the problem, identify what must be 
accomplished, when and where it must be accomplished, and why it needs to be accomplished 
(ATTP 5-0, 4-25). A key process within mission analysis is forming an initial Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The IPB is a systematic and dynamic analysis of a 
geographically defined threat and operational environment. Mission analysis, as a process, 
encompasses 19 discrete steps (see ATTP 5-0, 4-31). These sub-steps within mission analysis 
involve analyzing the higher headquarters actions, determining constraints, identifying critical 
facts and assumptions, conducting risk assessment, developing the initial commander’s intent and 
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reviewing facts and assumptions. Course of Action (CoA) analysis follows mission analysis. A 
CoA is a “broad potential solution to an identified problem” (ATTP 5-0, 4-79). Within CoA 
development, each possible CoA must meet a series of criteria.  They must be suitable to 
accomplish the mission and comply with the commander’s guidance, feasible in that the unit must 
have the time and resources to accomplish the mission, acceptable in that the CoA must justify the 
costs (including potential civilian harm) and resources available, distinguishable in that each CoA 
significantly differs from each other, and complete in that the CoA must represent a complete 
mission plan. CoA development itself is an eight-stage process that involves analyzing combat 
power, generating options, arraying forces, developing schemes for maneuver, assigning 
headquarters and preparing CoA statements, conducting CoA briefings and then selecting or 
modifying CoAs for continued analysis (see also FM 101-5, 5-11).  
After a series of CoAs have been developed they are analyzed via wargaming. Wargaming 
is the examination of a battle plan in an artificial environment and identifying the likely reactions, 
impacts, responses, costs, and benefits of a plan (Pech & Slade, 2004). Wargaming follows a 
formalized 8-step process that involves several steps: gathering tools; listing friendly forces; listing 
assumptions; listing critical decision points and events; determining evaluation criteria; selecting 
the wargame method, and how to record and display results. The wargame itself follows an action-
reaction-counteraction cycle until a critical event is completed, or the commander determines that 
the CoA is incapable of achieving the mission (FM 101-5, 5-22). General “rules” for wargaming 
include having participants remain objective and not allowing a sense of “what the commander 
wants” to influence evaluations, as well as avoiding developing premature conclusions and then 
gathering facts to support such conclusions (i.e., cognitively “closing” on a CoA and ignoring other 
options; see Kruglanski, 1989, 1990). After all identified CoAs have been wargamed, the CoAs 
are compared by each staff officer analyzing and evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of 
each CoA.  
 Acknowledging that military operations are often conducted in time-sensitive situations 
and that operations may “outrun” an initial plan, both the Field Manual 101-5 and ATTP 5-0.1 
offer guidelines for conducting a time-restricted MDMP. In military planning, “time” is both 
nonrenewable and the most critical resource, and the MDMP is abbreviated whenever there is 
insufficient time for the thorough and comprehensive application of the full MDMP process. That 
said, within time-restricted planning, the process itself is not altered. As the Field Manual states, 
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there is only one process, and omitting steps is not the solution (FM 101-5, 5-27). There are four 
primary time-saving techniques when employing the MDMP in time-sensitive environments. The 
first is to increase the involvement of the commanding officer allowing them to make hands-on 
decisions during the process rather than being briefed (and then providing feedback) on the results 
of the process. The second technique is for the commander to be more direct in the guidance 
provided, limiting the number of options that can be generated. The third technique is to “cap” the 
number of CoAs that can be developed (minimizing the amount of wargaming, evaluations, and 
comparisons). Finally, parallel planning can be used. This abbreviated version of the MDMP 
maximizes the available use of time while also facilitating adaptability in the face of a rapidly 
changing situation (FM 101-5, 5- 28).  
 
Practical and Theoretical Issues with the MDMP  
 
 The military has adhered to a model of decision-making (both doctrinally and in training) 
that is both rational and linear (Allen, Coates, & Woods, 2012). Crucially, it is based on experience 
and expertise and is thus informed by many generations of experienced commanders. As such it is 
in line with approaches that celebrate and recognize that decision-making is phase based, 
experience-led and uses previous patterns to deal with new situations. Further, the MDMP 
recognizes the value of scenario-based learning and the use of alternatives to test assumptions. 
There is no question then as to its strengths. However, there are several pragmatic concerns with 
the MDMP. Firstly, it is very time-intensive (see Matthews, 2013, p. 55). Specifically, it is not 
uncommon for commanders to invest most of their time in CoA development (Antal, 1998), as 
such, once a CoA has been recommended and approved there remains little time to develop a full 
plan that includes contingencies and follow-on actions (Shoffner, 2000). Furthermore, in time-
sensitive situations the systematic MDMP process can demand more time than is afforded by the 
situation (Fallesen, 1993). Second, the MDMP thus rests on the assumption that the commander 
has good information, fully understands the battlespace, and has time to prepare, evaluate, and 
execute the best CoA (Matthews, 2013, p. 55). Third, contrary to multi-attribute decisions the 
target in military decisions is both adaptive and potentially unpredictable. An unpredictable enemy 
thus increases the likelihood that assumptions made in the MDMP will be false and increases the 
likelihood “unknowns” will be encountered in the mission execution. Dealing with an 
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unpredictable, adaptable opposition, along with the latent uncertainty inherent in military 
operations increases the “noise” introduced into the MDMP, increasing the likelihood that an 
outcome will be poorly matched to the real operating environment. This is especially pertinent 
when the outcome of the MDMP is a single CoA that is optimized to work against the most likely 
enemy CoA (FM 101-5, see also Shoffner, 2000).  
  
Traditional Decision-Making 
 
 Practitioners of war and not cognitive scientists developed the MDMP (Matthews, 2013), 
as such there are questions regarding the degree to which MDMP doctrine reflects the decision-
making strategies employed by members of the military when operating on deployment. From a 
theoretical standpoint, the MDMP is closely aligned with the “rational comprehensive” model of 
decision-making, in that it focuses on identifying alternatives and comparing them to a prescribed 
set of criteria (this is also referred to as “economic rationality,” Simmons 1997). The MDMP is 
thus rooted in views that decision-making is algorithmic and idealized, in that they assume 
decision-making processes occur in perfect situations with significant time resources. It, therefore, 
shares several commonalities with what psychologists refer to as “traditional” or “classic” models 
of decision-making.  “Traditional” theories of decision-making have been under development for 
over three hundred years and have their roots in economics, philosophy, and mathematics (see 
Doyle & Thomason, 1999). The traditional approach is therefore analytical (contrasted with 
intuitive), in that it assumes decisions are made through a process of logical (i.e., unbiased) 
probabilistic analysis. This approach has been characterized by several main concepts; (Funder, 
1987; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999); 
 
1. There is a choice between multiple available alternatives. 
2. Decisions are the result of a deliberate analytical process that involves a comprehensive 
search for information that culminates in optimal performance.  
3. Models can be developed and tested quantitatively that will predict decision-making. 
 
The issue, however, is that by the late 1960s psychologists had amassed a considerable 
body of evidence that documented numerous decision-making anomalies that derived from faulty 
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(and non-rational) reasoning (e.g., see Goldstein & Hoggarth, 1997). From this it was clear; people 
are not skilled ‘probability estimators’ who derive their judgments, in a systematic way, from 
mathematical calculations (as argued above). It was in the face of this realization that Tversky and 
Kahneman’s (1973) studies made such an impact on the field of decision research. As they found, 
“our studies show that utility theory, under the standard interpretation, is grossly inadequate as a 
descriptive model of individual choice behavior” (Tversky, 1975, p.164). Instead, “people rely on 
a limited number of heuristic principles, which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite 
useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” (Tversky, 1975, p. 164)  
 
Heuristics and Biases  
 
Tversky and Kahneman found that we often use “heuristics” or mental shortcuts to inform 
our judgments. As Golstein and Gigerenzer (2002, p. 75) argue, heuristics are substitutes for 
computations that are otherwise too demanding for the mind to carry out. As Kelley argues, the 
assumption is that the “naïve psychologist” in the street uses an equally “naïve” method of science 
which is, logically, a poor replica of the scientific one; incomplete and subject to bias, but which 
can proceed on incomplete information unlike the scientific method (Kelley, 1973, p. 109). It 
follows that when people make estimations of probability, they are not aware of the underlying 
heuristics that may govern these judgments, they cannot control the use of heuristics, and, if taught 
about their existence, they can learn to make appropriate corrections. In their 1973 paper, Tversky 
and Kahneman identified several underlying heuristics that affect judgments; while many others 
now exist, these three are still viewed as playing a central role in probabilistic decision-making. 
Specifically, these heuristics can be roughly grouped into (i) assessments of representativeness or 
similarity, (ii) going with the answer that is most easily accessed (availability heuristic) and (iii) 
anchoring and adjusting. Below I unpack each of these in turn. 
The representative heuristic is often evoked when we try to figure out whether an object 
belongs to a “class” (i.e., superordinate category) of objects. An oft-used example has us 
considering the following individual: Mr. X. is described as "meticulous, introverted, meek, and 
solemn." People are then asked to evaluate the likelihood that Mr. X is a farmer, librarian, pilot, 
or salesman. Because, Mr. X appears “similar” to (that is, has traits representative of) a librarian, 
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people often say he is most likely to be a librarian. This judgment, however, ignores the general 
base rates of these occupations, (i.e., there are a lot more farmers than librarians). Tversky and 
Kahneman found that people generally ignore base rates and sample sizes, focusing instead on the 
degree to which the individual is “representative” (i.e., stereotypical) of a given group. Tversky 
and Kahneman also identified the “availability heuristic” whereby we assess the frequency of a 
class (or probability of an event) by the ease with which we are able to remember a instance of 
that event (p. 19). The third of the heuristics originally identified by Tversky and Kahneman is 
anchoring. Anchoring describes how our final judgments depending upon an initial value, rather 
than an objective estimation (this is also a common tactic in business and salary negotiations). 
Hence, what Tversky and Kahneman’s research introduced was the idea that, although individuals 
should adhere to the normative logic, they do not. Instead they make systematic, and predictable 
errors deriving from the use of cognitive shortcuts and biases.  
  
Naturalistic Decision-Making  
 
As argued by Gary Klein (2008) “by 1989, it was fairly clear how people didn't make 
decisions”; Decision-makers didn't “generate alternative options and compare them on the same 
set of evaluation dimensions. They did not generate probability and utility estimates for different 
courses of action and elaborate these into decision trees. Even when they did compare options, 
they “rarely employed systematic evaluation techniques” (see Klein, 2008, p. 456). In response to 
this, Naturalistic Decision-making (NDM) emerged as a distinct sub-discipline within decision-
making and now has made 30 years’ worth of contributions to the field. NDM models have been 
empirically shown to match what decision-makers do in dynamic and uncertain high-stakes 
situations (Cannon-Bowers & Bell, 1997; Pascual & Henderson, 1997), and NDM perspectives 
have been confirmed as relevant to decision-making in a range of organizational contexts including 
aviation, sport, business, engineering and the military (more in Chapter 3; see Gore, Flin, Stanton 
& Wong, 2015). NDM models have become attractive to academics and practitioners seeking to 
explain decision-making in time-pressured and uncertain situations due to emphases on intuition 
and expertise. 
NDM seeks to describe how people make decisions in the real-world. An NDM researcher 
might conduct field research to discover the strategies people use when making tough decisions 
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with limited time, high uncertainty, high-stakes and unstable conditions, rather than beginning 
with a rational actor model in mind. As Lipshitz discusses in his seminal history of NDM; to fulfill 
this “mission” NDM focuses on five characteristics: proficient decision-makers, process 
orientation, situation-action matching decision rules, context-bound informal modeling, and 
empirical-based prescription. The characteristic that arguably receives the most attention is the 
role of proficiency. The ‘proficient decision-maker’ recognizes the role of prior experience in the 
decision-making process. As Zsambok (1997, p. 4) states NDM is the way people use their 
experience to make decisions. As such, the decision-maker is not a passive evaluator of 
information but uses prior experience to sort incoming details and to direct the search for new 
information.  
Although there are many different NDM models (see Lipshitz, 1993 for an outline of 
numerous examples), Recognition-Primed Decision-making (RPD; see Klein, 1993; 1998) is 
viewed as the “prototypical” NDM model (Lipshitz et al., 2001). RPD developed serendipitously 
to explain research on how fire commanders made decisions under time pressure and high 
uncertainty (see Klein, Calderwood & Macgregor, 1989).  Klein and colleagues figured that time 
constraints would cause commanders to generate a small number of alternatives, falling back 
between a favored option and an alternative, rather than engaging in the full comparison and 
analysis of all available courses of action. The reality was even starker: the commanders often 
carried out the first course of action they identified. RPD, therefore, emerged as a model to answer 
two questions: How could commanders rely on the first option they developed? and how could 
they evaluate this option without considering any alternatives? The key insight of RPD, developing 
from the idea that a decision-maker sizes up a situation and responds with the first course of action 
generated is that the more “expertise” an individual has the more feasible that first option will be 
(Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood & Zsambok, 1993). Regarding the evaluation of any course of 
action, the decision-maker engages in mental simulation to assess its chances of success. In 
situations of high uncertainty, the decision-maker will engage in “story-building” to mentally 
simulate what could happen (see Pennington & Hastie, 1993; Klein & Crandall, 1995). This model 
is termed recognition-primed to imply that decision-makers with significant prior knowledge in 
the area are more likely to recognize parallels between current and previous situations, and 
therefore to build better mental simulations of what might happen in the present situation. This 
cognitive approach mirrors that of chess masters; rather than laboriously planning many moves 
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ahead, they rely on their greater experience with board positions to make relatively accurate 
predictions about the strength of the moves available to them. Novices, on the other hand, will tend 
to try to consciously play out several moves ahead from a candidate move, wasting precious 
cognitive resources, and likely arriving at a worse CoA. To date, this strategy of RPD has been 
identified in naval officers, medics, tank platoon leaders and aviation pilots (see Klein, 1998; 
Klein, 2013 for reviews) in fact RPD has been integrated into the MDMP to find ways to increase 
reliance on intuition and expertise in military decision-making, as well as to speed up the overall 
military decision-making process in time-sensitive situations. This hybrid RPD-MDMP model is 
outlined below.  
 
Recognition Planning Model of Military Decision-Making  
 
 In 1999, John Schmitt and Gary Klein published the results of their naturalistic study of 
military decision-making. Their presupposition (which I agree with and highlighted earlier) was 
that while the Army, Marines, and Navy have developed formal planning models to assist with the 
planning of military operations these models are inconsistent with the actual strategies used by 
decision-makers, and they actually slow down the decision-making process (p. 1). Instead, Schmitt 
and Klein argue that these formal models are actually ignored to speed up decision-making. 
Schmitt and Klein, therefore, proposed a new model for military operations planning, the 
Recognition Planning Model (RPM). The RPM they argued is consistent with both military 
planning methods (MDMP) and what we know about human decision-making processes in time-
pressured uncertain environments (RPD; Klein, 1998; Schmitt, 1994; Schmitt & Klein, 1996, 
1999a, 1999b). The RPM is both descriptive (in that it is the process that Schmitt and Klein 
observed planners gravitating towards) and prescriptive in that it provides a routine which could 
be followed to increase the pace of the planning process (Schmitt & Klein, 1999b).  
The first goal of the RPM was to streamline the planning process. “Tempo” is the speed of 
military action and along with surprise, concentration, and audacity is a fundamental concept of 
maintaining the initiative in war (FM 5-71-2). The importance of operational “tempo” cannot be 
underestimated. The Joint Vision 2020, which outlined the U.S. vision for future capability and 
warfare, specifically states that “faster operations tempos” are the desired capability that will 
“serve as a catalyst for changes in doctrine, organization, and training.” (p. 75).  As I mentioned 
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above the MDMP can often “overrun”, decreasing operational tempo and opportunities to maintain 
(or seize) initiative. Given this, RPM was specifically designed to be compatible with time-
constrained planning situations. Secondly, RPM seeks to ensure that the commander (the most 
experienced person in the planning unit) is as involved as possible, rather than a more passive role 
of approving/disapproving options generated and presented by subordinates. Additionally, RPM 
does not prescribe a linear planning process. Planning, while often sequential, is also dynamic in 
that activities overlap (especially in large plans) and can move between phases based on feedback. 
Finally, in line with what Klein observed in firefighters, the RPM seeks making “a tentative 
decision” early in the process (rather than as an emergent outcome of the process). This will allow 
stages of rehearsal, order dissemination etc., to be planned prior to final approval, increasing time 
for the implementation stage of the operation. Based on these goals -- and coupled with their 
naturalistic observation of mission planning from Commander Joint Task Forces, U.S. Marine 
Expeditionary Forces and U.S. Marines Regiment Combat Operations Centers (among others; see 
Klein, 1996; Klein, Phillips, Klinger, & McCloskey 1998; Miller, Zsambok, & Klein, 1997) -- 
Schmitt and Klein proposed a four-stage model of military planning.   
As outlined by Schmitt and Klein (1999b), the first stage of the RPM is to identify the 
mission and conceptualize a CoA. Contrary to the view (and MDMP) the RPM acknowledges that 
planners simultaneously identify the mission and conceptualize rough CoAs at the same time. This 
is, in fact, beneficial for the decision-maker because conceptualizing a CoA also helps to clarify 
the mission, because planners gain a better understanding of the problem by working through 
potential solutions (p. 5). The RPM also puts far less weight on identifying and comparing CoAs 
based on the findings (as outlined above) that decision-makers do not compare multiple courses of 
action in parallel, but instead accept and reject courses of action in sequence until they find one 
they think will work (a la RPD). As Schmitt and Klein (1999b) argue creating multiple CoAs is 
artificial and doesn’t improve the quality of a plan (p. 7). The outcome of this stage of the RPM is 
to “identify” a decision – namely a tentative concept of operations. This early decision is important 
because it increases operational tempo while increasing the amount of time that can be taken to 
arrange certain aspects (for example mobilizing air support). In Schmitt and Klein’s view; “a good 
concept well-executed is superior to a superior concept poorly executed” (p. 52) which is clearly 
a nod to George S. Patton’s adage that “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect 
plan executed next week.”  
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The second stage of the RPM is to analyze and operationalize a CoA. Planners cannot 
conceptualize a reasonable CoA without knowing if it is feasible or how it will be executed. This 
is, therefore, the point at which a CoA meets reality, and doing so early is critical. For example, if 
a central requirement of a CoA is support from allied forces then it is better to check they are 
willing and able as soon as possible. After it has been confirmed that a CoA is indeed “feasible”, 
it is wargamed (like the MDMP). Klein and Crandall (1995), along with many others (such as 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Klein, 1993), argue that mentally simulating the outcomes of an 
action is vital for effective decision-making. While the traditional MDMP involved wargaming all 
possible CoA (as a part of the evaluation of feasibility) the RPM envisions wargaming a single 
CoA against several enemy CoAs. What this means is that more time can be invested in 
anticipating how to deal with the consequences of a CoA, rather than just the implementation of a 
CoA. This focus on predicting the enemy’s reaction to a CoA is especially important given that, 
as argued by military strategist Helmuth von Moltke, “You will usually find that the enemy has 
three courses open to him, and of these, he will adopt the fourth." Finally, once the CoA has been 
wargamed, approved, and become a plan the necessary order documents are developed (although 
usually, this will have started far earlier in the process).  
In comparison to doctrinal approaches such as the MDMP, the RPM offers several 
advantages. First and foremost, while it is sequential, it is not linear, meaning that stages can 
overlap and co-occur. This means that the final stage of the RPM (order generation) has likely 
been ongoing since the end of stage one. Furthermore, the feasibility of a CoA is assessed much 
earlier, meaning that time and energy is not invested in making a decision that is not a viable 
option. The importance of this cannot be understated. Consider the following decision faced by 
General Petraeus while he was commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A; reported in Atkinson, 2005); 
 
One seemingly trivial item on Sinclair’s agenda was in fact vital: Should helicopter 
blades be taped or painted? Apache and Blackhawk rotors revolve at such high 
speeds—1,456 feet per second at the tips—that blowing grit could bore through the 
titanium spar on the leading edge of each blade. Wormlike, a grain of sand would 
then eat out the honeycombed material inside the blade, which might unbalance the 
helicopter aerodynamically and cause a crash. Traditionally, the blade edges were 
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protected with strips of black tape, which had to be reapplied after every mission 
or two. But taping was time-consuming, difficult in the desert, and required 
adhesive that wore badly in hot weather. Some aviation experts insisted a thick coat 
of black paint, reapplied to the edges after every flight, was an effective substitute. 
Rotor blades were in short supply – the 101st had only five spare Blackhawk blades, 
which cost $80,000 each. More to the point, each Apache cost $20 million, and 
each Blackhawk carried the souls of four crewmen and as many as sixteen 
passengers. The tape-versus-paint conundrum neatly illuminated the thousand 
technical challenges facing every commander. 
 
This issue had been hotly debated between the commanders for months, with some 
aviators stating “I’ll go to my grave before I put tape on.” General Petraeus 
remained torn, he had heard some good things about tape but in his gut, he 
remembered the problems tape had caused in the past. The issue, however, was 
moot. Hardly a single roll of tape for the 101st could be found in Kuwait. The 
division’s supply had been stored in an East Coast warehouse that had collapsed 
during a recent blizzard. All that discussion…. And there’s no tape. (p. 54–57) 
 
This example shows a clear strength of the RPM; The quicker you can begin to operationalize a 
CoA the quicker you can find out if it is feasible. In RPM, these tests of feasibility are done much 
sooner, increasing operational tempo and lowering the risk that resources and time will be invested 
in an unrealistic CoA.  
 
Can the RPM Replace the MDMP?  
 
The RPM has been experimented with by several military commands including the United 
States Marine Corps and the British Military (Pascual, Blendell, Molloy, Catchpole & Henderson, 
2001). In addition, Thunholm (2007), a psychologist with the Swedish Defense University, 
compared division-level planning groups within the Swedish Army that used either the doctrinal 
MDMP or the RPM, finding that RPM increased operations tempo by 20 percent. Because the 
RPM did not seek to replace the MDMP, but merely codify the decision-making process it was 
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well received, with military personnel commenting that they were “already doing this” (Ross, 
Klein, Thunholm, Scmitt & Baxter, 2004). In a further test of the RPM, Ross and colleagues tested 
the RPM during a two-week experiment at the Fort Leavenworth Battle Command Battle 
Laboratory (BCBL). Here the BCBL devoted two days to training staff on the RPM. During the 
experimental phase, there were five days devoted to testing the RPM in action. The scenarios used 
involved multiple planning loops and variations of offensive operations the staff also had to plan 
stability and support operations after the offensive action was over. The decision-making of the 
teams was observed by researchers, who took questionnaires and in-depth interviews. 
Interestingly, the results were mixed. Participants had little trouble learning and using the RPM 
(unsurprising as it is designed to reflect what they were already doing) and overall, they estimated 
that it took 30 percent less time than the MDMP. However, there were also some concerns. Some 
of the participants, for example, stated that the RPM caused them to rush through the mission 
analysis (which in RPM occurs in tandem with CoA analysis). Furthermore, despite being 
instructed to use the RPM, participants were observed to gravitate towards several MDMP tools 
(such as listing the assumptions they were making). Overall, one participant (a Colonel) cautioned 
throwing away 26 years of the MDMP because of five days with the RPM. While he felt that the 
RPM had demonstrated sufficient face validity to warrant additional research, this demonstration 
alone was not sufficient to justify replacing the MDMP (Ross et al., 2004, p. 10).  
There is one more important flaw in RPM that was raised by participants, and that is the 
degree to which the RPM helped them make decisions in novel environments. Clearly, if a 
commander lacks experience (central to the RPM) then s/he will generate lower-quality plans when 
using the RPM. This is a valid concern given that a central objective of the RPM is to let the 
commanders’ experience increasingly drive the planning process. However, this criticism is not 
unique to RPM; it also affects the MDMP. In fact, new situations are generally a significant issue 
with the RPD (or any naturalistic) approach. Let us for a minute examine the original model of 
RPD (Klein, 1998; see Figure 1.).  
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Figure 1: A Model of Recognition Primed Decision-Making (from Klein, 1998). 
 
RPD allows fast decision-making through matching patterns in the situation to previous 
instances and applying previous successful actions to this situation. The pertinent question then is 
what happens when a situation does not match a previous one? Per Klein’s RPD we engage in a 
further search for information, but extensive information searches are not always possible because 
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we lack both time and information. Consider, for example, you are facing a new situation. 
Following RPD, you evaluate the similarity of this situation with a series of past situations. If 
nothing similar comes to mind you re-evaluate. If this re-evaluation fails, according to Figure 1, 
you re-evaluate. Logically in fact, if this situation truly is unique, the decision-maker becomes 
stuck in a pattern of assessment and re-assessment. Re-evaluating the paradox of Buridan’s ass 
(outlined in from Chapter 1) perhaps the Donkey is not paralyzed by choice, but continually re-
evaluating the bales of hay in hopes of finding an analogy that suits.  
This is a critical point. I do not reject the presuppositions of RPD, nor its relevance as a 
theory to explain how people make fast and effective decisions under conditions of risk and 
uncertainty. It has been empirically proven that it is the dominant decision-making strategy in 
many fields (military, police, nursing, firefighting; see Klein, 2011). However, if you look closer 
at the types of decisions that people have made when they use RPD they are (to varying degrees) 
familiar. For example, in the military cases, RPD is often shown to be a dominant strategy the 
planners are dealing with common well-rehearsed missions. Thunholm’s research, for example, 
involved defending the troops from an enemy ambush (Thunholm, 2007). A Military operation 
“101” if you will. But, even though these types of decisions may make up most military decisions, 
this does not mean that we should not focus on how people make decisions in novel (albeit rare) 
situations. Especially, and echoing Taleb’s economic theories of “black swans” (i.e., highly 
improbable, but incredibly damaging situations such as the stock market crash of 2008; Taleb, 
2008; see also Posner, 2010)2, because these types of situations could be those that have the highest 
risk of a negative outcome.  
This is an irrefutable issue. RPD relies heavily on the experience of a leader or commander, 
specifically as it pertains to their ability to pattern match the current situation to a familiar one 
(Klein, 1997), but the diversity and complexity of the contemporary conflict environment, such as 
increased involvement in Operations Other Than War (OOTW; Taw, 2002), increases the 
likelihood that a commander (or a more junior officer) will face situations that they have no 
                                                 
2 Now it is important here that we define what we mean by “rare”. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “rare” as 
“of an event, situation, or condition not occurring very often”. In the medical field, when talking about prevalence, 
scientists have defined rare as “an estimated incidence of fewer than 1:250,000 persons.” (see Raghuveer, Garg & 
Graf, 2006 for example). Here, we adopt a view not dissimilar to that of the medial field, in that the decisions we 
define as rare are those that are unlikely to have been experienced by that individual before (and it is safe to assume 
that they, themselves, have probably made over 250,000 decisions) and is unlikely to be experienced, in the exact 
same way, by another soldier (and in most wars there are over 250,000 Soldiers operating in a theatre of conflict).  
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“analogous” experience. So, in such circumstances how do decision-makers adapt and improvise? 
And, what degree (if any) of transferability of expertise is there from one type of military domain 
to another?  
This is one of the reasons least-worst decisions are so hard to make and they fall in a gap 
that RPD cannot satisfactorily explain. Furthermore, they check all the boxes for what we would 
view as a “hard” decision precisely because they are new. As highlighted by Yates (2003), 
decisions are hard when we cannot forecast what is likely to happen; without experience of making 
a similar decision in the past, it is even harder to forecast the potential outcomes of an event. This 
is then especially hard given that, in a military environment, operations often have second- and 
third-order effects as well as larger operational and strategic consequences that can be very hard 
to see while making decisions on the ground. Another great example of this type of decision is the 
rotor-blade decision faced by General Petraeus (outlined above). Rotor blade protection may be 
prosaic and unlikely to be something that was taught in training or experienced in a previous 
deployment (perhaps if it was it would not have been such a hard decision to make). Yet what is 
important about this decision — and what makes it so hard — is that it was novel and there was 
no guiding experience to reach for, in fact even those with experience still differed in their advice 
of what to do. These are the types of decisions I concern ourselves with for the rest of this thesis.  
So, to bring these two models (RPD and MDMP) into perspective, the current Doctrine, 
while organizationally useful, attempts to force decision makers to make decisions in a way that 
is slow, unresponsive, laborious and quite opposite to the natural tendencies of cognitively limited 
humans. But the RPD is, perhaps, too much the other way, focusing on the quickest (and simplest) 
possible cognition of finding an analogy that works. This creates a critical gap in understanding 
(and support) when there is no analogy and a choice is required. It is here then, in addressing those 
situations in which analogies do not exist, and soldiers do not have the wits or time to maximize, 
that we begin to explore the psychology of choice.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I sketched out the history of decision-making. I outlined the theoretical 
perspectives both old (traditional decision-making) and new (naturalistic decision-making). 
Furthermore, I outlined the doctrinal perspectives that are currently used to train decision-makers 
Conflict 
 40 
in military environments. However, as I outlined here (and has been argued by many others, e.g., 
Klein, 1989), these idealistic rational models of decision-making (such as those forwarded by the 
MDMP) often do not reflect the decision-making processes of those in the military who, instead, 
often engage in recognition-primed models in which they focus on the workability of one course 
of action. That said, and as highlighted above, despite the prevalence of RPD in military personnel, 
it alone cannot account for many types of decisions faced by military personnel; for example, those 
decisions in which there are multiple different actors with competing goals or those situations in 
which the decision-makers have no prior experience (hence they cannot use recognition-prime as 
a tactic). Such decisions reflect a qualitatively different process of decision-making that perhaps 
require an alternate (yet equally non-economic) model of decision-making. Given this then, in the 
next chapter, I outline a model of decision-making that I feel best accounts for these types of 
decisions (specifically least-worst decisions). Taking the lessons from this chapter, I focus on 
naturalistic (rather than lab-based) theories of decision-making. But, borrowing from the strengths 
of the MDMP and RPM, I present a phase-based model. However, what this model adds is a wider 
focus on the factors (beyond “analogies”) that are at play when people make novel least-worst 
decisions. Furthermore, the model we present is specifically attuned to indecision, a common 
outcome when people are forced to choose between least-worst options (Alison et al., 2015). While 
I discussed delays in decision-making as an outcome of cognitive conflict in Chapter 1, using the 
model of decision-making presented in the next chapter I further elucidate the psychological causes 
and behavioral consequences of decisional conflict; namely decision inertia.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE SCIENCE OF SELECTING LEAST-WORST OPTIONS  
 
In a situation where the consequences of wrong decisions are so awesome, where a 
single bit of irrationality can set a whole train of traumatic events in motion, I do not think that 
we can be satisfied with the assurance that ‘most people behave rationally most of the time’ 
 
- C. E. Osgood. 
 
Military decisions are made in unique, high-stakes, high-pressure, life or death 
environments. By this uniqueness, the military environment forces theories of decision-making to 
contort well past their structural norms, laying bare the strain in their foundations. As we 
mentioned above, the two models (RPD and MDMP) that have currently been applied to military 
decisions both have their flaws, and while both have their strengths, neither is fully fit for purpose; 
Doctrinal efforts constrain natural processes and elongate decision-making, while naturalistic 
(RPD) perspectives are too linear and only work with those decisions we have faced before. 
Furthermore, and as we will elaborate upon throughout this chapter, neither considers factors 
outside the decision-itself. What we mean by this is that often the process of making (and not 
making) decisions is affected by wider environmental, organizational, and social factors that alter 
our evaluation of options. None of these influence (despite being shown elsewhere) are 
conceptualized in the models used to date.  
Given this, it is my presupposition (following on from those before me; Power, 2016; van 
den Heuvel et al., 2012, 2013; Waring, 2011) that the SAFE-T model of decision-making offers 
an innovative insight-generating platform through which the process of making military decisions 
can come into better focus. There are several, more specific benefits to applying the SAFE-T model 
to military decision-making. First, the SAFE-T model, as a phase model, not only identifies factors 
that influence the decision-making process, but also unique ways with which these factors affect 
the process of decision-making depending on the stage of decision-making at that time. Secondly, 
the SAFE-T model is principally focused on the ways in which decision-making can become 
“derailed”. As such, it not only identifies how exogenous (factors that arise from those responsible 
for managing and responding to a situation) and endogenous factors (situationally specific factors 
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such as uncertainty and time pressure) in the environment affect the decision-making process, but 
how the effect of such factors are moderated by the stage of decision-making the individual is in. 
The SAFE-T model incorporates both the effect of exogenous and endogenous factors on decision-
making. What this means is that it extends our study of decision-making of merely the nature of 
the choices on offer and the experiences and intuitions of the decision-maker but towards a view 
of the decision-maker of operating within an “ecological niche” that affects their decision-making.  
The SAFE-T model is closely aligned with the issue of “indecision” (or “doing nothing”, 
see Anderson, 2003). What the SAFE-T model adds then is that it identifies how derailment can 
occur throughout the decision-making process; namely decision avoidance (postponing any 
attempt to decide), decision inertia (being unable to decide upon a CoA) and implementation 
failure (failing to put a decided upon CoA into action).  In this chapter, I outline the SAFE-T model 
and the factors that can affect and derail the decision-making process. Furthermore, I outline, from 
a practical and theoretical standpoint, how the SAFE-T model as applied to military decision-
making earns its place by providing a series of testable hypotheses that can guide future 
experimental research on military decision-making (a long-standing criticism of the RPD 
perspective; see Vowell, 2004). Furthermore, when outlining the SAFE-T model I explore the 
psychological phenomena of failing to decide because it is in accommodating for indecision that 
the SAFE-T model can better capture the complexities of decision-making in high-consequence 
situations.  
  
The SAFE-T Model of Strategically Challenging Decisions  
 
Van den Heuvel and colleagues (2012) developed the SAFE-T model of decision-making 
from both the evaluation of strategic decision-making literature and a detailed naturalistic 
observation of decision-making in critical incidents (see Alison et al., 2013). The model was also 
generated with reference to several latent phase-based decision-making models (e.g., Lipshitz & 
Bar-Ilan 1996; Orasanu, Martin & Davidson 2001; Salas, Rosen, Burke, Goodwin & Fiore 2006; 
Thunholm, 2005). The SAFE-T model holds that four key phrases facilitate the accurate 
assessments of the situation, action, and concurrent learning. These phases are Situational 
Assessment (SA); Plan Formulation (F); Plan Execution (E) and Team Learning (T). Situational 
awareness (SA) is the process through which an individual comes to understand their environment 
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by identifying and encoding salient cues present within it. This allows them to draw an 
understanding of the environment, as well as develop expectations about what might occur (Klein 
1993). Situational awareness is a central tenet of NDM in that RPD is “essentially a matter of using 
accurate situational awareness and assessment to intuitively choose a plausible course of action” 
(Brennan 2011, p. 180). Situation awareness (SA) most simply is “knowing what is going on 
around you” (Endsley, 2000, p.3), and “sense-making” is a central part of this process. Sense-
making is a motivated effort to understand connections to anticipate future trajectories and act 
effectively (Klein, Moon & Hoffman, 2006). Sense-making involves sifting through large volumes 
of information and selecting the necessary pieces (Ben-Shalom, Klar & Benbenisty, 2012). 
Humans are guided by the cognitive edict to make sense of what is happening in their immediate 
environment. Sense-making is one of the fundamental roles of perception and cognition and when 
it fails the motivation to act can unravel, leaving the individual in a state of “limbo.” This need to 
“make sense” of our surroundings (and the negative effects of not achieving this) cannot be 
underestimated. Recently, Chater and Loewenstein (2016) argued that sense-making is a powerful 
human motive, positing “the existence of a ‘drive for sense-making’ which, I argue, is analogous 
to better known drives such as hunger, thirst and sex.” (p. 137).  Innate drives are self- and species-
preserving. They are biologically determined in that they impose “on every civilization and on all 
individuals in it the carrying out of such bodily functions as breathing, sleep, rest, nutrition, 
excretion, and reproduction” (Malinowski, 1944. p. 7.51). Innate drives are usually accompanied 
by powerful positive or negative affective states that cause individuals to approach or avoid stimuli 
and situations; being full is pleasant, whereas going hungry is not. These affective states provide 
the motivation to act. We do not need psychologists to tell us that uncertainty, the outcome of 
unsuccessful sense-making, is unpleasant (Shaw & Thomas, 2013). Hence, we can conclude that 
humans have a motivation to “makes sense” of their environment, that making sense of their 
environment is a pleasant experience, and that not making sense of their environment is an 
unpleasant experience which motivates the individual to undertake actions to remedy this (i.e., to 
gain a better sense of what is going on).  
 There are many definitions of SA, most of which are closely linked to aviation, but a 
generalist definition couches SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status 
in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, p. 82). Endsley (1995) proposed a descriptive model of the SA 
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phenomenon. Her theory of SA sought to “explain dynamic goal selection, attention to appropriate 
critical cues, expectancies regarding future states of the situation, and the tie between situation 
awareness and typical actions” (p.34). Endsley (1993) proposed that the first step of achieving SA 
is to perceive “the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment.” (p.36). 
This entails getting the best information possible on the relevant attributes of the environment. For 
example, a golfer would want to know the distance they are from the pin, the wind conditions (and 
if this will change), the shape and slope of the green. A tactical commander, on the other hand, 
needs accurate data on the location, type, number, capabilities, and dynamics of any potential 
enemy forces within a given area. The second stage of developing SA is to comprehend the 
situation. Comprehending the situation is based upon synthesizing the elements collected in Level 
1. As such, in line with Gestalt principles, Level 2 SA “goes beyond simply being aware of the 
elements that are present to include an understanding of the significance of those elements in light 
of pertinent operator goals.” (Endsley, 1995, p. 37). To unpack this, the decision-maker forms a 
holistic picture of the environment. This is the sense-making component of SA. The final level of 
SA is the “ability to project the future actions of the elements in the environment, at least in the 
very near term” (Endsley, 1993, p. 37).  Endsley’s model is viewed as the most extensive and 
highly cited model of SA (Golightly, Wilson, Lowe, & Sharples, 2010) and has immediate 
applicability when looking at the way in which members of the Armed Forces are continually 
required to encode the elements of a situation, understand their interrelation, and use this to predict 
whether they need to take (potentially life-saving) action.  
Plan Formulation (PF) describes how individuals, or teams, construct possible courses of 
action that could be taken within a situation to achieve their goal. Thus, they match their SA to a 
series of possible actions strategies (Thunholm, 2005). Plan execution (PE) then relates to the point 
at which a decision has been made and these plans are then implemented. In multi-phased 
decisions, the decision-maker also can implement a decision, learn from the outcome, and self-
correct before launching a new decision (Salas et al., 2006). In such cases, the decision-maker can 
continually reflect on and revise assessments allowing them to adapt future responses to fit the 
demands of a dynamic and volatile situation (Team learning; T).   
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Decision Inertia 
 
 Research on decision-making has increasingly turned its focus to the psychological 
phenomenon of indecision. “Decision inertia,” is one specific form of indecision in which the 
decision-maker engages in “redundant cognitive deliberation of choice for no positive gain” 
(Alison, Power, van den Heuvel, Humann, Palasinksi & Crego, 2015). Decision inertia, therefore 
occurs between the ‘option generation’ and ‘option evaluation’ stage of decision-making and 
involves an active, engaged, effort to decide (contrary to decision avoidance; the passive avoidance 
of a decision that needs to be made). Decision-makers are more likely to become inert when they 
are faced with decisions that are “least-worst,” i.e., those in which all choices offer a potential 
negative outcome and are high-risk and naturalistic research on members of the police, fire and 
ambulance services has shown that, when faced with a least-worst decision, decision-makers 
struggle to decide (Power & Alison, 2017; van den Heuvel et al., 2012).  
After conducting a Critical Interpretative Synthesis (Dixon-Woods et al., 2006) of literature 
on decision-making and indecision Power (2016) developed a taxonomy of decision inertia 
arguing that it can take three forms; decision avoidance, decision inertia, and implementation 
failure. Contrary to decision avoidance (outlined by Anderson, 2003) decision inertia is defined as 
“the redundant cognitive deliberation of choice for no positive gain” (see Alison, et al., 2015). 
Thus, what separates decision inertia (a negative outcome) from more general indecision or 
avoidance (which can be positive when it prevents hasty or reckless decisions; Janis & Mann, 
1977; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1994) is that despite the individual’s motivation to act, they struggle 
to commit to a choice (either cognitively, or behaviorally). A central facet of decision inertia, 
therefore, is that the decision-maker fails to decide within a “ideal” timeframe. With that in mind 
then, decision inertia is immediately more pertinent to decisions in time-sensitive situations (e.g., 
economic, critical incident, foreign policy, or military) than more day-to-day decisions that could 
be deferred without causing a significant loss, or causing significant harm to life. This also 
separates decision inertia from the concept of hypervigilance proposed by Janis and Mann (1977) 
because while hypervigilance involves poor decision-making due to the perception of insufficient 
time, decision inertia involves the inability to decide at all within a given timeframe. In her 
taxonomy, decision avoidance is similar to Anderson’s (2003) conceptualization (ignoring the 
decision and accepting the status quo).  
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Implementation failure, on the other hand, is distinct from both avoidance and inertia in 
that it is a behavioral manifestation of indecision. Specifically, it describes the situation in which 
an individual has committed to an action yet fails to actualize this choice (i.e., taking the necessary 
steps to implement the choice; see Power, 2016). Implementation failure therefore represents a 
psychological commitment to action (unlike inertia and avoidance) without the corresponding 
behavioral commitment. Implementation failure may be especially likely in situations in which the 
decision-maker has agonized over the choice for a long time, and there is no immediate time 
pressure. For example, autobiographies of members of extremist organizations often highlight that 
after a prolonged period of “disillusionment” with the movement they come to the decision that 
they must leave, however, for a host of social and personal reasons (e.g., fear of arrest, fear of 
retaliation, lack of social support, lack of alternatives) they are physically unable to leave (see 
Altier, Horgan & Thoroughgood 2013). The same may also be true for those who have committed 
to leaving a marriage, yet failed to take the concrete steps required to implement this choice (e.g., 
filing for divorce, see Janis and Mann 1977).  For example, and referencing the bomb paradigm 
from Chapter 1, I can decide that cutting the red wire is the best course of action, but deciding 
which wire to cut does not cut the wire. A behavior process must be engaged to complete the 
decision. As Feldman and Spratt (1998, p. i) highlight in the introduction to their text on business 
mergers and acquisitions;  
 
Five frogs are sitting on a log. Four decide to jump off. How many are left? 
Answer: five. 
Why? Because there’s a difference between deciding and doing. 
 
 In aligning Power’s taxonomy with the SAFE-T model (and they are closely aligned given 
that Power heralds from the same school of thought as those who proposed the SAFE-T model), 
there are therefore three separate stages at which decisions can become derailed (later in this 
chapter this is visually depicted in Figures 2 and 3); after SA (avoidance), after PF (inertia) and 
after PE (implementation failure). Furthermore, and as identified by the SAFE-T model, inertia 
does not occur in a vacuum, nor as just the outcome of the nature of the options available. Instead, 
the SAFE-T model holds that during critical incidents there are a host of ambient, affective, 
cognitive and organizational factors that derail a decision-makers’ ability to follow through this 
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sequential set of steps. Thus, what the SAFE-T model does so well (and what is completely ignored 
by both MDMP and RPD) is that it identifies those factors outside of the decision and the decision-
maker that can equally impact upon the decision. I outline these factors below, identifying, where 
possible, the specific relevance of these factors to the environment within which military decisions 
are made.  
 
Factors that Affect our Ability to make Strategically Challenging Decisions  
 
Within the SAFE-T model, there are a series of situational factors that impede upon the 
ability, or motivation, of the decision-maker to make effective (and prompt) choices. The SAFE-
T model identifies several ambient, affective, cognitive, and organizational factors that can stall, 
or derail, decision-making at both the situational assessment, plan formulation, and plan execution 
stage of decision-making. Each of these factors and their effect on the decision-making process 
are outlined below.  
Anticipatory regret. Anticipatory regret involves forecasting the level of regret that could 
be experienced in the future based on decisions, or actions, that could be taken in the present 
(Wong & Kwong 2007). The greater the discrepancy between the current state and the (intended) 
outcome state the greater the intensity of anticipatory regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters 2007). While a 
degree of anticipatory regret can be beneficial, preventing a decision-maker from seizing a 
seemingly attractive option without forethought of the consequences (e.g., anticipatory regret can 
have life-saving consequences for individuals contemplating suicide), anticipatory regret can cause 
the maladaptive response of indecision, in which the decision-maker is in a prolonged SA, PF or 
PE phase because of a preoccupation with negative consequences (see Janis, 1985).  Anticipatory 
regret is more likely to be experienced by the decision-maker when they are aware of the 
“opportunity costs” of choosing the most attractive option, when loses are imminent, when there 
is a degree of social commitment, when they are optimistic that a better solution could be found 
(in time) and when they are not under a significant time pressure (Janis & Mann, 1977). When 
experiencing anticipatory regret decision-makers may prefer lower risk (yet strategically or 
tactically less effective) options (“better safe than sorry”) or more risky options (“better risky than 
regretful,” see Inman & Zeelenberg, 1998; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; 
Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). Anticipatory regret is also closely linked 
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with decision avoidance with decision-makers selecting courses of action that maintain (as best as 
possible) the status quo, minimizing anticipated regret but potentially resulting in inappropriate 
action or no action at all (Anderson, 2003).  
Outcome mutability. The likelihood that an individual will experience anticipatory regret 
is closely linked to outcome mutability. Mutability is the ability to reverse the outcome of a 
decision or event (Morris & Moore, 2000). In highly mutable events decision-makers are viewed 
as more accountable because the decision-maker is viewed to have been able to prevent it (see 
Coombs & Holladay, 2002). In decision-making mutability is strongly linked to the “lost 
opportunity” hypothesis (see Beike, Markman, & Karadogan, 2009) in that decision-makers may 
avoid launching interventions that offer a low chance of being “fixed” if the outcome was 
regrettable because doing so will lose them opportunities that could have been available to them if 
they had taken an alternate (or no) action. Thus, highly immutable situations encourage indecision 
because of anticipatory regret regarding potential opportunities that could be lost due to 
irreversible decisions. 
Accountability. Accountability is comprised of four main factors, each of which has been 
found to influence decision-making. These factors include being appraised by external audiences 
(Klehe, Anderson, & Hoefnagels, 2007); who have the power to instigate rewards or punishments 
(Baucus & Beck-Dudley, 2005); when the individual knows that any actions will be linked back 
to oneself (Postmes & Lea, 2000); and that they will be required to provide a justification or 
explanation for these actions (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, De Cremer, & Rooij, 2007). In 
decision-making, the expectation of future accountability can influence behavior (Frink & 
Klimoski 2004). When looking at the SA phase of decision-making the anticipation of future 
accountability can affect the information gathering and interpretation processes, it can also 
encourage a decision-maker to consider more (potentially useless) information without first 
discerning its relevance, increasing cognitive load (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). In the PF and PE 
phases of decision-making, accountability encourages a decision-maker to switch towards 
egocentric, defensive, justifications for formulated plans and executed actions (Gollwitzer & 
Moskowitz 1996). Specifically, in naturalistic research on decision-making of police officers 
facing a dynamic terrorist event, feelings of accountability resulted in shifting priorities away from 
saving the lives of those who could be victims of a (potential) terrorist attack to saving oneself 
(i.e., making decisions that could be defended if reviewed later and after the fact; van den Heuvel 
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et al. 2012). Like anticipated regret, accountability is also linked to inaction. Alison (2010) found 
that police officers viewed “non-decisions” (i.e., doing nothing) as less blameworthy than taking 
an action that may result in a negative outcome. Increased accountability, therefore, increases self-
preservation, and detracts attention away from the task at hand, inhibiting the ability of the 
decision-maker to discriminate between critically relevant and irrelevant information (Waring, 
Alison, Cunningham & Whitfield, 2013).  
Uncertainty. Finally, within the SAFE-T model (as with the larger literature on NDM), 
uncertainty has a clear negative impact on decision-making. The effect of uncertainty and 
ambiguity on decision-making has been studied extensively in the literature (Kahneman, Slovic & 
Tversky, 1982; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). While uncertainty has many varied definitions (see 
Argote, 1982) it can generally be viewed as a lack of precise knowledge about the likelihood of 
events (Hogarth, 1987). Thus, uncertainty is a subjective experience that results from trying to 
make decisions in situations that involve missing, complex or conflicting information (Klein, 
1998).  
In a laboratory environment, often involving simple scenarios and calculations, outcomes 
are known. I know, for example, that if I give this individual 50% of my money as a reward for 
their performance, I will keep 50%.  “Real” decisions, on the other hand diverge, because the real 
world is filled with uncertainty. As such, how we deal with uncertainty has always been prominent 
in the literature on decision-making (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; March & Olsen, 1976). 
In the traditional lab studies outlined above, gains were absolute, derived from the monetary value 
of an outcome with a known level of risk between two options. Yet in the real world, the 
differentials between options (and especially outcomes) are not so clear, and decision-makers will 
struggle to determine what has happened; what is happening; and crucially, what will happen if 
they act (or do not act).  Uncertainty has had an uncertain history: As Yates and Stone (1992, p. 1) 
argued, “if we were to read 10 different articles or books about risk, we should not be surprised to 
see risk described in 10 different ways.” A consensus definition now is “Uncertainty in the context 
of action is a sense of doubt that blocks or delays action”, Lipshitz and Strauss (1997; p. 150). As 
mentioned above understanding how decision-makers make decisions under circumstances of 
uncertainty is a central tenet of NDM and NDM researchers have identified a series of strategies 
(e.g., Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997) that are employed to reduce uncertainty during the decision-
making process. Lipshitz and Strauss, for example, proposed the R.A.W.F.S. heuristic that 
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collectively refers to the five different methods through which a decision-maker navigates 
uncertainty: (1) Reducing uncertainty (by collecting more information), (2) making Assumptions, 
(3) Weighing pros and cons of alternatives, (4) Forestalling, and (5) Suppressing anxiety (Lipshitz, 
1997; Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). These five methods are deployed preferentially in the order 
displayed above: Inadequate understanding is reduced by collecting (or attempting to collect) more 
information and using assumptions to “fill in the gaps.” If this is not viable, decision-makers 
compare courses of action to reduce uncertainty or they prepared contingencies (forestalling). 
Finally, if all else fails, decision-makers resort to suppressing anxiety. 
Within the SAFE-T model uncertainty is characterized as either endogenous (in that it is 
derived from uncertainty about the event itself; Klein 1993) or exogenous (in that it stems from 
the surrounding management and team processes; van den Heuvel, Alison & Power, 2014). 
Endogenous sources of uncertainty include ambiguous information, time pressure and risk 
(Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Endogenous uncertainty, therefore, prevents the decision-makers 
from developing SA (i.e., “what is going on”) as well as their ability to prospectively model future 
outcomes of courses of action (i.e., “what will happen if”; Klein, Pin & Snowden, 2007).  Efforts 
to decrease exogenous uncertainty can hinder effective decision-making by delaying action 
through redundant searches for information. Time pressure specifically can derail decision-making 
by reducing cognitive flexibility and decreasing the decision-makers’ ability to generate multiple 
differing courses of action (Macquet, 2009; see also Alison, Doran, Long, Power & Humphrey, 
2013). Furthermore, the perception of time pressure (rather than an actual pressure) is enough to 
derail decision-making in certain types of individuals (see Alison et al., 2013).  
 Exogenous uncertainty derives from confusion over one’s own expectations or 
expectations of another’s performance (van den Heuvel et al., 2013). Within team-based decision-
making, poor role understanding reduces confidence (Shanteau, 1997) and self-efficacy (Bandura, 
1997), both of which are important for goal setting and action planning (Olsen, Roese & Zanna, 
1996). Poor role understanding can also impede inter-personal trust within a team that can, in turn, 
affect confidence and perceptions of reliability regarding other team members’ judgment and 
advice (Budescu & Rantilla, 2000). Endogenous uncertainty can also affect team cohesion, 
reducing team members’ willingness to share (McKay, 1991) and seek information (Sniezek & 
Van Swol, 2001). Naturalistic research on police decision-making in a hostage negotiation 
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scenario found that exogenous uncertainty was more common than endogenous uncertainty and 
affected the planning and execution phases of decision-making (van den Heuvel et al., 2013). 
 
Integrating the SAFE-T Model with the MDMP  
 
The SAFE-T model shows a high degree of overlap with the current MDMP. But it differs 
on several critical components; namely the possibility for decision-making to become derailed, 
and the impact of several environmental factors such as accountability and time pressure on 
decision-making. The SAFE-T model also has a high degree of overlap with the Recognition Prime 
Model of military decision-making (see Klein et al., 2003) and with other well-known military 
decision-making models such as the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). The OODA loop 
was developed by John Boyd (1996), and involves taking in observations of the situations (i.e., 
SA), making judgments of the situation, understanding what it means, developing options (i.e., 
PF) and acting (i.e., PE).  Thus, in being informed by previous phase models from the decision-
making literature, and in being structurally similar to the MDMP (and OODA), the SAFE-T model 
has a high degree of both pragmatic utility and scientific validity.  
 
What the SAFE-T model adds above and beyond these models, however, is a series of “error traps” 
that can be encountered along the way, adding theoretical insight into the potential ways in which 
decision-making can stall during high-stakes military operations (van den Heuvel et al., 2012). 
Figure 2 shows an expanded version of the MDMP model that integrates both the derailment 
pathways highlighted by the SAFE-T model (and expanded by Power, 2016) and the cognitive, 
ambient, organizational and affective factors that can increase the likelihood that decision inertia 
will emerge. 
 Let us walk through Figure 2 to show it in-action. Let us consider that an event happens 
and a mission is received (e.g., launch a raid on a local compound). In both the MDMP and the 
SAFE-T model, the first stage of the process is mission analysis; assessing the situation and trying 
to understand what is going wrong. Now, what the SAFE-T model adds here, is that the decision 
maker may (for a variety of reasons), after assessing the situation, avoid it, and not move onto the 
next phase. If they do not avoid it, they will then move onto the next phase plan formulation.   
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Consequences 
Mission Receipt 
(commanders initial guidance) 
 
Mission Analysis 
(Problem statement, mission 
statement, assumptions ) 
CoA development (war game) 
(CoA statements and sketches, 
revised planning guidance) 
CoA comparison 
 (Evaluate CoAs, recommend 
CoAs, update assumptions) 
CoA approval 
 (Commander-selected CoA and 
any modifications, refined 
commanders intent) 
Order Production 
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F 
SA 
E 
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Figure 2: The integrated SAFE-T/MDMP model of military decision-making identifying 
derailment points and factors that can increase the emergence of decision inertia. 
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 With the SAFE-T model, plan formulation involves identifying the best course of action to 
take for a given situation. In this case, how specifically to go about the raid. It thus reflects the 
three MDMP steps of CoA development, comparison and improvement (interestingly the SAFE-
T model, unlike RPD and MDMP, does not specify if the comparison is sequential or parallel, all 
that matters is that eventually, a CoA is chosen). However here, once again, the SAFE-T model 
offers another avenue of de-railment. Let us imagine, for example, that our Soldier finds it hard to 
choose which is the best method to launch the raid. Furthermore, in agonizing over this decision 
(and the risks and benefits of each CoA), they actually do not manage to launch a mission in time 
and the target escapes (rendering the mission a failure). This, in respects to the SAFE-T model is 
decision inertia. Finally, let us imagine that they do decide on a CoA. In the MDMP those orders 
would be produced and the mission launched. However, in the SAFE-T model, while the process 
is the same, there is still one further step for potential de-railment in which the decision is made 
for a CoA, but the orders are not produced, and, hence, the mission is never launched. This is 
implementation failure.  
When looking at an integrated SAFE-T/MDMP model it is arguable that many of the 
factors highlighted by the SAFE-T model are present within the military decision-making 
environment. Firstly, military operations are conducted in a highly accountogenic environment. In 
addition, media access to military operations may be increasing feelings of accountability. While 
embed journalists within the military and technological advances such as social media are 
providing a “‘real time’ and transparent imagery of life on the front line” (Kennedy 2008, p. 285) 
members of the military are increasingly being held accountable for actions made during war in 
domestic courts. As James Gow (2013) argues, “global coverage and the rise of social media as a 
platform for documenting conflicts went hand in hand with the proliferation of international 
criminal tribunals, stirring intense debate over boundaries between right and wrong, legal and 
illegal, in contemporary warfare.”  
Furthermore, the SAFE-T model also highlights the important role of uncertainty in 
military decision-making. Experimental research supports that, in military operations, endogenous 
uncertainty can increase decision inertia. Specifically, research employing scenarios developed 
from real experiences of uncertainty during Operation Enduring Freedom found that decision-
makers with missing information took significantly more time to decide upon a course of action 
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that those who were provided with conflicting information. Furthermore, both groups with missing 
information and ambiguous information took significantly longer to decide upon a course of action 
that the baseline group (with no uncertainty). In addition, those who took a long time to assess the 
situation also took a long time to decide upon a course of action (Shattuck, Miller & Kemmerer, 
2009). This implies that endogenous uncertainty in a military context has the effect predicted by 
the SAFE-T model in that uncertainty during the SA phase caused repeated and redundant requests 
for information whereas uncertainty during the PF and PE phases led to choice deferral and the 
decision-maker adopting a “wait and see” mentality (van den Heuvel et al., 2012, p. 181).  
The SAFE-T model also posits an important destabilizing role of exogenous uncertainty, 
which, while receiving far less empirical attention, is equally prevalent in the military decision-
making environment. Specifically, in Afghanistan and Iraq there have been large-scale tactical and 
strategic adaptations of military forces and an overhaul in the type of operations that Soldiers have 
been undertaking (see Farrell, Russell & Osinga, 2013; Kahl, 2007). Soldiers deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan found themselves undertaking extensive population-centric operations that they had 
not engaged (nor been trained) in before (Nagl, 2012). This adds a degree of role and task 
uncertainty into the military decision-making process. Additionally, military operations are often 
conducted in partnership with other, multi-national units with whom individuals have varying 
degrees of previous experience with one another. Ben-Shalom’s field research with members of 
the Iraqi Defense Force (IDF) showed that many combat situations present the military equivalent 
of a “one night stand” in that they “have a finite life span, form around a shared and relatively 
clear goal or purpose, and their success depends on a tight and coordinated coupling of activity” 
(Ben-Shalom, Lehrer & Ben-Ari, 2005, p. 77).  In addition, both military operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan relied upon partnerships with indigenous forces that can often increase exogenous 
uncertainty. Bordin’s (2011) interviews with members of the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan demonstrate several sources of exogenous uncertainty within this 
partnership. Specifically, ISAF forces had low confidence in their Afghan counterparts (“the 
overall quality of the ANA cannot be intelligently described. It would benefit Afghanistan to 
disband the ANA and start over again.”), low interpersonal trust (“While on patrol.... I don't trust 
them,” “I wouldn't trust the ANA with anything, never mind my life”) and a perception of 
incompetence (“They are just about useless; genuinely stupid,” “We are interfering with Darwinian 
Theory!”). When looking at more recent experiences in Afghanistan it would also be viable to 
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propose that the increased emergence of green-on-blue attacks (also referred to as “insider 
attacks”) would also be a significant source of exogenous uncertainty, specifically during combat-
related decisions. 
 
Implications of the SAFE-T Model for Military Decision-Making  
 
The first important implication of the SAFE-T model as it pertains to the MDMP is that it 
provides a systematic way in which researchers can focus on how the decision-making process, 
rather than the outcome, falters in high-risk and often least-worst situations. In such cases, it is 
more appropriate to look at the process by which decisions are made (or not made) rather focusing 
solely on the outcome (Woods, Johannesen, Cook & Sarter, 1994).  In doing so the SAFE-T model 
can serve as an important tool for explaining erroneous decisions post hoc. The After-Action 
Review (AAR) is “a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that 
enables Soldiers to discover for themselves What happened, Why it happened and How to sustain 
strengths and improve on weaknesses” (United States Army, 1993). The decision-making behind 
large-scale operational errors (such as Operation Anaconda; see Hastert, 2005) is often scrutinized 
and the integrated SAFE-T model, therefore, affords a pragmatic, objective, analysis of the 
decision-making process that is specifically focused on identifying where, within a dynamic, 
uncertain and complex environment, decision-making became derailed.  
Furthermore, knowing the antecedents of decision inertia can also help inform decision-
making training for military officers in that it can expose decision-makers to situations in which 
decision inertia is likely to emerge. Elsewhere research has shown that inertia can often be the 
result of goal-conflict, in which the decision-maker struggles to decide between approach-
motivated goals (e.g., “save life”) and avoidance-motivated goals (e.g., “prevent further harm”; 
see Power, 2016). Knowing this can be used to inform training scenarios for military decision-
making training. Currently, the military (in line with RPD) attempts to train Soldier intuition by 
exposing Soldiers to a series of increasingly complex missions, in doing so “the learner begins to 
build his or her own library of experiences that can ultimately be tapped into when an intuitive 
decision is called for” (Matthew, 2013, p. 67). Yet as I highlighted above many decisions cannot 
be responded to with an individuals’ “library of experiences,” and in such cases, it would be 
beneficial to expose individuals to the ways in which, when facing novel situations, their decision-
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making can become derailed. Focusing on the ways in which the process of decision-making can 
become derailed also has significant training benefits in that “explicitly addressing these 
‘derailment pathways’ in training programs will forewarn [the trainees] of the potential pitfalls and 
dangers associated with these maladaptive cognitive processes.” (van den Heuvel, et al., 2012, p. 
184). Matthews (2013) states that while military experts know what to train, cognitive 
psychologists know how to train. Thus, by identifying the elements of a decision (and the decision-
making environment) that increase the likelihood that a decision-maker will struggle to choose, 
cognitive psychologists can begin to develop training scenarios (and empirically informed 
interventions) that can improve military decision-makers’ ability to deal with such situations when 
deployed. Furthermore, because individual differences are likely to moderate the effect of these 
variables (see Alison et al. 2013; Parker, be Bruin & Fischoff, 2007) the results of research in this 
area can support wider questions of force selection by identifying a series of cognitive factors (e.g., 
high fluid mental ability, or a low need for closure) possessed by individuals who can maintain 
robust decision-making strategies in the face of least-worst decisions. 
Finally, the SAFE-T model provides an experimental framework to guide future research 
in military decision-making. Todd and Girgerenzer (2000) argue that NDM perspectives avoid 
detailed theorization due to the (mistaken) belief that decision-making processes in high-stakes 
environments cannot be modeled, precluding the development of detailed hypotheses (see also 
Serfaty, MacMillan, Entin & Entin, 1997). On the contrary then, the SAFE-T model (and 
integrated SAFE-T/MDMP model) offers a series of testable hypotheses, derived from 
experimental research elsewhere as to the likely effect that certain affective, organizational, 
cognitive and ambient pressures should have on the MDMP. For example, we can hypothesize that 
time pressure will negatively affect CoA development (Alison et al., 2013) while high levels of 
uncertainty will cause choice deferral (van den Heuvel et al., 2012). Feelings of accountability will 
affect the SA phase of the MDMP because the decision-maker is unable to discriminate between 
relevant and irrelevant information (Waring et al., 2013). High levels of exogenous uncertainty 
will decrease collaboration and information sharing within teams, while also derailing decision-
making by increasing role confusion (van den Heuvel et al., 2013). Adopting the SAFE-T model 
therefore offers a series of testable hypotheses surrounding the role of exogenous and endogenous 
sources of uncertainty on decision-making and decision inertia. 
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Restrictions of the SAFE-T Model 
 
There are several restrictions in integrating SAFE-T with the MDMP that should be 
considered before I move on with this thesis. Firstly, as stated above a significant portion of the 
utility of the SAFE-T model is the identification of inertia traps, however, I am yet to prove 
empirically that members of the military become “inert.” General George S. Patton, Jr.’s military 
adage holds that “a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” 
Military organizational culture and training emphasize making prompt decisions at the cost of 
searching for a better outcome. Specifically, and with regards to the OODA loop model of 
decision-making, the basic strategy for defeating the enemy is to “get inside his OODA loop” by 
executing your OODA loop faster than they can. Thus, within military decision-making there is 
even more pressure for fast decisions as this will allow them to take and then keep the initiative in 
a battle (Dupuy, 1984).  What this means then is that members of the military, in comparison to 
other critical incident responders who face (arguably) similar types of decisions (e.g., police 
officers and members of the fire service) may be less likely to suffer decision avoidance, decision 
inertia or implementation failure, opting instead to execute any plan now. That said, while this 
may decrease the utility of the SAFE-T model for military decision-making, it does not decrease 
the warrant for further exploration in this area. Given that decision inertia has been seen in these 
other domains its absence (relative, or absolute) in military operations would provide an important 
comparison point. Identifying what (if anything) allows members of the military to be resilient to 
decision inertia may then inform future interventions (e.g., training) across other critical incident 
responders. For future research then the first step is to apply methods from NDM (specifically 
critical incident decision tasks; see Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006) to members of the Armed 
Forces to collect narrative accounts of military decision-making in the field to examine the 
situations in which they navigate goal conflict and least-worst decisions to see if inertia emerged 
(for early stages of work in this area see Shortland & Alison, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In war (and in many high-stakes situations) decision-makers often face new and novel 
situations in which they have little prior experience, and the outcome of any decision has the 
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potential to be high-risk and adverse. While I do not disagree with the utility of RPD as a decision-
making strategy to make fast, effective, decisions in military (namely tactical) environments, RPD 
(and more rational models such as that purported in the MDMP) alone are insufficient to explain, 
from a naturalistic standpoint, the ways in which members of the military can navigate these 
complex least-worst situations. Specifically, neither RPD nor the MDMP account for the way in 
which decisions are influenced by a series of ambient, organizational, and environmental factors 
such as accountability, uncertainty, and anticipatory regret that elsewhere have been seen to affect 
decision making. As such, and to spur the theoretical direction of this thesis, in this chapter I 
proposed the utility of incorporating the SAFE-T model of strategic decision-making to the field, 
especially as a theoretical framework to understand situations in which critical time-sensitive 
decisions are stalled or avoided. In support of this effort in this chapter I identified both the 
pragmatic and scientific validity of the model (in that it demonstrates clear overlap with the current 
MDMP and other phase-based models of decision-making). I also showed the theoretical, 
empirical and pragmatic benefits of applying (if confirmed through further scientific study in this 
area) aspects of the SAFE-T model into military training. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
we highlighted the importance of decision inertia as the result of a dynamic, cognitive, social and 
organizational process (Alison et al., 2015). Military culture places a premium on timely, effective 
decision-making. In the military, then (even more than other critical incident environments such 
as the police and fire), inertia within the decision-making process can have significant negative 
consequences, emphasizing the importance of both theoretical and empirical efforts that identify 
the manifestations and antecedent factors of indecision in the military decision-making process. In 
the next chapter, I test the utility of the SAFE-T model as a knowledge gathering framework to 
examine military decision-making.  
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CHAPTER 4: MILITARY DECISION-MAKING ON DEPLOYMENT  
 
‘Oops?’ What the fuck do you mean ‘Oops?’ 
 
- Unidentified camera operator to a Predator Drone pilot before takeoff, July 24, 2012. 
  
It is viable to propose that military operations are perhaps one of the most time-pressured 
and uncertain environments within which a decision can be made. However, there currently exists 
little research that specifically centers on the cognitive processes that underpin the decision-
making of military personnel when they are on deployment. While the observation of decision-
making during training scenarios offers many benefits (including increased experimental control, 
the ability to isolate and manipulate situational variables etc., for a discussion of this see Alison, 
van den Heuvel, Waring, Power, Long et al., 2012) such methods are, arguably, limited in the 
degrees to which they can effectively re-create the actual environment within which such decisions 
are made. Furthermore, while there are studies that examine Soldiers under conditions of 
physiological load, such studies often focus instead on the physiological reactions to such 
conditions, rather than decision-making strategies that are employed (e.g., Kobus, Brown, Wu, 
Robusto & Bartlett, 2011; Mahoney, Hirsch, Hasselquist, Lesher & Lieberman, 2007). Other 
research that has examined Soldiers’ performance during high-stress SERE (Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance and Escape training) often focusses on the physiological changes that are caused by 
exposure to severe stress rather than their performance and decision-making within such situations 
(e.g., Taylor et al., 2008). Even the notable exception of Larson (2001) is flawed, because while 
he did investigate decision-making in stressed, deprived military students, this was merely an 
inhibitory shoot/don’t shoot decision. It was, in this sense, a test of behavioral inhibition under 
conditions of extreme deprivation rather than a test of decision-making. Thus, when commenting 
on the process through by which military decisions are made there is a dearth of research that not 
only uses the practitioners themselves but more importantly examines real decisions made by these 
individuals in wartime conditions.  
Given this, and to test the theoretical claims made in Chapter 3, in this chapter I used the 
Critical Decision Method technique (CDM; Klein et al., 1993) to capture data on the decision-
making strategies used by Soldiers who have faced least-worst decisions on deployed service. 
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CDM is a knowledge-building tool for generating theories and data on the process of making 
complex decisions in conditions, such as the military, that are defined as in extremis (that is they 
“at the point of death,” Kolditz, 2006, p. 655). Specifically, this chapter seeks to explore, from the 
perspectives of the Soldiers’ themselves, the cognitive underpinnings of the decisions they made 
at war. However, I am not interested in just any decision. I specifically seek to explore the cognitive 
underpinnings of what I (and others; Alison et al., 2015) call “least-worst” decisions; those damned 
if you do, damned if you don’t, high-risk, rare, “black-swan” decisions that many Soldiers face, 
yet few are ever trained to deal with. It is these decisions, as argued in Chapter 2, that fall in the 
gaps left between rational doctrinal decision strategies and more common RPD strategies. 
Furthermore, in line with the SAFE-T model outlined in Chapter 3, I seek to understand how, 
under conditions of high-risk, time pressure and uncertainty, Soldiers to navigate least-worst 
decisions without being paralyzed, or derailed by decision inertia. In doing so I hope that this 
chapter provides an important addition to the extensive body of research that has applied NDM 
(specifically RPD; e.g., Klein, 1998, 2005; Thunholm, 2005) methods to understand how, with 
high time pressure and uncertainty, Soldiers can make fast, effective decisions. 
 
Method 
Participants  
 
 13 current, or veteran, members of the United States Armed Forces (Marine, Army, Navy, 
Air Force; however, there were no participants from the Coast Guard) were interviewed for the 
first part of this study. All participants had served on deployed duty in Afghanistan or Iraq since 
2001 (many had also served in other foreign theaters). Participants were opportunistically sampled 
and were not restricted by rank, or length of service. As such, participants included members of 
the Armed Forces who served in tactical level positions for a short time (or as a reservist) before 
leaving the military as well as those who had long careers in the Armed Forces and served in high-
ranking command positions at the time.  
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Critical Decision Method  
 
Collecting data during “live” cases of decision-making in high-stakes situations has clear 
methodological constraints. As such a powerful qualitative research method is to probe actual 
events post hoc. CDM interviews are a form of Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) method that seeks 
to understand decision-making in a specific, often unique, incident that a practitioner faced in the 
real-world. CDM therefore provides a method of collecting, in retrospect, insight into 
practitioners’ decision-making processes. The CDM helps practitioners “tell stories”; it is a single 
incident-centric method and requires the participant to select and recall a single (ideally rare) 
incident in detail. In doing so, it allows researchers to gather information on the incident, the 
incidents’ background, and the individuals’ cognitive functions during the event (such as planning 
and sense making). It also allows researchers to identify critical decision-points. CDM, therefore, 
develops rich and detailed data on the cognitive processes used by experts when responding to 
challenging events (Crandall, et al., 2006). One of the distinct advantages of CDM then is that 
decisions are explored post hoc, rather than in situ, meaning that detailed data can be collected 
without putting the researcher (or more importantly the participant) in harms’ way. In fact, the 
CDM was developed in part due to issues collecting data on the decision-making of firefighters 
while “in action” (see Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006). CDM has several benefits; it gives 
indications of the cues and patterns that experts perceive; “rules of thumb” they have devised; the 
kinds of decisions they are required to make; as well as features of tricky, typical and rare decisions 
(Crandall et al., 2006).  
CDM involves an extensive (over 2 hour) interview and has previously been used to elicit 
data points for decision-making in nurses (Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993), ambulance 
dispatchers (Wong & Blandford, 2002) intelligence analysts (Hutchins, Pirolli & Card, 2004), 
pilots (Plant & Stanton, 2013), diagnosticians (Islam, Weir, Jones, Del Fiol & Samore, 2015), 
ophthalmic surgeons (Pauley, Flin & Azuara-Blanco, 2013) and military command and control 
(Pascual & Henderson, 1997). CDM interviews involve four “sweeps,” each sweep uses different 
types of probes and perspectives to facilitate the quality of recall (Crandall et al., 2006). The first 
sweep results in the selection of an incident that matches the requirements of the research and the 
goals for data collection. Usually, CDM focuses on non-routine decisions and challenging events 
because these have the greatest potential for uncovering aspects of a given cognitive phenomena. 
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This is also important to ensure that the interview catches cognitive processes beyond procedural 
and routine knowledge, allowing insight into the characteristics of skilled and expert performance 
(Crandall et al., 2006). Once a candidate event has been identified the interviewee is asked to recall 
the event from start to finish. The second sweep involves the participant developing a visual (or 
verbal) timeline of the event. In developing a timeline participants are encouraged to highlight 
“critical points” during which the decision-maker experienced a major shift in their understanding 
of an event, or an action was taken that changed the event (Crandall et al., 2006). During the second 
sweep inconsistencies, gaps, and missing elements are also identified, allowing the interviewer 
and interviewee to arrive at a shared view of the facts.  The third sweep involves “deepening”, 
within which the interviewer uses a series of cues to investigate the practitioners’ cognitive 
experience of the event (i.e., their expectations, mental models, assessment, and experience). The 
third sweep goes beyond the timeline to seek out the participant’s perceptions, expectations, goals, 
and uncertainties during the incident. During this sweep, the interviewer uses probes for additional 
information and elaboration from the participant. The final sweep of the CDM involves 
questioning the “what if’s” of an event. In this sweep a series of probes aimed at identifying 
hypothetical factors (within the environment, or the decision-maker) that would have resulted in a 
different outcome or experience (see Crandall et al., 2006, p. 69-83).  
Our CDM interviews started with this statement: 
 
“I am going to be asking you in a moment to spend some time thinking about a 
decision that you had to make, while in the Armed Forces, in which you had to 
choose between one or more options and in which you spent a lot of time thinking 
about all the possible outcomes.” 
 
After the participant felt they had identified a situation that met these requirements, we proceeded 
with the four sweeps of the CDM. First, the participant outlined the event to ensure that it met the 
requirement of the study. After this, the participant was asked to provide a timeline (auditory, or 
visual through drawings) of the event identifying key decision points, key actors, key events, and 
outcomes. Next, the “deepening” began in which (using a semi-structured interview technique) I  
used a series of probes to further delve into the decision-making of the participant. The probes 
used in this part of the interview are outlined in Table 4. Where possible, all probes were used for 
Shortland Thesis (2017)  
 63 
each participant, however, in some cases the probe was irrelevant and hence, not asked. Finally, 
after deepening probes were exhausted, participants were asked a series of “What if” questions to 
explore what aspects of the situation, if changed, would have changed their decision-making. 
These “what if” probes were unique to each interview, but generally centered around identifying 
which aspects of the decision-making environment, if changed, would have altered their decisions. 
It was, in this sense, a test of threshold and commitment to a course of action, as well as a useful 
framework for identifying central aspects of factors that played an especially important role in 
their decision calculus. For a full outline of the recruitment and interview method please see 
Appendix A – F.  
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Topic  Cues  
Information  What were you hearing/thinking/noticing during this situation? 
What information did you use in making a decision or judgment? 
How and where did you get this information, and from whom? 
What did you do with this information? 
Did you discard any information that you received? 
Analogs Did this situation remind you of any previous experiences you have 
had?  
Standard Operating Procedures  What were the parallels you drew between the situation and others? 
Did this case fit a standard scenario? 
Is this the type of event you were trained to deal with? 
Goals and Priorities  What were your specific goals and objectives at this time?  
What was the most important thing for you to accomplish at this point? 
Options What other courses of action were considered? 
What courses of action were not considered, and why?  
Was there a rule that you were following in choosing this option? 
Experience  What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in 
making this decision? 
Assessment If you were asked to describe the situation to someone else at that point, 
how would you describe it?   
Mental models  Did you imagine the possible consequences of this/these action(s)? 
Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
Did you imagine the events and how they would unfold? 
How close was your imagined outcome to the actual outcome? 
Decision-making  What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the 
incident? 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
Did you think about it for too long? 
Were you ever worried about the time it was taking to make the 
decision?  
How long did it take to actually make this decision?  
Guidance Did you seek any guidance at this (or any) point in the decision? 
How did you know to trust the guidance you got? 
Feelings How did making this decision-make you feel? 
How did you feel about potentially making the wrong choice? 
 
 
Table 4: CDM probes used to explore participants’ decision-making strategies.   
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Data Analysis  
 
CDM interviews were transcribed, anonymized and subject to thematic analysis. Thematic 
analysis is a form of content analysis. Content analysis methods present and evaluate information 
in a systematic, objective and reliable manner allowing conclusions to be drawn from data that is 
rich in detail and applied to a particular context. Thematic analysis is defined as “a method for 
identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organizes and 
describes your data set in (rich) detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). As such quantities of diverse 
data, such as that collected here, can be minimally organized yet described in rich detail (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) and common themes can emerge independently from word frequencies (Simons, 
Lathlean, & Squire, 2008, Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Here, the thematic analysis followed the step-
by-step procedure provided by Braun and Clarke (2006) and was performed using the qualitative 
analytical software nVivo (Gibbs, 2002). 
The first stage of analysis involved establishing ‘codes’ within the data. Codes identify a 
feature of the data (both semantic and latent content) that is of interest. Codes are “the most basic 
segment, or element, of the raw data or information that can be assessed in a meaningful way 
regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 63). Codes are then grouped together into 
‘themes’. To achieve this, codes were inspected for consistent informational threads (recurrent 
elements of narratives) and clustered together to form coherent themes. Inter-relation between 
themes was also considered to identify candidate themes and sub-themes. The accuracy of the 
thematic analysis was then tested by providing a sample of codes to an additional researcher, also 
trained in qualitative analysis, to provide a metric of inter-coder reliability. 
   
Results 
 
The Manifestations of Least-Worst Decisions in Conflict  
 
First and foremost, while all the decisions discussed in this research occurred on 
deployment; most the decision discussed did not involve kinetic operations (60.87%). In most 
cases, the least-worst decisions that they faced did not involve a decision to take offensive action 
against a potential target. Instead many of the least-worst decisions that were faced were logistical, 
Conflict 
 66 
and even personnel centered. To put this point in perspective, in my sample of Soldiers who had 
conducted multiple tours of duty and hundreds of in extremis kinetic operations, for many, the 
decisions that they identify as challenging were not faced “at the point of death” but instead in the 
headquarters, or basecamp. However, what all decisions in my data have in common is that they 
were least-worst meaning that, the decision-maker could not clearly identify a “good” option and 
was instead faced with multiple courses of action that could all, equally, result in an adverse 
outcome. As hypothesized throughout this thesis, my data supports that such decisions are highly 
challenging for Soldiers, and have significant moral and organizational implications. As one 
Soldier recalls; 
 
But there is the other side of me that looks at it and says, you know, that if I fired 
and wasn’t supposed to, not only would that have probably ended my career, forget 
my career, I would have had to have lived the rest of my life knowing I had killed 
that guy. I don’t know what other people’s impression of the military is - if we take 
these decisions lightly - but I certainly didn’t and I don’t think other people do 
either. And the idea that you become jaded to the point when you stop caring about 
hurting innocent people, I can’t imagine becoming that jaded about that decision, 
in fact, it still bothers me to this day, the idea that I, in a fraction of a second, I 
could have shot that guy. And if he was you know, Taliban, great, but if he wasn’t, 
you know, I can’t imagine the thoughts that would go through my head about that 
guy’s family, and things like that. So, it is a hard decision to live with. 
 
Another Soldier equally recounts the difficulties of making decisions when it is not clear which 
course of action will have a “better” outcome;  
 
You never know if it is the right decision or not. Someone could have parked a car 
bomb right there on the side of the street next to it, you could have had multiple 
casualties, stuff like that was running through my mind. Stuff like that was running 
through my mind you know, what is the worst thing that can happen. You see it 
might be, plugging the cobalt beneath the street full of explosives and just waiting 
for us, and just baiting us with that. And all that stuff was certainly in the back of 
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my mind. It was those kinds of risks. And then someone would say, man, that was 
totally the wrong call, putting that many people in that kind of an area, you just 
created this huge target. And you know, was this scraper worth it? So that was 
always there. But I always felt like, and I probably felt on most of my missions that 
I always did everything I could do to mitigate risk. 
 
“Unique” decisions 
 
When looking at the nature of the decisions that my sample identified as “least-worst” it is 
important to consider the types of decisions they were trained for. Members of the Armed Forces 
are trained to make fast, and accurate decision in war (Matthews, 2013), and several models (such 
as the Military Decision-making Process, or OODA Loop Framework; Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Act; Boyd, 1987) have been developed to allow members of the Armed Forces to “apply critical 
and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches 
to solving them” (ADP 5-0. U.S. Armed Forces, 2012). However, the domains (and scenarios) 
within which these decision-making strategies are trained, are often routine, that is; they test and 
train individuals with the types of tasks and missions that reflect the types of task and mission that 
they will be required to perform repeatedly during their future operations. Least-worst decisions, 
by their very nature are often rare, atypical events that are dissimilar to situations previously faced 
by the decision-maker. What this means is that most decisions that were recalled as part of this 
study were tricky specifically because they were completely different to the types of decisions that 
made in training. As one of my interviewee’s (a drone pilot) stated: 
 
Interviewer: So how did this decision differ to the ones you’d faced in training? 
AFC Evans: Training is easy, you know you just do it you’re given missions without 
thought and you’re not giving, you’re never given scenarios where Afghans may be 
doing this or they may not. Go look at this, find this, do this, get a beer after or a 
steak dinner. It’s not like this where you live on a base that’s getting rocket attacked 
and stuff. Everything plays into it. There were a few times we were wearing our 
gear while we were flying because we were getting attacked. Nothing training can 
do.  
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 Linked in with this point was the finding that in all cases discussed here, the decision (for 
one reason or another) was “unique” meaning that the decision-maker had not faced (in the real 
world, or training) a decision like this. Currently, the military (in line with RPD) attempts to 
support Soldiers’ decision-making by developing their intuition through exposing Soldiers to 
increasingly complex missions, aimed at building “his or her own library of experiences that can 
ultimately be tapped into when an intuitive decision is called for” (Matthew, 2013, p. 67). But in 
this research the decisions that participants faced did not match the “library of experience” they 
had developed through prior deployments and training. One interview, for example, was with a 
driver working in Afghanistan and providing rear support to a large convoy of oil that needed to 
be delivered to a Forward Operating Base who used his truck to protect the convoy from what he 
thought could have been a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that was heading directly 
for them. He explained this situation as unique:  
 
This particulate situation was unique, and, especially where we had two things 
happen one after another, I mean, this is 2010. This is when the whole drawdown 
was going on any everything, does it compare, from what other people told me, 
these were pretty quiet times, except you would have your spurts every now and 
then, and this was a lot a precursor to ISIS [the Islamic State] and everything, they 
were fighting amongst each other and less against us, I think we were just waiting 
it out. But yeah, I uh, yeah, I this was really a unique situation, I cannot think of 
another situation where it was like this, this was the only one I had to write a 
statement on! So, yeah, I mean, we’d had trucks try to force their way into our 
convoys but never like this. 
 
Uncertainty  
 
In many cases, least-worst decisions emerged due to the “fog” of war; meaning that the 
uncertainty in the situation created a least-worst decision because the decision-maker did not have 
enough situational awareness to be able to effectively project the likely outcome of an action, 
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instead they could only project the outcome of two, very different outcomes, both of which were 
often in conflict.  As one Soldier recounts 
 
Now at this point, and you talked earlier about a point at which there was no good 
decision, I don’t know what their intent is, I know they are coming straight at my 
guys, at my friend, um, and I don’t know what I am supposed to do right? I don’t 
know if this guy is a danger or not. And I also don’t know, with an SUV you’ve got 
a fair amount of cargo capacity there, so I’m thinking this could also be a bomb? 
So, inside my head, I am thinking “he’s going to die,” this guy is going to blow 
himself up, because, just the way he came out, he really tore his way out of that 
parking lot and came right at them... and there was a split second when I thought I 
can save [the walk in’s] life right now by possibly murdering an innocent person. 
And on the other side of it, and I had to weigh that against, do I want my friend to 
possibly be killed, and at the same time I’m thinking, it’s possible that if I shoot at 
this guy, it isn’t going to save my friend anyway right? 
 
As another interviewee stated during our interview:  
 
“That was all uncertainty on my part, I felt like that might be a threat, but I 
wasn’t sure enough if it was, right. On the one side, you know I’ve got a deadly 
weapon and intent, I just don’t have the know-how, I just don’t know whether I 
should be firing or not. And so, I guess some part of me is worried about killing 
him, and about escalating a situation that was non-hostile. And so, that was 
probably a larger factor in my mind and, um, I’m thinking I don’t want to screw 
this up, and so I’m really going to pay attention to what they are doing, and um, I 
think if they had been, you know, he was drawn on the guy and I was drawn on 
the guy he was ready to fire and I was ready to fire. If, um, we had heard, if a 
round had gone off I would have been firing immediately, no question about it, if 
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you know the driver had shot or my guys had shot I would have fired without 
hesitation, but I didn’t know, I wasn’t sure if I was supposed to fire.” 
 
 The finding that uncertainty in the situational awareness is directly in accord with Lipshitz 
and Strauss’ (2001) work with members of the Iraqi Defense Forces Command and General Staff 
College. Lipshitz and Strauss asked Soldiers to “write a case of decision-making under uncertainty 
from your personal experience in the I.D.F.” Their results showed that the two most common 
sources of uncertainty were that they inadequately understood the situation (24.6%), and they were 
conflicted due to having alternatives with equally attractive outcomes (24.6%; p. 156). It is clear, 
however, that these two issues are causally linked in many cases in that a poor understanding of 
the situation can create the perception of equally unattractive outcomes because the decide-maker 
is unable to prospectively project the outcome of a given course of action. In being unable to 
prospectively project the outcome of a given course of action the decision-maker is unable to 
employ RPD strategies because, without knowing (with any degree of certainty) what the outcome 
of decision will be, the decision-maker cannot identify if it is “satisfactory” or “workable”. 
 
Endogenous Uncertainty  
 
In Chapter 3 I outlined the SAFE-T model, and in doing so, identified a series of factors 
that can impact upon the decision-making of individuals during critical decisions. Here, 
participants highlighted several factors within the decision-making environment that detrimentally 
affected their ability to make decisions. Endogenous sources of uncertainty include ambiguous 
information, time pressure, and risk (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). They prevent the decision-maker 
from developing situation awareness (i.e. “what is going on”) and, as I argued above, affects the 
ability of decision-makers to prospectively model outcomes of an action (i.e. “what will happen 
if”; Klein, Snowden, & Pin, 2007). Exogenous uncertainty has received even less attention from 
scholars of military decision-making. Exogenous uncertainty derives from confusion over both 
one’s own expectations and their expectations of another’s performance (van den Heuvel et al., 
2013). Exogenous uncertainty can derail teamwork by affecting team cohesion and reducing team 
members’ willingness to share (McKay, 1991) or seek information with other partners (Sniezek & 
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Van Swol, 2001). In several cases collected as part of this study, not only did the decision-maker 
had to deal with endogenous uncertainty, but also exogenous uncertainty surrounding the roles and 
actions of other members of the decision-making team. Sveral participants were either forced to 
make a least-worst decision because of uncertainty surrounding the intentions and actions of 
others. For example;  
 
One of the reasons I was forced to do something in this situation was because the 
gunner didn’t. Had she lit up that truck, she would have been 100% justified, 
whether they were innocent or not, you know, she would have seen the threat 
coming. I think if it was any other people that were up there. But I mean if it was 
my regular gunner, I mean, whoever was in that vehicle probably wouldn’t have 
got home that night, you know. So… She knew very well it was a threat because she 
was yelling it out. She just didn’t do anything about it and so it was kind of left up 
to me with the truck, or to let them pass. 
 
In other cases, they struggled to decide due to uncertainty stemming from their interactions and 
relationships with others: 
 
It was frictional, I mean even us going and asking. They have their own priorities 
and missions and this is just a distraction for us. We almost had to go through 
another unit to get to even set up direct communications with them. And that’s hard, 
just the communications piece. [at one point] I flew a guy up there just to have a 
face-to-face meeting…. So that was kind of the interaction with the Poles, all of 
which had to be done though interpreters. 
 
Hence the data supports that not only does uncertainty cause a least-worst decision by creating 
outcome uncertainty, but exogenous uncertainty within the decision-making team can hinder the 
decision-making process by introducing issues of role confusion, cohesion, and trust which creates 
barriers to decision-making.   
 
Organizational Pressures  
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In addition to uncertainty, participants frequently referenced the role of organizational 
pressures such as accountability and “blame culture” in their decision-making. In decision-making, 
future accountability influences choice (Frink & Klimoski, 2004). NDM research has shown that, 
accountability increases cognitive load (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Accountability also increases 
self-preservation and detracts attention away from the task at hand (Waring et al., 2013). To date, 
little research has explored the influence of accountability on military decision-making, even 
though military culture “vests considerable authority, responsibility, and accountability with the 
commanding officer” (Broedling, 1981, p. 91). Accordingly, several participants highlighted both 
the role that organizational pressures played in both the way in which they decided and specifically, 
the course of action that they chose. As highlighted by one interviewee: 
 
The culture at the time was a fault intolerant culture, right, they were more worried 
about whether you followed the procedure right, um, than whether they were setting 
you up for paranoia. Your paranoid about the Afghan’s as much as you were about 
your boss coming down on you… so yeah that was absolutely in my thought process, 
everything there was about you know trying to prevent bad things from happening, 
they were less worried about that it seemed to me that they were about 
accomplishing the mission, so I’m, at this point I’m a major, I’m a field grade 
officer, I know my Sun Su, and my Clausewitz and things like that, and I know, as 
they said, all wars political. War is an extension of politics by other means, that the 
real way you win this war, like Sun Su said is to win the hearts and minds of the 
people, and so it is frustrating to me, this is a side, unrelated to the decision-making, 
but it is frustrating to me to be in an environment when they are not interested in 
engaging with the Afghan people, going out and making tribal alliances, and 
making friends, they were more worried about “let’s not screw anything up.” Let’s 
not do anything wrong, right? 
 
 Regarding the latter point, CDMs also highlighted that in several cases decisions were 
made not because they were perceived as the “best” (or even “least-worst” cause of action) but 
due to organizational pressures that affected the choices that a Soldier made. Such pressures are, 
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currently, not featured in any theoretical model of military decision-making. This reinforces the 
void between our theoretical perspectives of military decision-making (either RPD or MDMP) and 
the factors that can influence the way military decisions are made on deployment. Or, as one of 
my interviewees highlighted: 
 
The people making the decisions on the doctrine have no idea what they’re talking 
about [laughs] that’s my personal opinion. They do not take into account the 
feedback they get from the field so that’s the reason and in theory and in a perfect 
little word and happy bubble we all want to get it all, make it all like roses and fine 
and dandy but it’s not like that. 
 
Rumination  
 
One important issue that emerged during this work was also the degree to which the decision maker 
ruminated on their decision post-hoc. As one interviewee recounts: 
 
“I think about this all the time, and I came out without a scratch and it’s one of 
those things those three guys, or four guys, who were wounded almost 
instantaneously, you think you know, maybe I could’ve made a different decision? 
But those are alternate realities” 
 
Now, to date the literature on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has focused on events and 
tragedies seen, what it has not so much focused on in the long-term consequences of the 
psychological tragedy of having to make critical decisions that involve balancing lives against 
other moral imperatives. In doing so, it is arguable that there are long-term ramifications on the 
individual even in those cases where there was not a bad outcome. One interviewee, for example, 
discussed how he ruminated on his decision “every night”, despite the fact that no harm came to 
anyone. Hence, his trauma was not because of what happened, but it was because of the decision 
he made, why he made it, and the incongruence that caused between this “real” self and his own 
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view of how he should act. Others, more in passing, gave small insights into the long-term 
suffering and negative consequences that have endured as a result of experiencing a certain event 
and making the decisions they made. As one interviewee outlined: 
 
“And erm…so erm…so that’s something you know, looking back on it for a 
number of years and doing some leadership and decision making courses, I don’t, 
I can never understand why I made that choice. You know, I think it was out of 
desperation and also because you know I had taken some personality tests and I 
think I’m a very intuitive kind of thinker, maybe more so than I need to be, you 
know, at times” 
 
While it is far beyond the scope of this research to begin to understand long-term trauma, or even 
attempt to bridge the gap between these types of least-worst decisions and PTSD/psychological 
harm, given the significant prevalence of PTSD and suicide in military samples, it is incumbent 
upon psychologists (me included) to further explore this link and the role of these decisions on 
long-term negative health outcomes for Soldiers.  
 
Discussion 
 
This chapter provided empirical support for several assertions made in the early chapters 
of this thesis. Firstly, that members of the Armed Forces often face least-worst choices, in which 
they struggle to decide between two equally unattractive options (in this research no one recalled 
a situation in which they faced two equally good options). Furthermore, as presupposed in Chapter 
2, in such situations they were unable to draw on any “library of experiences” because these least-
worst decisions were unique. Here then, they were forced to engage in a complicated, and fragile 
process of choosing between two equally adverse options while still maintaining the ability to 
behaviorally commit to a choice (i.e., to not become inert). Furthermore, and as argued in Chapter 
3, the data collected here supports the importance of several factors, outside the nature of the 
options available, that can affect the decision-maker. Here then, CDM highlighted the role of 
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factors that are unlikely to emerge in general interviews, or SBTs, such as organizational pressures. 
This then further strengthens the relevance of the SAFE-T model that specifically identifies these 
factors and the negative role they will have on decision-making.  
In support of these efforts, this research presents the first glimpse of 13 narrative accounts 
of least-worst decision-making in war. In analyzing these accounts, I focused on the role of 
uncertainty (exogenous and endogenous) and accountability as potential factors that can derail 
decision-making. In recent naturalistic research using a simulated counter-terrorism operation van 
den Heuvel and colleagues (2012) demonstrated how uncertainty and “save self” priorities (i.e., 
seeking to avoid being blamed for a wrong decision, rather than making a decision that could result 
in the best outcome) could derail effective decision-making and introduce inertia into the decision-
making process. Here I found early evidence that both these factors also come into play in military 
contexts. For example, many of my participants highlighted the role of accountability and 
organizational culture in shaping the types of decisions that they made. In addition to this, I 
extended the discussion of uncertainty. While in many high-stakes situations uncertainty in the 
environment is prevalent, here I argued that equally important to consider (and for psychologists 
to explore) is the role of exogenous uncertainty in the decision-making team. This issue too 
emphasizes the importance of future work that focusses on the role of the decision-making team 
in military decision-making, as well as the conflicts that can arise when different members of a 
team have different priorities and values. These findings, therefore, emphasize the importance of 
applying on-going research in critical and major incident decision-making to other areas of high-
risk decision-making, such as the military.   
One very prominent finding from this study is the apparent lack of decision inertia within 
our Soldier sample. To put this in perspective, in CDM interviews conducted by Power (2016) in 
which she asked members of the Emergency services to discuss a least-worst decision they had 
made, she found that they often suffered from decision inertia because they experienced goal 
conflict (i.e., struggling to choose between two opposing goals). Here, however, while our Soldiers 
all recalled least-worst decisions, and many identified opposing goals (such as protecting the life 
of Soldiers vs., protecting civilians or pursuing a known enemy) inertia was a very rare outcome. 
In fact, only one interviewee (7.29%) exhibited clear evidence of inertia and was unable to commit 
to a choice of action in time. The remaining 12 interviewees (92.30%) were all able to commit to 
a choice of action within the required time frame. Many in fact highlighted a very deliberate series 
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of cognitive ruminations they made to avoid inertia. The following was recalled by a Navy 
Commander about how he used mental simulation to plan operations in Afghanistan;  
 
I call it playing chess, but I try to visualize the chess games, like I do this, what is 
the reaction? If I do this, what is the reaction? If I do this, what is the worst that 
can happen? And when I’m [facing these decisions] I am not doing it by myself 
obviously, I have some field grade officers and helping out with the decision and 
saying what about this and what about this, and we can do this. And by kind of 
thinking through that we’ll red team it. Try to figure out what is the most likely 
thing to happen that we had to be prepared for and what is the worst thing that can 
happen and are we prepared to handle that? And we kind of walk through each of 
those scenarios, and then just make sure we have some kind of counter-measure to, 
so, if it is likely that somebody put an IED on the route between here and there, 
then let’s make sure we have route clearance between here and there. Ok, we are 
likely to be on the ground for 8 hours, ok, well we could become a sitting duck for 
a sniper so let’s put an extra cordon on there. And, oh yeah, 8 hours, you guys are 
doing to need a latrine to drink water and maybe something to eat because it is 
going to take us 3 hours to get there and 3 hours back so let’s think about some 
logistics of that stuff. So yeah, so, did I put a mental framework on that, yeah, and 
I think that started back in the early tours where you try to visualize how this 
unfolds, you know, …what is the most likely thing that is going to happen, and then 
um, I think the last thing, at least as a leader is, the last thing you visualize, is what 
if the worst does happen? What am I going to do about that, what do I have in 
reserve, who do I call? What if this just goes completely south? What does that 
mean to me? What are the first 2 or 3 things that I am going to do, because there 
is not an SOP [standard operating procedure] for that. But it is nice to have thought 
about that, because then you do not suffer from the paralysis. 
 
 While, on the face of it, this seems problematic for my early hypotheses (namely the 
exploration of decision inertia in military decision-making) this finding, in fact, offers incredible 
promise. Specifically, if, as I am arguing here, when faced with least-worst decisions members of 
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the Armed Forces are resistant to inertia, then the critical question is why, when faced with similar 
situations they outperform their police and Emergency services counterparts. There are, logically, 
three potential hypotheses that could be forwarded to explain this finding. I elaborate on these 
below; 
 
1. Individuals who enter the Armed Forces have individual differences in decision-
making styles compared to those who do not join the Armed Forces. It is well known 
that individuals differ in their decision-making styles (e.g., a need to maximize, vs., a 
willingness to satisfice) and that this correlates with differing ability to avoid decisions 
(Parker, De Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007).  
2. Individuals become more resilient to inertia because of extensive training in decision-
making and develop a domain-general ability to make critical time-sensitive decisions.  
3. The environment within which decisions are made (namely “at war”) alter the degree 
to which external pressures (such as accountability) are felt, preventing such factors 
from derailing decision-making. Research from social psychology has extensively 
shown that individuals are affected by the situation, and often behave in situation-
relevant ways (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969). Given this, it is possible that the military 
environment creates social expectations for swift and decisive action.  
 
Above are three possible explanations for the lack of decision inertia witnessed in the 13 
narrative accounts of least-worst decision-making collected here. These three, while currently all 
under-investigated (if investigated at all) will provide an essential starting point for the 
experimental research-stage of this thesis. Specifically, each of the three explanations above 
implies a discrete set of hypotheses that can be tested experimentally. Namely;  
 
1. If we accept hypothesis 1 then Soldiers and members of the Emergency services will 
significantly differ on several, relevant, personality and decision-making metricizes.  
2. If we accept hypothesis 2 then Soldiers will outperform members of the Emergency 
services in all least-worst situations because of an improved decision-making style 
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3. If we accept hypothesis 3 then Members of the Emergency services and Soldiers will 
all be more resistant to inertia when making military decisions vs., making least-worst 
decisions in a non-military setting.  
 
We test these hypotheses in the latter stages of this thesis (see Chapter 6, 7 and 8).  
 
Methodological Limitations: Post hoc “bolstering” 
 
 Given the strong assertions I am making from the narrative data, and the importance of this 
for the following directions of this thesis, it is important that I outline some of the potential issues 
with this data. Janis and Mann’s (1977) model of decisional conflict argues that when making a 
decision that involves (potential) unfavorable outcomes decision-makers often “bolster” the 
perceived benefit of one choice while minimizing the costs of the other. Bolstering involves 
magnifying the attractiveness of a chosen outcome while playing down the potential losses 
(Festinger, 1964). Bolstering can also involve diminishing the likely losses from options that were 
turned down. Bolstering is therefore a dissonance-reducing activity that changes the decision-
makers’ subjective evaluation of the chosen and unchosen actions, rating the chosen action as more 
attractive and the unchosen action less so. As such, the decision-maker effectively spreads the 
alternatives increasing the differentiation of options to a greater degree than they were at that time 
(Janis & Mann, 1977; p. 82). This “spreading of alternatives” has been shown in both experimental 
and field studies; showing that after someone has committed to an action they are likely to bias 
their perception in a way that maintains the spread between alternatives (e.g., Brehm, 1956; Brehm 
& Cohen, 1962). What this means is that when asking participants to recall a situation in which 
they specifically had to choose between alternatives that were equally adverse, because they made 
a choice, they are likely (and to varying degrees) to perhaps bolster their positive perception of the 
choice that they made and minimize the potential losses that could have occurred from the choices 
that they did not make. This is an important point to consider given that bolstering has been shown 
to occur in decisions such as car purchasing (Elrich et al., 1957), and in this research CDM is 
focused on decisions that are high-risk, adverse, and whose outcomes involve the life, and death, 
of themselves, fellow Soldiers and members of the civilian populations. Given the high-stakes of 
such decisions (coupled with the high cost of an error) it is viable to propose that post-decisional 
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bolstering could be a vital defense mechanism against dissonance and regret. Given the clear 
methodological constraints of gaining access to members of the military and Emergency services 
in extremis this point puts precedent on efforts of psychologists to increasingly use experimental 
methodologies to examine least-worst decision-making to remove the opportunity for post hoc 
bolstering and provide a clearer picture of the decision-making strategies that occur during a least-
worst decision.  
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been said that war acts as a “laboratory for the human condition in extremis” (New 
York Times, 2014). Here, analyzing a series of highly detailed narrative accounts of Soldiers’ 
decision-making on deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq I sought to investigate the types of 
decisions that these individuals faced, and how our wider theories of decision-making can account 
for the way in which they made these decisions. Several, very interesting, findings emerged from 
this work. First and foremost, I identified that, in many cases, the decisions that Soldiers’ struggle 
with share many commonalities; “satisfactory” outcomes could not be predicted during the 
decision-making process; the decisions are (often) non-kinetic, they are novel, they have not 
trained for these types of decisions before, nor were they particularly expected. This finding 
cements the importance of the argument levied at theories of decision-making during the early 
chapters of this thesis. Specifically, theories that focus on experience and choosing the most 
“satisfactory” alternative fail to explain least-worst decision-making. Furthermore, the ease with 
which my participants could recall at least one least-worst decision highlights that these types of 
decisions are prevalent, and they warrant further scientific attention. To further this point many 
participants demonstrated very strong memory traces and often emphasized that they still ruminate 
on this choice. This issue of rumination is something that I have explored elsewhere (Shortland, 
Alison & Moran, forthcoming) but it reinforces that least-worst decisions, while they only 
represent a minority of the overall quantity of decisions made by Soldiers are high-stakes and high-
consequence and largely defy RPD and traditional theories of decision-making under uncertainty.  
Given this then this research sought to specifically investigate cases of choice in a military 
population. It sought to identify the types of situations that cause choice and conflict and some of 
the barriers to effective decision-making in these situations. It found that, perhaps contrary to many 
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expectations, that most least-worst choices that Soldiers’ faced were not in extremis, but were more 
often logistical, personnel, or mission planning. This is not to say that the consequences did not 
involve life or death, but that more often hard choices were not encountered in the field. This 
perhaps shows the strengths of RPD and doctrine (as intended) in that it means that least-worst 
decisions are not as prevalent in time-sensitive tactical operations. Despite this, all my interviewees 
could readily recall a time when they had to make a least-worst decision. Furthermore, they 
outlined the cognitive conflict that these decisions caused (namely “hesitation, vacillation, feelings 
of uncertainty, and signs of acute emotional stress.” Janis & Mann, 1977, p. 46; see also Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992). What this research shows is that despite most decisions being well explained by 
traditional RPD methodologies, least-worst choices exist and require more efforts to document 
their occurrence and examine the strategies used by decision-makers to navigate them.  
 Finally, data presented above supports the need for theories of decision-making to not only 
consider both endogenous and exogenous uncertainty. It is commonplace for the academy, as well 
as the military, to highlight that decisions in war are made “under a cloud of uncertainty” but often 
we do not elaborate where that uncertainty stems from, or at the very least, we assume it stems 
from incomplete information, or a clandestine and unpredictable “enemy”. Here exogenous 
uncertainty was commonly cited; confusion caused by uncertainty about our roles, and the roles 
of others. Similarly, organizational pressures such as accountability were cited as affecting 
decision-making. From this, any theory of military decision-making which seeks to describe 
choice as exclusively an output of an evaluation of options is missing the important influence of 
these sources of exogenous uncertainty.  
Finally, in identifying that, when compared to their Emergency service counterparts, 
Soldiers displayed a relative lack of inertia, in this chapter I proposed three hypotheses that may 
explain this finding. Namely that the people are different; there are trained to makes decisions 
differently; and that the nature of the environment changes alters their decision-making process 
(namely making them less concerned with negative outcomes and accountability). It is essential 
then that this qualitative research is followed up with quantitative research that can make a first 
attempt at exploring this. However, before I engage in any quantitative research I still lack a 
detailed understanding of the process through which least-worst decisions are made in military 
samples. Without which, it is both premature and empirically unwise to begin to experimentally 
test performance and make assertions as to the factors underlying causal differences between 
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samples. In the next chapter then, I expand upon this study to explain how Soldiers can make least-
worst decisions in conflict situations. Specifically, I seek to delve deeper into the process of option 
selection and how Soldiers evaluate and commit to choices that seem equally adverse and high-
risk.  
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CHAPTER 5: LEAST-WORST MILITARY DECISION-MAKING: A GROUNDED 
THEORY  
 
Between two foods alike to appetite, and like afar, a free man, I suppose, would starve before of 
either he would bite. 
So would a lamb, between the hungry throes of two fierce wolves, feel equipoise of dread, so 
hesitate a hound between two does. 
 
- Dante, Divine Comedy, Paradiso 3 (1265 – 1321).  
 
In the previous chapter, I took a detailed look at what military decision-making looks like in 
the field. Through a series of critical decision method interviews I unpacked some of the exogenous 
and endogenous factors that come into play within the military decision-making process. 
Furthermore, I looked at the type of decisions that members of the military are required to make 
finding that, despite the focus on repetition and building a “library of experiences”, they are often 
faced with situations in which they have no “analogous” memory. Furthermore, I identified that in 
some cases (often those for which they have no analogies) they are required to choose between 
two options that are equally unattractive, this again creates issues with current theories that focus 
on “workability” and “satisficing.” What the last chapter did then is it resuscitated the importance 
of choice and the fact that, in certain situations, members of the military are required to choose 
between options for which they do not know which holds the “ideal” outcome. The question then 
is, in the absence of recognized-prime and satisficing, how do Soldiers commit to courses of action 
which is adverse and high-risk? Furthermore, given what we know from similar decisions in 
critical incidents, how do they commit to courses of action without suffering from decision inertia? 
In this chapter, I seek to further elaborate on this process. Specifically, I engage in a theoretical 
deepening by conducting a series of further interviews with members of the Armed Forces and 
employ a grounded theory approach to understand the psychological process through which 
Soldiers are, and are not, able to make least-worst decisions in conflict situations.   
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Do Soldiers Choose?  
 
 In conducting the research for the last chapter I came across a perplexing phenomenon in 
that some members of the Armed Forces often told me that they “did not make any decisions” on 
their deployment. While originally this was hard to reconcile (they had often been deployed in 
combat roles and engaged in kinetic activities; yet felt like they made no decisions?), what they 
are saying is that not that they did not make any decisions, they made many decisions every day. 
What they are saying is that they never made any choices.  
In war, many decisions do not specifically require a choice. Actions are either mandated 
(through a SOP), or have an analogy or preexisting commitment that (at least according to your 
forecasts, and SA at the time) will work. This assertion is fine, and indeed it is the basis of military 
training and it really does support the importance of RPD in both training and theory. As Mike 
Matthews, a Professor at the United States Military Academy West Point, highlights, the continual 
practice leads to a “library of schema-script connections. As proficiency builds, the Soldier can 
quickly pattern-match the observed situation with an appropriate script Decision-making in these 
cases may become virtually automatic.” (2013, p. 62). Military decision-making research too 
follows this trend, focusing on RPD perspectives of how experiences and expertise are applied in 
the field (e.g., Bryant, 2002; Davison, 2008; Elliott, 2005; Morrison, Kelly & Hutchins, 1996; 
Pascual & Henderson, 1997; Ross, Klein, Thunholm, Schmitt & Baxter, 2004; just to name a few). 
Previous experiences, a wealth of training and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) therefore 
combine to allow the Soldier, in many conditions, to act without deliberating between options, but 
by choosing one solution (experience, or SOP-based) and acting. This is the RPD model. However, 
it is very clear that when there are competing goals or multiple options Soldiers will have to choose. 
Perhaps one of my interviewees from the last chapter phrased it best: 
 
I always fear making a wrong decision, especially in a deliberate process like that 
this. In terms of a right or wrong decision if it is time critical and I have got make 
a decision or else I’m going to die or somebody else is going to die, those decisions 
get made very easily and there’s no real thinking about it in the time that you have. 
Here, in the 5 hours that I had to dither and ruminate and the number of “what ifs” 
and “if I make this decision this is what’s gonna happen” the number of scenarios 
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that I was able to go through in my own mind were significant enough to where I 
did feel that making the wrong decision was going to end up in mission failure and 
in my own loss of credibility to in the eyes of my commander, in the eyes of my soul, 
and my air men and my folks that rely upon me to make those right decisions, and 
so I would be lying to say that…my thinking about making the right or wrong 
decision didn’t affect me making the ultimate decision. But with the amount of time 
that I had and the amount of time that I had to ruminate on the decision I did feel 
like I made the right decision and I feel like when everybody looks from the outside 
that the ends achieved, that that was the right decision to do it so I wouldn’t 
necessarily say that making the wrong decision was necessarily something that I 
really thought about umm…But what I did do was I stressed heavily about the idea 
that I needed to make the decision that was going to result in mission success versus 
a decision that was going to result in mission failure umm…Again accepting the 
risks that were going to be accepted after that decision which is again why you have 
the two critical options between bad and not so bad type decision-making. 
 
Thus, despite the prevalence of RPD (both in the real-world and training), I hold that 
Soldiers are required to make choices. They will have to evaluate options and choose an alternative 
based on consequence. Furthermore, from my own observations and research, I know that making 
such choices is often a demanding task given the nature of modern warfare and the operating 
environment they make such choices within. If our focus remains on RPD and efforts to train 
Soldiers continue to focus solely on decision-making without choice when they face a situation 
that requires choice (because of the parameters set out by Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011) they may be 
totally ill-equipped to do so. This point cannot be emphasized enough.  
 
A Trimodal Theory of Decision-Making  
 
Perhaps, perplexingly, this apparent paradox between the degree to which decision-making 
involves a choice is related to the fact that decision-making is so often viewed as “selecting the 
best of multiple options by deliberating about consequences.” (Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011). A 
decision is conventionally defined, for example by Jeffrey (1965/1983), as a choice between two 
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or more options, which is based on reasoning regarding the desirability of each one. However, if a 
decision does not necessarily involve choice, then what does it involve?  The avid reader will 
remember that in Chapter 1 I defined a decision as a commitment to a course of action. This is in 
line with Yates, Veinott, and Patalano (2003). Cohen and Lipshitz (2011) expanded on this idea 
of decisions as a commitment in that they defined a decision as “graded commitments of mental, 
affective or material resources to courses of action. Decision-making includes any cognitive 
process that can create, reject, or modify such commitments – regardless of the cognitive resources 
it may or may not consume in doing so (p. 4; italics are the original authors’). Drawing upon 
Bratman’s (1978) work on intentions, plans and reason, Cohen and Lipshitz define a decision as 
an intention or commitment; which in term reflected a set of dispositions;  
 
(a) to stop looking for or thinking seriously about alternatives (unless the situation changes 
and the choice needs to be re-assessed)  
(b) to seek out aspects of the situation that are specifically relevant to the implementation 
of the chosen course of action  
(c) to plan the course of action in more detail  
(d) to take preparatory steps to implement that course of action (e.g., allocating resources, 
rehearsing, or enlisting others’ cooperation)  
(e) to experience a negative affect if the chosen course of action is blocked;  
(f) to execute the chosen course of action at a suitable time and place 
 
The importance of viewing choice as commitment is that decision-making does not start 
from scratch. Instead, each decision is affected by the agents’ pre-existing commitments (Bratman, 
1987), which in turn shape new intentions or generate immediate action (Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011). 
This is not a surprising revelation given that experimental research has long-shown that committed 
decision-makers are reluctant to change their minds (the sunk cost fallacy: Arkes & Ayton, 1999), 
they ignore and distort information to match their currently-held views (confirmation bias: Wason, 
1968; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Poletiek, 2001), and even deepen their commitment in the face of 
negative feedback (escalation of commitment: Staw, 1976; Staw & Ross, 1989). 
A decision is therefore the combination of both existing commitments, long-term 
knowledge, and current information. Thus, any eventual plan that is developed is the result of 
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multiple, dynamic, decision cycles rather than the output of a discrete choice stage (Cohen & 
Lipshitz, 2011). Cohen and Lipshitz (2011) propose these three forms of commitment change as 
unique modes of decision-making, each of which is associated with a qualitatively distinctive 
phenomenology of thinking and acting, as well as differences in the ways in which actions are 
chosen and justified. In the first instance; one in which a decision-maker has no prior 
commitments; they will engage in a process of Matching that is they will ask “What should a 
person in my role do in a situation of this kind?” (see March, 1994, p. 58). In these situations 
choices can often be dictated by rules or norms that can stem from a range of sources including; 
social norms (Bicchieri, 2005; Bicchieri, Jeffrey, & Skyrms, 2009), organizational routines (Levitt 
& March, 1988), standard operating procedures and best practices (Betsch & Haberstroh, 2004), 
previous cases and precedents (Schank, 1990, 1999; Kolodner, 1993), religious doctrine (Atran, 
2002), and moral principles and political ideologies (Thompson, Ellis, & Waldavsky, 1990). 
Matching thus generates intentions and actions without choice; because the choice is dictated by 
practice or rules. These rules usually do not present multiple, exclusive courses of action and more 
frequently form an “If A then B” model. Meaning that if the situation is perceived as “A” then “B” 
follows without much choice or competition. While this sounds relatively mundane (merely 
following doctrine or policy) the importance of this tactic should not be underestimated and it can 
be relied upon to solve incredibly high-risk complex dilemmas.  
The second form of decision-making is Reassessment in which “the decision-maker 
monitors for, or actively probes for, problems with an intended action (i.e., Rebuttals to previous 
arguments), in response to the implicit or explicit question, “Is my course of action reliable?” 
(Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011, p. 10). This question can be answered by mental rumination of the 
outcomes of a preference (either through story-telling or mental simulation; Cohen et al., 1996; 
Endsley & Garland, 2000; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Reassessment and matching are deeply 
connected. As Cohen and Lipshitz (2011) argue “While matching seeks to maximize the number 
of truths, reassessment seeks to minimize the number of errors. Thus, matching seals commitments 
and reassessment unlocks them…. Matching and reassessment are both necessary: one to generate 
commitments based on accumulated knowledge and the other to vet commitments and stimulate 
improvements, which are then used in future matching.” (p. 15). Furthermore, while both differ in 
the etiology of the choice, they are both single selection in that options are (either generated or 
evaluated) sequentially and one-at-a-time. Thus, Reassessment closely represents the common 
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RPD model of decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty in that they center on the 
“workability” of a situation and accepting (or rejecting) the feasibility of an option that usually 
appears to the decision-maker quickly and based on prior experience.  
The final form of commitment change is Choice. It begins with the commitment to choose 
one course of action, and centers on the question “Which of these options is the best means to my 
ends?” (Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011, p. 11). This form of choice is centered on maximizing expected 
desirability of future states and requires a shift in commitment from being equally dispersed across 
to disjunctive options to one option. Selection should further be justified (i.e., Do A because it is 
the most effective means to my end). This normative form of rationalization is what Simon called 
objective (1956) or substantive (Simon, 1976) rationality and was outlined in detail in Chapter 2. 
And while in Chapter 2 I highlighted the many issues with assuming “rationality” in an economic 
decision-making model; I do not disagree that in some cases the decision-maker is forced to weigh 
the pros and cons of multiple options. Furthermore, most criticisms launched at rational-choice 
perspectives do so because it viewed that it was “how humans made decisions,” rather than a 
slightly more muted view that it is a “strategy” that humans adopt in a certain situation. As Cohen 
and Lipshitz (2011) argue decisions require choice (rather than matching or reassessment) when;  
 
(a) The environment presents multiple options  
(b) An external pressure (organizational or cultural) requires you to justify your action by 
comparing it to another option  
(c) The goals of the decision-maker compete with one another, and advantages and 
disadvantages must be traded off to approach optimality. 
 
It is telling that these three requirements are the exact same that the founders of RPD state 
mean that recognition-prime is not sufficient (Klein, 1998). Thus, I have arrived at come clarity; 
and at the same time added some clarity to our earlier discussions about the applicability of RPD 
decision-making in cases of high-uncertainty and no–previous experience and rational 
comparative models in situations in which fast action is required. At the same time, I have fleshed 
out the choice strategy that it likely to accompany to underpin decision inertia and least-worst 
decision-making. As we have seen above; there are various forms of “choosing” a course of action 
and these range from a highly simplistic “what should I do given the role I have,” to a more 
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elaborate “will plan X work?” Both of these closely resemble the wealth of literature on decision-
making in conditions of uncertainty in that it does often denigrate choice. To quote Klein’s (1989) 
article in Military Review again: 
 
The culprit is an ideal of analytical decision-making which asserts that we must 
always generate options systematically, identify criteria for evaluating these 
options, assign weights to the evaluation criteria, rate each option on each criterion 
and tabulate the scores to find the best option. We call this a model of concurrent 
option comparison, the idea being that the decision-maker deliberates about several 
options concurrently. The technical term is multiattribute utility analysis. 
Another analytical ideal is decision analysis, a technique for evaluating an 
option as in a chess game. The decision-maker looks at a branching tree of 
responses and counter- responses and estimates the probability and utility of each 
possible future state to calculate maximum and minimum outcomes. Both of these 
methods, multiattribute utility analysis and decision analysis, have been used to 
build decision training programs and auto- mated decision aids 
These strategies sound good, but in practice, they are often disappointing. 
They do not work under time pressure because they take too long. Even when there 
is enough time, they require much work and lack flexibility for handling rapidly 
changing field conditions. (p. 56) 
 
And from this assertion the field (and research focused on military decision-making) increasing 
began to fore-go the idea of “choice” and “comparison” focusing instead on how members of the 
military make fast decisions, based on experience, so that they can then train the decision-makers 
to make decisions quickly (and without using too many cognitive resources) in the field when 
required. And this was reflected in some of the interviews presented in the last chapter (usually 
when they contrasted the “hard” decision they were discussing with the “easy” ones they had faced 
before): 
 
You know what kept what makes situations like this easy is again the very boring 
answer of repetitive training we worked you know worked very hard at home station 
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to make sure that red and white were always very comfortable to pass in and out of 
each-others rings we worked very hard to be comfortable task organizing on the fly 
so even just fighting as red and white together but then also as hunter-killer teams 
like two Bradleys and a tank working together so that was something we really 
prided ourselves on you know the ability to task organize on the fly with you know 
little umm little issues or anything 
 
But this is only one strategy that can be used; and it only works when the decision-maker 
has already established commitment to a course of action that they can apply. As I argued in 
Chapter 2 then, this strategy of choice has little utility in cases that we have not experienced. In 
addition, the other form of choice “matching” is equally relevant to the military given the 
significant investment in developing (and updating) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Even 
though SOPs are viewed as “too rigid” they do proceduralize decision-making, allowing the 
decision-maker to answer “what should someone in my role do in this situation.” (Pascual & 
Henderson, 1997). However, even this is not sufficient to accommodate the plethora of situations 
members of the military find themselves having to make decision in. In the interviews from the 
previous chapter, as I talked with Soldiers’ about the decisions they faced, they often discussed 
the role of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs; and hence their ability to “match”) and more 
often than not the SOPs either 1; didn’t apply, 2: didn’t exist for this type of situation, or 3; SOPs 
helped with procedural aspects of the decision-making (e.g., how large a delegation should I take 
out to provide security for a mission) yet crucially didn’t help with the actual decision (should I 
go out on this mission or not?). As one of my interviewees from the last chapter explains: 
 
The SOPs that we used were probably the risk mitigation measures, setting up the 
cordons, that would have been a SOP for anything, but for an infantry unit to go in 
and do some operations. Having the air coverage was probably a SOP, the 
movement out there was a SOP, but as far as the recovery and stuff that was kind 
of a new, like I said, because of the size and location, that where we really relied 
on the experience of the Non-Commissioned officers and the subject matter experts 
to figure out how they were going to solve the enigma of getting that out of there. 
Getting in there, clearing the area and securing the area and getting back out was 
Conflict 
 90 
all, we used SOPs for them, that is stuff that they have all been trained on before, 
they knew. The communications were pretty standard. I would say a lot of it was 
SOP, uh, the uh, decision to get in there, the decision was different, and then the 
actions on site kind of had to be improvised and adapted to fit. 
 
Thus, and perhaps this is an over simplification, in war easy decisions do not require 
choice; it is either mandated (through a SOP) or you have an analogy or preexisting commitment 
that (at least according to your forecasts, and SA at the time) will work. The issue, however, is that 
attempting to develop a Soldier that makes decisions without deciding you do not train a Soldier 
who is able to decide when they cannot pattern match nor do their experiences suffice. This is a 
fundamental issue with RPD and associated perspectives, and one that is continually at the fore 
when we discover inertia; an inability to decide. By denigrating the idea that decisions involve 
choices (even if this is a rare occurrence in respect to the total number of decisions that are made) 
and trying to train Soldiers to make decisions without having to choose; when they face a situation 
that does require choice (because of the parameters set out by Cohen & Lipshitz, 2011) they may 
be totally ill-equipped to do so.  
 
Choice and Conflict  
 
A choice is the emergent outcome of weighing and summing outcomes and making 
tradeoffs about utilities. Yet choice breeds tradeoff and tradeoffs result in conflict because “the 
decision-makers must accept less of one choice attribute to get more of another” (Luce, Payne, & 
Bettman, 2001, p.86). As Tversky and Shafir (1992, p. 358) wryly note the “experience of conflict 
is the price one pays for the freedom to choose”. In decision-making, conflict has no formal 
definition but the most commonly held view is that it involves “preference uncertainty” (see Dhar, 
1997; Fischer, Jia, & Luce, 2000; Shafir et al., 1993). Hence, when a decision involves multiple 
options conflict refers to the uncertainty about which option is more valuable (Fischer, Jia & Luce, 
2000; Fischer, Luce & Jia, 2000).  
Conflict is an aversive experience and people are motivated to avoid it (Lewin, 1951; 
Houston, Sherman, & Baker, 1991; Shepard, 1964) and experiencing conflict can have both 
behavioral (e.g. longer choice times) and mental outcomes (e.g. lower confidence). Participants in 
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experimental studies preferentially select a “no-choice” option when the choices generate conflict 
(Dhar, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999). Under conditions of conflict, decision-makers take more time 
(e.g., Fischer et al., 2000); report increased decision difficulty (Scholten, 2002; Scholten & 
Sherman, 2006); have lower confidence in their choice (Zakay, 1985; Zakay & Tsal, 1993); are 
more likely to defer the choice (Dhar, 1996, 1997; Dhar & Nowlis, 1999; Dhar & Simonson, 2003); 
and have an increased number of thoughts, or justifications used for each option (Dhar, 1997). In 
Alison’s research (e.g., Alison & Crego, 2008; Alison et al., 2013; 2015), conflict was often 
accompanied by an increased experience of negative affect while when deciding.  
The degree of conflict one experiences is related to the size of the tradeoffs between the 
attributes that one must make (Scholten, 2002; Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, 1993; Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Simonson, 1993) and we experience a sense of conflict when we must 
make both large and small tradeoffs in decisions (Festinger, 1964; Scholten & Sherman, 2006). To 
give you a sense of high and low tradeoff conflict let us consider, for example, a hostage dilemma 
that was posed to me (N. Shortland) by my Ph.D. supervisor (Prof. Alison) during one of our 
(many) Ph.D. sessions: 
 
 
Imagine you are a commanding officer and have arrived at the scene of a hostage 
siege at a local junior school (the students are aged between 5 and 12). You have 
received intelligence that while most teachers and pupils have been able to escape 
the school and are safe in the car park there are two rooms in which hostages are 
being held. Intelligence suggests that each room contains one hostage taker. In the 
first room, from what you can gather, the hostages include two children (aged 8 and 
11) and an elderly teacher. In the second room, the hostages are three children (aged 
6, 8 and 12). From your assessments, you can launch a raid on one of the two rooms 
or split your men to launch simultaneous raids on both rooms. Launching a raid on 
a single room will likely result in the successful rescue of the children inside, but 
will also very likely cause the death of the hostages in the second room. Splitting 
your forces would create a much lower chance of successfully rescuing the hostages 
in each room. 
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In this scenario, there are both small and large tradeoffs to be made; all of which induce 
conflict. For example, if you decide to split your forces and launch a simultaneous raid you would 
be trading away the likelihood of success, but avoiding the conflict associated with choosing 
between rooms. This is, clearly, a large-tradeoff that requires a high degree of sacrifice. On the 
other hand, if you decide that you do want to launch a raid on only one of the rooms then you are 
faced with deciding which room to target. Both rooms have three people inside, hence the tradeoff 
is relatively low, yet conflict still emerges.  
Conflict, therefore, occurs in both high and low tradeoff decisions because, in high tradeoff 
situations, conflict arises from the sacrifices that must be made, while in the low tradeoff situations, 
conflict emerges from having to find a strong argument between two similar options (Scholten & 
Sherman, 2006). Regarding the hostage scenario above: in the decision to target a single room 
sacrifice is high (i.e., you are potentially condemning the second room to death) but argumentation 
is low (you have a strong argument in that you can guarantee with greater confidence that you will 
rescue at least 3 hostages). Having made that choice, then deciding which room to target leads to 
low sacrifice and high argumentation (i.e., it is very hard to argue between the value of lives; two 
children and one adult vs., three children).  
Scholten and Sherman (2006) formalized this relationship between argumentation and 
sacrifice in their double-mediation model of conflict, within which, for any decision, there are two 
sources of conflict: the first is a concern about sacrifice, and the second is a concern about 
argumentation. In Scholten and Sherman’s double-mediation model they propose two important 
hypotheses. The first, which I showed above, is that both high and low tradeoffs cause conflict. 
The second, and perhaps more important hypothesis is that “when one attribute is much more 
important that the other (very unequal attribute importance), the relation between tradeoff size and 
conflict will change in an upward direction, more specifically, the inverse U-shaped relation will 
change into a (more) positive relation” (2006, p. 243). Thus, the degree of conflict experienced 
emerges from three pressures: 
 
1. The degree of sacrifice incurred by selecting one option  
2. The ability to argument and justify a choice  
3. An independent metric of attribute importance.  
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As they outlined in their model (and empirically tested in the lab), when one attribute is 
valued as much more important than others, the amount of conflict is “differentially weighted,” 
meaning that the degree of experience experienced from sacrifices and argumentation are not 
equal, but mediated by the degree of preference we have for a given choice. The double-mediation 
model ideally integrates with our naturalistic research with decision-makers who become inert, 
and those (namely members of the Armed Forces) who do not.  
In her Ph.D. thesis on decision inertia in critical incident decision-making, Power 
conducted a series of critical decision method interviews (like those I used here) with members of 
the “blue light” services (that is Police Service, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Services). 
Her work with Prof. Alison (which has fed into a lot of my own work on the military) focused on 
exploring how different goals facilitate action (and under what conditions these goals inhibit 
action). As Power outlined, while approach goals influence tendencies to take positive action 
towards a positive stimulus, avoidance goals encourage individuals to avoid negative effects by 
moving away from a negative stimulus (Elliot, 2006; Elliot, Eder & Harmon-Jones, 2013; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000). Power interviewed 31 command level decision-makers from the Police 
Service, Fire and Rescue Service, and the Ambulance Service (AS). As with my own experimental 
method, participants in her research were asked to recall a “difficult decision” that they had 
responded to in the past. Power found that emergency commanders held two overarching goals:  
 
(i) Save life: Goals and motivations associated with approaching positive outcomes 
from a situation  
(ii) Prevent further harm: Goals and motivations associated with avoiding anticipated 
negative consequences. 
 
However, Power’s research found that these (competing) goals often resulted in uncertainty, 
goal conflict, passive and active avoidance, and inaction. In her own words “The ‘save life’ goal 
appeared to derail action if the decision-maker experienced goal conflict by trading it off against 
the competing avoidant goal to ‘prevent further harm’” (Power, 2016, p. 96). In terms of the 
double-mediation model of conflict, Emergency service responders experienced significant 
conflict because they were unable to tradeoff between the goal to save life and to avoid further 
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harm. They had no preference. As one of her interviewees recalled; “what you have to avoid is 
delaying making your decision about anything which then leads to somebody getting hurt but by 
the same token you don’t want to knee-jerk and rush into a decision that is not properly considered” 
(p. 96). Thus, because the service personnel viewed these goals as equal (and hence competing) 
they experienced significant conflict and, accordingly, experienced decision inertia in terms of 
decision avoidance. This work together then implies that the ability to commit to choices in least-
worst decisions is centered on the ability of a decision-maker to argument and sacrifice between 
the available options, and when, as shown in Power’s research, they are unable to argument and 
sacrifice, they become inert and struggle to commit to a decision.  
 
This Study  
 
 In the previous chapter, I identified the types of decisions faced by members of the Armed 
Forces, their inability to identify and apply analogies to these situations, and some of the general 
barriers to decision-making that are present in the military decision-making environment. What 
the last chapter did not do (and what neither MDMP nor RPD satisfactorily do) is explain how 
individuals choose between equally unappealing courses of action. This is an especially important 
element of this thesis given that the last chapter shows that members of the Armed Forces show 
an increased ability or readiness to make such decisions. This puts a premium on the need to 
understand the psychological process through which they make these decisions. Given this, in this 
chapter, I develop a grounded theory of military decision-making. Specifically, I develop a theory 
of how members of the Armed Forces decide between equally adverse courses of action. Given 
that there is little empirical research in this area grounded theory is the appropriate research 
methodology to employ (rather than discourse analysis or qualitative content analysis; see Starks 
& Trinidad, 2007).  
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Method 
 
Grounded Theory  
 
Grounded theory is a general methodology that is used to systematically develop theories 
that are emergent from, and grounded in, data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The theory itself evolves 
during the research and is the outcome of a dyadic data-collection-analysis process (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994). Glaser and Strauss originally proposed grounded theory in 1967 as a practical 
method by which you can conduct research that focuses on the interpretive process by analyzing 
the “actual production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real settings” (Gephart, 
2004, p. 457). Hence, in their view (and in stark contrast to the current emphasis for impartial 
external evaluators in science), a theory could be developed by exploring the interpretations of 
daily realities by those who were experiencing them (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 239). Hence, 
grounded theory is therefore a rejection of positivistic notions of falsification and hypothesis 
testing (Suddaby, 2006). Most significantly, grounded theory offers “a compromise between 
extreme empiricism and complete relativism by articulating a middle ground in which systematic 
data collection could be used to develop theories that address the interpretive realities of actors in 
social settings.” (Suddaby, 2006, p. 634). What separates grounded theory from other forms of 
qualitative analysis using the same data (interviews, observations, historical reports etc.,) is the 
unwavering focus developing substantive theory. As defined by the Grounded Theory Institute, 
run by one of the grounded theory founders (Glaser) grounded theory is defined as follows 
(Grounded Theory Institute, 2013): 
 
Grounded Theory is an inductive methodology. Although many call Grounded 
Theory a qualitative method, it is not. It is a general method. It is the systematic 
generation of theory from systematic research. It is a set of rigorous research 
procedures leading to the emergence of conceptual categories.  
 
Grounded theory, as outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) features two central 
components; constant comparison and theoretical sampling. Constant comparison (as noted above) 
emphasizes the fact that data collection and analysis co-occur and interplay with each other. 
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Theoretical sampling is the process by which the collected data dictate the direction of future data 
collection, in accord with the theory that is being developed. And, while a common misconception 
is that grounded theory must begin with a complete absence of theory (indeed the research should 
abstain from developing any insight into the area, incase this taints or directs their analysis; see 
Suddaby, 2006) theory can be modified, elaborated and generated through a grounded theory 
approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273). As a precursor for this grounded theory the 13 narrative 
accounts collected in Chapter 4 were re-analyzed using grounded theory methodology.  
 
Theoretical Sampling  
 
What emerged from the grounded theory of the original narratives was a series of 
propositions surrounding the way in which individuals evaluated choice and the subjective nature 
through which different choices were evaluated by the individual. Specifically, what emerged 
organically from these first 13 narratives were references to individual “value systems” that were 
at play and being used to direct action. However, despite the many references to values (both direct 
e.g., “I valued X” and coded through researcher interpretation “It was more important to me that 
we did Y”) this alone was insufficient to develop a series of axial and theoretical codes because, 
alone, the role of values had not reached the level of theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967). Given this, I engaged in a process of theoretical sampling to further explore the role of 
value systems as they pertain to choice in military decision-making. 
Theoretical sampling is the second core principal in grounded theory. Theoretical sampling 
cannot be planned before embarking on, and analyzing data from, the grounded theory study 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 192). During the initial data collection stages many codes may emerge, 
some of which are more important to the propositions of the theory than others. Given this, and to 
fully explore the axial relationships between codes further data collection is often needed to deepen 
the researchers understanding of certain categories until these categories reach, what Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) call, “theoretical saturation” in which;  
 
... no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can develop 
properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over again, the 
researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is saturated ... when one 
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category is saturated, nothing remains but to go on to new groups for data on other 
categories, and attempt to saturate these categories also. (p. 65.) 
 
Theoretical sampling then is the process through which data collection evolves as directed by an 
evolving theory and is a pivotal strategy in grounded theory methodology as it ensures that theories 
are based on a full exploration of the categories involved (Charmaz, 2000; Strauss, 1987). As 
Glaser (1978) outlines, theoretical sampling is the process in which “the analyst jointly collects, 
codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, to 
develop his theory as it emerges” (p. 36). In lay man’s terms, theoretical sampling occurs once the 
researcher begins to develop an idea of what is occurring, and alters his/her methodology to collect 
more detailed data on a given category or aspect of their area of study. As Strauss (1987) 
highlights, theoretical sampling “involves . . . much calculation and imagination on the part of the 
analysts . . .” (p. 39).  
 Despite the central importance of theoretical sampling to grounded theory, there is 
surprisingly little systematic guidance on the process (Draucker, Martsolf, Ross & Rusk, 2007). 
For example, as identified by Draucker et al. (2007), research that has claimed to have used 
theoretical sampling ranged from choosing participants with certain backgrounds to modifying 
their data collection practices. One study (Wilson, Hutchinson & Holzemer, 2002) even changed 
the entire direction of their study via theoretical sampling. Despite this variety in the specific 
method of theoretical sampling, it remains one of the fundamental hallmarks of grounded theory. 
Here I adopted the theoretical sampling method used by Caron & Bowers (2003) in that after 
conducting a series of preliminary interviews (see Chapter 4) I identified an area of interest (value 
systems) and added questions to my interview guide to explore this topic.  
 
Participants 
 
 For the first stages of the grounded theory, the narrative accounts collected through the 
Critical Decision Method (CDM) were used to support this study. However, for the theoretical 
sampling, a further 14 members of the Armed Forces were recruited and interviewed. Because the 
increasing interest was not on a specific type of decision, as in Chapter 4, individuals were not 
restricted by their length of service, rank or role.  
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Critical Decision Method  
 
 For the theoretical sampling, I used the same CDM method and structure outlined in 
Chapter 4. The only alteration in the 14 additional interviews was that during the third sweep 
(deepening) a series of probes were included that specifically sought to identify the underlying 
value systems at play during the decision-maker. If relevant the underlying origins of these values 
were also discussed. The updated series of deepening probes used for these 14 interviews are 
included in Table 5. 
 
 
Topic  Cues  
Information  What were you hearing/thinking/noticing during this situation? 
What information did you use in making a decision or judgment? 
How and where did you get this information, and from whom? 
What did you do with this information? 
Did you discard any information that you received? 
Analogs Did this situation remind you of any previous experiences you have 
had?  
Standard Operating Procedures  What were the parallels you drew between the situation and others? 
Did this case fit a standard scenario? 
Is this the type of event you were trained to deal with? 
Goals and Priorities  What were your specific goals and objectives at this time?  
What was the most important thing for you to accomplish at this point? 
Value systems  What values were you rely on when making these decisions? 
Which of these values were you willing to sacrifice against? 
Why, to you, is this value so important?  
Options What other courses of action were considered? 
What courses of action were not considered, and why?  
Was there a rule that you were following in choosing this option? 
Experience  What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in 
making this decision? 
Assessment If you were asked to describe the situation to someone else at that point, 
how would you describe it?   
Mental models  Did you imagine the possible consequences of this/these action(s)? 
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Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
Did you imagine the events and how they would unfold? 
How close was your imagined outcome to the actual outcome? 
Decision-making  What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the 
incident? 
How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
Did you think about it for too long? 
Were you ever worried about the time it was taking to make the 
decision?  
How long did it take to actually make this decision?  
Guidance Did you seek any guidance at this (or any) point in the decision? 
How did you know to trust the guidance you got? 
Feelings How did making this decision-make you feel? 
How did you feel about potentially making the wrong choice? 
 
 
Table 5: CDM probes used to explore participants’ decision-making strategies with a special 
emphasis on value systems (italics represent new questions). 
  
Data Analysis 
 
As proposed originally by Glaser and Strauss (1967), grounded theory involves constant 
comparative analysis consists of “explicit coding and analytic procedures” (p. 102). This, they 
advise should be conducted by following four procedures steps of data analysis:  
 
1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, 
2) integrating categories and their properties, 
3) delimiting the theory, and 
4) writing the theory (p. 105). 
 
In constructing the categories and theory, grounded theory relies on three central elements; 
concepts, categories, and propositions. Concepts are the basic unit of analysis (like “codes” in 
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thematic analysis). They are not units of data per se, but basic units of analysis which emerge from 
the data. As Corbin & Strauss (1990) highlight;  
 
Theories can't be built with actual incidents or activities as observed or reported; 
that is, from "raw data." The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, or analyzed 
as, potential indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual labels. 
If a respondent says to the researcher, "Each day I spread my activities over the 
morning, resting between shaving and bathing," then the researcher might label this 
phenomenon as "pacing." As the researcher encounters other incidents, and when 
after comparison to the first, they appear to resemble the same phenomena, then 
these, too, can be labelled as "pacing." Only by comparing incidents and naming 
like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic units for 
theory. (p. 7).  
 
Hence, concepts must be abstract from time, space and the original event from which they came 
(Glaser, 2002). In Glaser’s (2002) view, concepts must also have the power to “enduring grab.” 
As he argues concepts must “instantly sensitize people, rightly or wrongly, to seeing a pattern in 
an event or happening that makes them feel they understand with “know how”. In a word, the 
person feels like he or she can explain what they see.” (p. 30). Coding in grounded theory is 
therefore the process of both labelling concepts categorizing them into groups of similar 
phenomena (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Coding, then, is the “pivotal link between collecting data 
and developing an emergent theory to explain these data” within which the researcher finds 
meaning within the data and a theory begins to emerge (Charmaz, 2006, p. 46). With the evolution 
of grounded theory, several different forms of coding have been proposed (most notably the split 
in methods between the founders of Grounded Theory; Strauss and Glaser). Glaser (1978) suggests 
that there are two stages of coding, one “substantive” and the other “theoretical”. Corbin and 
Strauss (1990) suggested three stages of coding: open, axial and selective. Charmaz (2006) has 
since also proposed three stages of coding: initial, focused, and theoretical. What all models, 
arguably, reflect is a gradual increase in coding specificity from a priori open coding of the 
material thorough to attempting to discern the theoretical relationship between the codes. In Corbin 
and Strauss’ coding model open coding is “the interpretive process by which data are broken down 
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analytically” (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 12), axial coding explores the relationship amongst codes 
and, finally, selective coding is the process through which researchers generate stories that can 
link one or more categories. These selective codes then form the basis of the theoretical 
propositions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; see also Cho & Lee, 2014).  While it is clear the coding and 
data collection process occurred in parallel (e.g., open codes of “values” guiding new interview 
questions and further sampling) the analysis pattern employed here broadly reflects this original 
method proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Here I employed the three-stage coding strategy 
forwarded by Corbin and Strauss (1990).  
 
Results 
 
A Grounded Theory of Military Decision-making  
  
In Power’s work (outlined above), members of the blue light services encountered decision 
inertia when they were required to make a tradeoff between approach and avoidance goals; both 
of which were equally important to them. In military situations, while competing goals are 
common, goal conflict was far less prevalent. In my research while Soldiers’ often highlighted 
clashing goals, this rarely resulted in inertia. Through grounded theory analysis of their narratives, 
and theoretical sampling around the value systems, I identified an early theory of how Soldiers, 
under conditions of goal conflict, could commit to choices that have potentially intolerable 
outcomes. At the heart of this theory, and in line with the work above on argumentation and 
sacrifice, I identified the central role of attribute differentiation; that is, despite all options having 
the potential to be adverse, Soldiers have a strong sense of attribute differentiation when choosing 
between least-worst decisions. In the qualitative data collected above Soldiers consistently 
demonstrated a strong degree of attribute differentiation between different goals (meaning that 
they often had a strong goal hierarchy) and when making least-worst decisions, they often would 
not make a sacrifice on a single prominent attribute. What this means is that while the importance 
of the goals may have been equal (meaning they would be in conflict), the Soldiers were still able 
to draw a dissociation between the two choices, allowing a decision to be made.   
What emerged in this work, and what I engaged in further sampling to investigate was the 
role of individual values in the way different choices are argued and sacrifices are made. 
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Specifically, one finding that could be viewed as central to the theory developed here (but there 
are exceptions, as stated below) was that Soldiers often refused to make any sacrifices regarding 
the safety of the men and women under their command. For example, when deciding if and how 
to recover a large military asset currently burning in a local village, one interviewee highlights the 
importance of force protection: 
 
I think um If I was to prioritize [my goals], it would be to protect the lives of U.S. 
Armed Forces, I don’t want to be skittish and afraid to do our mission, but I 
certainly didn’t want to waste lives, or put them unduly at risk. We had spent a lot 
of money to mitigate risk and injury and death, and this was about recovering a 
piece of equipment, and I put that below Soldier safety. If I would have known the 
outcome of that would have been the death of 2 Soldiers, I would have said it was 
not worth it. 
 
On the reverse side, his decision-making would have been completely different had there been 
military personnel at risk: 
 
If I had personnel out there with it. I mean to say that the truck that they were 
hauling on was you know, say there was some personnel trapped out there. And 
then those are the times when you know you have to go, and you put people at risk 
to go, and we’ve been through that a lot of times when people get hit by an IED and 
there are folks trapped in the vehicle and then you just go, you don’t think about it, 
you don’t feel like you have a choice to just leave people out there. 
 
His decision-making, therefore, flips on the entirety of this single value. In a similar vein, another 
participant highlights the importance of force protection when deciding how to proceed with the 
convoy: 
 
Of course, protection is number one, make sure everyone gets back in one piece, 
hence we have a lot better chance in the firefight. I guess everyone in the country 
has control, and we have a squad that has more fire power than one of the most fire 
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powered squads in the military so the special forces or what…. our job is personal 
security detail, we are there to make sure an officer made it back and that was our 
primary objective, everything else was secondary. 
 
A Captain I interviewed from the U.S. Army shared a similar sentiment:  
 
I mean the idea is the way I saw it, and the, it is, you know, I, uh, before every 
deployment I talk with parents and, you know, my mission is to do my best to bring 
every one of their sons’ home. 
 
As one of my interviewees highlighted; the need to protect all your Soldiers stays even though it 
often clashes with more mission-focused objectives.  
 
You don’t want your squadron commander to yell at you. So, you don’t want that. 
So, I mean that was of course in the back of my mind, you don’t want to fail your 
mission and then again you don’t want to lose all of [vehicles] so that was a 
stressor. So, you didn’t want to fail your mission… certainly didn’t want to lose a 
Soldier 
 
Thus, despite the many goals in military decision-making (protecting the population, protecting 
forces, achieving the mission), perhaps one of my Marine interviewees sums it up best when, while 
pursuing a high-ranking member of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, he maintains that force protection was his 
number one priority:  
 
Targeting this insurgent was an incredible, great, opportunity, we have never had 
an opportunity like this before to get some bad guys that have put up a fight. But 
my goals were; (1) Protection of own force; (2) Killing bad guys; (3) Protecting 
population. 
 
The importance placed on looking after your fellow Soldiers is not surprising: it is commonly 
known to any lay person that this strong social bond between Soldiers is a vital protective factor 
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with the stressors placed upon them during war. In Leonard Wong and colleagues’ (2003) study 
on how Soldiers were motivated to “continue in battle, to face extreme danger, and to risk their 
lives in accomplishing the mission” they found that “U.S. Soldiers’, much like Soldiers of the past, 
fight for each other.” Thus, today’s Soldier is like their WWII counterparts, for whom, as S. L. A. 
Marshall (1942) noted in Men Against Fire, “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths that the thing 
which enables an infantry Soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or presumed 
presence of a comrade… he is sustained by his fellows primarily.” He continued “men do not fight 
for a cause but because they do not want to let their comrades down.” What this implies is the 
psychological coping benefits of protecting one’s troops; such a strong group-tie has psychological 
consequences for how Soldiers can handle conflict and navigate least-worst decisions.  
Here then, my theory centers not on the evaluation of multiple attributes (as with multi-
attribute decision-making, discussed in detail in Chapter 2), but with all options being evaluated 
on a single value to which complete priority is given. However, what separates my theory from 
the theoretical regression of single-attribute decision-making is the source of the value itself. In 
military decision-making, the single value used to evaluate all options was not dictated by the 
external environment, but intrinsic, deeply held to be important by the decision-maker and, hence, 
unique to them and with the potential to be different between different individuals making the 
same decision. Furthermore, these single values were not expressed as doctrinal, organizational 
policies, or even legal requirements. In most military personnel (who I interviewed) “force 
protection” was more than an organizational or cultural norm, but was a “sacred value.” Hence, 
my theory holds that military decision-making centers not on the presence and absence of goals 
(as with Power, 2016) but on the presence and absence of values.  
 It is a common misnomer that grounded theory involves not integrating theory that already 
exist, a priori, at that time. This is incorrect. As stated by one of the grounded theory founders 
(Strauss) currently existing grounded theories “they seem appropriate to the area of investigation, 
then these may be elaborated and modified as incoming data are meticulously played against them” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 273).  Hence, the theory that emerges from my data is not a “new” 
theory per se, but instead is the application of an extant theory of decision-making which is yet to 
be applied to military decision-making, but matches the data presented here and organically arose 
from it (rather than being deductively applied to it). Specifically, my theory of military least-worst 
decision-making centers on the presence, absence and interplay of sacred and secular values.  
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 Values are types of beliefs that guide us towards value-congruent behavior (Bardi & 
Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005). Values, therefore, affect the tradeoffs we are and are not willing 
to make in decision-making (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005; Rokeach, 1973). Incorporating values 
into decision-making can thus increase decision difficulty (especially when there is value-conflict), 
or can facilitate decision-making because people often hold values that are absolute; that is, they 
are precluded from being traded-off or traded against (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). Inviolable 
values are called “sacred values” (e.g. Tetlock et al., 2000). Sacred values are defined as “any 
value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite or transcendental 
significance that precludes comparisons, tradeoffs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or 
secular values” (Tetlock et al., 2000, p. 853). Baron and Spranca (1997) referred to such values as 
“protected,” in that each protected value is “infinitely more important than others” (p. 2) and 
attempting to tradeoff against such values can elicit strong emotional reactions such as denial, 
blame, procrastination, and avoidance (Anderson, 2003; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). Non-sacred 
values, referred to as secular, while important (often from an organizational standpoint) do not 
have the same inviolability.  
The presence of sacred and secular values in decision-making leads to three distinct types 
of value tradeoff (Tetlock et al., 2000). A first form of tradeoff is a routine tradeoff3 in which two 
secular values are pitted against each other. In the case of the hostage rescue, those secular values 
(something important, but not sacred) may include the desire for success with organizational 
policies. The second type of tradeoff is the taboo tradeoff, in which a secular value is traded off 
against a sacred value. Let us say, for example, that you hold that you must “try to save every life” 
as a sacred value. In this instance, this sacred value is traded-off against the more secular value 
(likelihood of success) resulting in a difficult, but consistent decision that you will launch a 
simultaneous raid because that way you didn’t simply ignore your sacred value of trying to save 
lives. Taboo tradeoffs are “in this sense, morally corrosive” in that “the longer one contemplates 
indecent proposals, the more irreparably one compromises one's moral identity. To compare is to 
destroy” (Tetlock et al, 2000, p. 853). The mere contemplation of a taboo tradeoff is sufficient to 
elicit a strong negative feeling of distress (Tetlock, 2003). The final type is a tragic tradeoff. To 
                                                 
3 It is worth mentioning that we (L. Alison and I) have a general distain for the terms “toxic,” “taboo” and “routine.” 
However, given that they are established terms within the field, and given the complexity of the analyses to come, 
we shall continue to use these terms to reference no sacred values; one sacred value and more than one sacred value.  
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demonstrate the ways in which sacred values can both make least-worst decisions both easier and 
harder let us reconsider our original dilemma. Looking at the hostage example above, there are 
several values at play that may be sacred. For example: the innocence of children; the sanctity of 
any life; and the need to ensure that you tried to save all possible lives could all be sacred. In which 
case, the least-worst decision is a tragic tradeoff because it requires individuals to trade two sacred 
values which ordinarily would both receive absolute priority.  
So, in least-worst decisions, values (especially sacred values) can both facilitate and hinder 
effective decision-making. In my Soldier sample, where in many cases I saw a clear and single 
sacred value (that of force protection above all others), I often saw effective decision-making and 
in those cases where I did see decision inertia it was often because of a tradeoff between equal 
(secular or sacred) values. Below I provide an example of a sacred value at play to emphasize this 
point; 
 
I’m sitting there getting everybody consolidated, reorganized, and distributing 
ammo because we didn’t know if there was gonna be another attack or what was 
going on and we had the civil affairs major came up to me and he said ‘I want you 
to pursue the enemy’. ‘I want you to go up into the mountains and get a body count 
pursue the enemy.’” and I looked at him and I said ‘are you kidding me?’ And of 
course we were all standing around the top of this little hill mountain that we were 
on where this medical clinic was no bigger than this room right now and we were 
in the middle and everybody was kinda around getting stuff ready and you know…I 
said ‘we’re not gonna do that. We’re gonna consolidate and reorganize, we’re 
gonna distribute ammo and we’re gonna get the hell out of here. We still have to 
make it out of this canyon. They let us in but it doesn’t mean that they’re gonna let 
us out. And frankly we don’t have the force to pursue the enemy.’ I mean at the time 
we didn’t know how big they were, we didn’t get the intel reports and stuff back 
until later, but it was clear that they were outnumbered and damn near overrun but 
for the close air support. And he said ‘Captain I’m not asking you I’m giving you 
an order you will go into the mountains and get a body count and pursue the 
enemy…. Talk about paralysis by analysis, there was no paralysis here. For a split 
second I thought ‘this is it, this is my military career’…and I said ‘well Sir here’s 
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what’s gonna happen; the people that are wearing this patch [pointing at his own 
arm] -- which was everybody there expect for the civil affairs team which were 
probably 6 guys -- I said everybody that is wearing this patch is gonna get in their 
vehicles and we’re gonna get the fuck out of here because this is not a safe place to 
be. And the people wearing that patch [pointing at the civil affairs Major’s arm] 
can stay here and follow you into the mountains. And at which point he got right in 
my face, very irate. the guy had a temper problem. He was just extremely irate you 
know swearing at me telling me that I was disobeying a direct order and he was 
gonna bring me up on charges and I just looked at him and said ‘well you do what 
you have to do Sir and I’ll do what I have to do.’ And I looked over to my Platoon 
Leader and I said ‘mount up let’s get the fuck out of here’ and everybody got in 
their vehicles including the Major who was umm the civil affairs major and we 
rolled out of there. 
 
Now, this clearly presents a least-worst decision; the officer had two choices; obey a (what 
he thought was risky and dangerous) order, or disobey an order and potentially end his military 
career. There is goal conflict, and these goals (pursue the enemy and return to base) reflect the 
approach and avoidance goals which Power and Alison (2017) identified as central to inertia. Yet 
this individual does not become inert. Instead, with relative ease, he decides and commits to a very 
high-risk course of action with a negative outcome. In his own words;  
 
My decision-making process there took about 30 seconds. Long enough for me to 
think...literally I disobey this order I’m taking my 10-year career and throwing it 
in the garbage. But again, this was a split-second decision for me because at the 
end of the day I remember thinking to myself I would rather lose my commission, 
you know, be fired and find another job and have everybody there that was with me 
make it back home than you know make the wrong decision and follow an order 
that I knew was tactically unsound and lose my Soldiers and/or my life. So, I don’t 
think that process took very long I guess long enough for me to kind of kinda have 
that conversation in my mind. 
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 Using my theory of value systems, I can hypothesize why this incredibly tough decision 
was, for this individual, so easy to make. Our Soldier demonstrates the sacred value of force 
protection over the more secular value of obeying orders to superior commanders and is able, in 
an extreme and high-consequence situation to make an effective decision. On the other hand, if he 
held the value of “obeying orders” or “pursuing the enemy” in the same regard as protecting his 
forces then it is viable to propose that he would have found this decision harder and, instead, 
become inert. However, and as evidenced by his actions, to this Soldier the importance of 
protecting the lives of his Soldiers was too sacred: 
 
No, you know I…it sounds corny but I think there’s a warrior ethos. There’s this 
idea that you never leave a fallen comrade and I think that influenced heavily in my 
decision-making. My radio telephone operator (RTO) and I had a conversation 
when we went into country and it was right after one of our Soldiers got dragged 
away in a mission. He got captured and you know they ended up either decapitating 
him online or they did something like that, and I remember looking at my RTO and 
saying ‘hey no matter what, don’t let them take me alive’ and vice versa right. I 
mean and we were serious like if there is nothing else put a bullet in me I just don’t 
want to end up on CNN right so…I think that idea that you never leave a fallen 
comrade is really engrained at least in me and I think a lot of my fellow comrades 
and I think that has a lot to do with the decision-making process there was almost 
no doubt I was going to get those guys right? In my mind, there was almost no 
doubt so…for what it’s worth I don’t know if that’s helpful to you 
 
While there is extensive research on both taboo tradeoffs and decision-making (e.g. 
Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Shweder et al., 1997; Tetlock, 2003; Tetlock et al., 2000), and moral 
decision-making as it pertains to military personnel (e.g. Eriksen, 2010; Hartle, 1989), none has 
gone so far as to investigate the effects of sacred values, or taboo or tragic tradeoffs in military 
decision-making (especially as it pertains to the emergence of decision inertia). That said, using 
my own data and that from other naturalistic research in this area (e.g. Power, 2016) I can 
demonstrate the role that sacred values can play in least-worst decision-making. Perhaps it is 
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easiest to present this as a simple table (and I acknowledge the over-simplicity of this 
representation) in which options A and B can be either sacred or secular (in line with Tetlock et 
al., 2003; see Table 6). To complete the table, I add my observations of the likelihood that inertia 
will emerge in these instances, and the ability of the decision-maker to make fast and effective 
decisions.  
 
 
  Option B 
 
 Secular Value Sacred Value 
Option A 
Secular Value 
Routine Tradeoff 
Decision inertia due to the 
inability to decide between two 
opposing secular values (e.g. 
organizational policies) 
Taboo Tradeoff 
Effective decision-making 
/absence of decision inertia 
due to a sacred value (e.g. 
Force Protection) which 
cannot be traded against 
Sacred Value 
Taboo Tradeoff 
Effective decision-making 
/absence of decision inertia due 
to a sacred value (e.g. Force 
Protection) which cannot be 
traded against 
Toxic Tradeoff 
Decision inertia/extreme 
difficulty in effective 
decisions due to tradeoff 
between equal sacred values 
which decision-maker is not 
willing to tradeoff against. 
 
Table 6: Sacred and Secular Values and least-worst decision-making.  
 
Furthermore, this view explains why certain individuals may struggle with some decisions 
while others will not. Consider the risk of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. General Stanley 
McChrystal, then Commander of the United States Armed Forces in Afghanistan, concluded in his 
2009 military progress report that there was an urgent need for a significant change in the way that 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were operating in Afghanistan. In his words, 
ISAF “had shot an amazing number of people, but to my knowledge, none has ever proven to be 
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a threat” (McChrystal, 2009). ISAF-caused civilian casualties were eroding ISAF’s credibility 
amongst the Afghanistan population, and in so doing significantly bolstering the Taliban’s 
strategic goals. When Gen. McChrystal took over as Commander ISAF (COMISAF) he 
implemented a series of strategic and tactical innovations and adaptations focused on minimizing 
civilian casualties through more restrictive rules of engagement (RoE), increased alignment of 
civilian and military efforts, building up the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and 
emphasizing non-kinetic activities. The goal was not to eliminate kinetic operations, but to ensure 
that kinetic activities were deployed in a counter-insurgency-centric manner (COIN) that 
emphasized protecting the civilian population as the ultimate target. As such, minimizing civilian 
casualties became a more pressing organizational policy, and the data show that this did lead to a 
direct reduction in the number of civilians killed by ISAF forces; see Shortland & Bohannon, 
2014). However, not all Soldiers adopted this new policy. Consider, for example, when one of my 
interviewees had to launch a missile attack on a compound: He “knew what the collateral damage 
estimate was, I was just going to have to accept it.” Contrast this with another one of my 
interviewees who, while holding that saving his fellow Soldiers is paramount, viewed avoiding 
civilian harm as equally important: 
 
But there is the other side of me that looks at it and says, you know, that if I fired 
and wasn’t supposed to, not only would that have probably ended my career, forget 
my career, I would have had to have lived the rest of my life knowing I had killed 
that guy. I don’t know what other people’s impression of the military is, if we take 
these decisions lightly, but I certainly didn’t and I don’t think other people do 
either. And the idea that you become jaded to the point when you stop caring about 
hurting innocent people. I can’t imagine becoming that jaded about that decision, 
in fact it still bothers me to this day, the idea that I, in a fraction of a second, I could 
have shot that guy, and if he was you know, Taliban, great, but if he wasn’t, you 
know, I can’t imagine the thoughts that would go through my head about that guy’s 
family, and things like that. So, it is a hard decision to live with. 
 
Thus, for some Soldiers the issue of civilian casualties is secular—imparted upon them top-down 
via doctrine and organizational policy—while for others saving civilian lives is a sacred value, a 
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violation of which causes moral outrage. Individual differences in sacred values can upend the 
decision-making calculus and crucially, explain when and why some individuals may suffer 
indecision and inertia while others will not. Consider this quote as a juxtaposition, in which the 
value of “civilian life” was clearly below that of “saving soldiers”: 
 
I cleared them to start engaging into this village cluster. I mean, there was 
nothing else I could do, I knew what the collateral damage estimate was, I was 
just going to have to accept it, and so, we started engaging inside the village, it 
was to the point where it was almost like part of the village was on fire because 
we were shooting rockets into the village. 
 
To further emphasize the presence of individual differences in sacred values: The sacred 
value of protecting ones’ fellow Soldiers was not universal in my sample, even though it was 
highly important for all, some (the minority) in my sample held other values as more important. 
While this changed the decision that they made - because it did not change the number of sacred 
values at play in the decision-making process - they were still able to quickly and effectively decide 
between two opposing options;  
 
Our duty is not to bring everyone home. As a young lieutenant, I thought that my 
duty is to bring everyone home safe, but that is actually not what I promised to do. 
So I promised to execute what, from way up there, you’re advancing U.S. policy 
and objectives, but at my level, it is executing missions. Now, at that point, it was 
‘I don’t think I can complete this mission with this group of folks that I have. I don’t 
think we can get it done.’ So, I don’t know if it goes deep enough as to why, I am 
objective focused, but I think largely it is because I try my best to as much trust in 
my leadership to not put me into situations where we are just getting screwed. 
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Conclusion 
 
We started this chapter investigating the question of when (if at all) do members of the 
Armed Forces make choices. While perhaps it is counter-intuitive to explore this, the central ethos 
of a lot of military training (and decision-making theory) is to better equip Soldiers’ to make fast, 
intuitive decisions with little deliberation. Hence, to eliminate choice because choosing is slow 
and Soldiers are not often afforded the luxury of time. I do not question the importance of such 
work. However, I hold that in war, certain situations will emerge that do require a choice; that is, 
we are required to deliberate between multiple choices. In such situations conflict can often 
emerge; especially when choice breeds tradeoffs. Previous naturalistic work has found that when 
faced with tradeoffs, decision-making often stalls and the decision-maker struggles to commit to 
a choice. But from what I have seen, members of the Armed Forces are better able to handle 
conflict and often less vulnerable to decision inertia. Here, then I engaged in a grounded theory 
approach to develop a theory as to how Soldiers make choices and why they are more resistant to 
decision inertia. I sought to explain this by looking at value systems. In tradeoffs, the degree of 
conflict experienced is weighted by the pre-existing values we hold, and some of these values we 
will not tradeoff against (sacred values). In the military, the bond between Soldiers is well known 
and is an important protective factor for the psychological struggle of being at war. But here I 
extended the importance of this, showing that, in many cases, the sacred value of force protection 
(or any other sacred value, such as completing the mission) often drove decision-making under 
conditions of conflict because Soldiers’ refused to tradeoff against this; meaning that they could 
make fast and effective decisions. Again, as with the propositions made in Chapter 4, this proposes 
several hypotheses that will guide my thinking going forward. Namely; 
 
1. Value systems predict the occurrence of inertia in least-worst situations. Specifically, 
when one sacred value is present decisions will be easier; but when two or more sacred 
values are present, decision will be harder. 
2. Because Soldiers show less inertia, they have stronger value hierarchy than those who 
become inert (namely members of the emergency services). This means that, more 
often, a decision involves only one sacred value.  
3. Choices will be harder to make when they involve two (or more) sacred values.  
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It is these hypotheses (along with those proposed in Chapter 4) that I proceed to test in the 
upcoming chapters.  
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CHAPTER 6: DEVELOPING AN EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM  
 
A hypothesis is a novel suggestion that no one wants to believe. It is guilty until found effective. 
 
- Edward Teller  
 
 Over the past two chapters, and informed by data collected on real decisions made by 
Soldiers in the theater of war I have proposed a series of hypotheses that relate to the differences 
between Soldiers and non-Soldiers and the difference between making military and non-military 
decisions. Furthermore, in developing a theory of how least-worst decisions are made, I have 
proposed a series of hypotheses that relate to how such choices are made, and critically when a 
decision-maker will struggle to commit to a least-worst decision. Perhaps it is useful to repeat the 
hypotheses I have developed thus far;  
 
From Chapter 4: 
 
4. Individuals who enter the Armed Forces have individual differences in decision-
making styles compared to those who do not join the Armed Forces. It is well known 
that individuals differ in their decision-making styles (e.g., a need to maximize, vs., a 
willingness to satisfice) and that this correlates with differing ability to avoid decisions 
(Parker, De Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007).  
5. Training in decision-making increases resilience to inertia because of it develops a 
domain-general ability to make critical time-sensitive decisions.  
6. The environment within which decisions are made (namely “at war”) lowers the degree 
to which external pressures (such as accountability) are felt, preventing such factors 
from derailing decision-making. Research from social psychology has extensively 
shown that individuals are affected by the situation, and often behave in situation-
relevant ways (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969). Given this, it is possible that the military 
environment creates social expectations for swift and decisive action.  
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From Chapter 5: 
 
4. Value systems predict the occurrence of inertia in least-worst situations. Specifically, 
when one sacred value is present decisions will be easier; but when two or more sacred 
values are present, decision will be harder. 
5. Soldiers will have a stronger value hierarchy, and hence, show less decision inertia.  
6. Choices will be harder to make when they involve two (or more) sacred values.  
 
In this second phase of this theses, I move from theoretical ponderings around the nature 
of these decisions and the way in which they are made to the quantitative testing of decisions using 
controlled experimental paradigms. I will explicitly seek to test the hypotheses that I have proposed 
over the past two chapters to provide evidence for the unique differences in Soldier samples and 
the importance of values as a framework for understanding least-worst decision-making.  In this 
chapter, I explore the methodological options available to us and their strengths and weaknesses. 
I then outline the methodology I will be using to test these hypotheses. Furthermore, in this chapter, 
I offer data from a pilot study to demonstrate the effectiveness and validity of the experimental 
methods adopted. 
 
Naturalistic Experimental Methods  
  
 Naturalistic researchers, where possible, seek to observe decision-makers in their natural 
environment. Now, while it is often problematic for them to attend and observe “live” critical 
incidents or operations (Crandall, Klein & Hoffman, 2006), researchers are increasingly securing 
access to observe (and be involved in the development of) high-fidelity training events (see Alison 
& Crego, 2008). Given the high-consequences and rarity of critical incidents it is often not in the 
best interest of practitioners for them to learn how to navigate such situations “on the go” (Kolb, 
1984) hence practitioners (and naturalistic researchers) rely on live exercises to provide experience 
of decision-making “in the coal face”. Live exercises are high-fidelity replications of complex, 
dynamic critical incidents such as terrorist attacks, floods, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 
Nuclear (CBRN) incidents and seek to expose the decision-maker to the environments faced by 
individuals in real operations to generate domain-specific challenges (Jenvald & Morin, 2004). By 
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integrating researchers into the design of such exercises the researcher can also able to maintain 
experimental control and evaluate individual performance (DiFonzo, Hantula, & Bordia, 1998).  
For example, a live-exercise involving a simulated terrorist attack was used in the 
development of the SAFE-T model outlined in Chapter 3 (van den Heuvel et al., 2012). In addition 
to that, a more recent SBT involving a 2-day simulated disaster with 194 participants and over 14 
different agencies allowed the researchers to observe the manifestation of decision inertia in 
critical and major incidents which, again, is a central precursor to this thesis (Alison et al., 2015). 
In addition to this, the author of this thesis (and others; Waring, Alison, and Humann) recently 
completed a live-exercise of a critical CBRN terrorist attack occurring across 3 sites and involving 
almost 100 practitioners distributed across 3 sites (Waring, Alison, Shortland & Humann, 
forthcoming). Here the authors evaluated the flow of information across the 3 sites with a view to 
examining the dynamic interplay between situational awareness and decision inertia. Live 
exercises then are phenomenally powerful, both for the practitioner and the researchers who wish 
to study decision-making as close to “live” as possible. For the practitioners, they provide an 
opportunity for the decision-maker to experience the complexity of critical incidents (and indeed 
to make mistakes and learn) without the real-world consequences, while for the researcher they 
provide the opportunity to witness decision-making in an environment that is a closer reflection of 
the microworld within which real decisions are made. This allows the identification of the wider 
exogenous and endogenous pressures (e.g., accountability, trust and role confusion) that would, 
arguably, not manifest in more “closed” decision-making tasks (see Alison, van den Heuvel, 
Waring, Power, Long & O’Hara, 2013). However, such methodologies are also not without issues. 
Namely, that while the “openness” of SBTs allows the emergence of wider factors within the 
microworld, what can be lost is the ability to isolate the individual’s influence and decision-
making. Given this, and with a view to identifying relevant methods to test my hypotheses, I must 
move away from fully immersive live exercises (despite their many benefits) to develop a more 
controlled (yet still immersive) research methodology. Specifically, in this research I use Scenario-
Based training (SBT) methods. SBTs offer a good halfway house as while providing a degree of 
immersion, they also allow degree of experimental control. Before I outline my SBT and its design, 
it is important that I outline the current methods that are used in military decision making research 
so we can see what a SBT-design adds above and beyond some of the more common methods.  
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Military Decision-Making Methods 
 
 When looking specifically at military decision-making research, there is an overwhelming 
reliance on mission planning exercises that are either a: table –top based pencil, or computer-
assisted mission planning exercises in which a Soldier (of varying degrees of experience) is asked 
to navigate a mission, and work through the military decision-making process, starting with of 
course or action identification, then comparison and finally execution. For example, Medhurst and 
Berry (2009) sought to understand risk taking in military decision-making. Here the experimental 
method involved a simple scenario presented alongside a set of serials constructed from cards 
which presented a single piece of information. Soldiers were then taken through the scenario and 
asked to judge how they would respond to the situation. Sarah Lincoln’s work on moral decision-
making has also adopted similar methods; employing a series of military scenarios that vary in 
ethical intensity (e.g., Lincoln & Holmes, 2010). Elsewhere, others have used tactical decision-
making tasks as a method to teach intuitive decision-making (rather than examine individual 
performance or predictors of individual differences; e.g., Vandergriff, 2006). When looking at the 
decision-making of small teams, Thunholm (2009) sought to examine leaders and followers’ 
differences in decision-making styles within a land battle scenario. Here small teams (5 -7) of 
Army captains conducted a 6-hour planning exercise in which they had to produce a written 
brigade plan. Thunholm (2007), Ross et al., (2004) and Schmitt and Klein’s (1994) work on the 
Recognition Planning Model uses similar team-based mission planning methods. Wider research 
investigating military decision-making (albeit loosely) have used a variety of methods from 
surveys to investigate the role of fatherhood on decision-making (Osman, 2003), to poker 
simulations (Paas, 2009), memory tasks (Aminoff et al., 2012) and business and managerial 
scenarios (Campbell & Campbell, 2011). 
One common method for collecting data on military decision-making with military 
personnel is the use tactical scenarios delivered through a computer-based program. For example, 
Kobus, Proctor and Holste (2001) provided 52 Marines with a series of vignettes developed from 
a tactical decision game (Mastering Tactics, Schmitt, 1994) presented via computer screen. The 
screen presents a visual depiction of the situation and a series of prompts or tools available to the 
decision-makers (see Figure 3).  Within this scenario decision-makers can click, pan, zoom in and 
out, review previous orders, submit orders and identify possible enemy locations. Within this 
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design, researchers modified the degree of uncertainty the participants were subject to (by 
increasing, or decreasing the amount of information provided within the scenario design). Less 
immersive methods that employ the same design often use paper and pencil scenarios in which the 
participant is given either a high or low detail mission brief and situational awareness.  
  
 
Figure 3: Dynamic display at the onset of the scenario (from Kobus, Proctor & Holste, 2001). 
 
 An alternate method, increasingly being used with the growth of technology in this area, is 
the examination of decision-making and performance in virtual systems. Research on video games 
has found that they are effective learning tools that can enhance decision-making skills 
(Dondlinger, 2007). Hence, virtual military training systems are increasingly being used. 
Deployable Virtual Training Environments (DVTE) were designed to help active-duty Marines 
learn and practice the elements of military Call for Fire (CFF) tasks (among other training 
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experiences). During such simulations, trainees act as the forward observer and are required to call 
in artillery fire onto targets in a simulated battlefield. The trainees have a series of tools available 
to them, including a compass, map, radio, and laser rangefinder. On the other hand, researchers 
have also used third-party generic video games to test military decision-making. For example, 
Vogel-Walcutt, Guidice, Fiorella and Nicholson (2013) used both DVTE and the video game 
“ARMA Combat Operations” (Bohemia Interactive, 2007). ARMA was used because it’s 
gameplay scenarios closely match the style and tone of DVTE. Here, while the off-the-shelf video 
game did not increase learning effectiveness, those who played it prior to a learning task reported 
more interest in continuing to learn. Ting and Zhou’s work also uses first-person virtual systems 
to train rapid decision-making skills for Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT; see, e.g., 
Ting & Zhou, 2008). When looking at more immersive methods, Kaber et al. (2013) recently 
examined the emergence, and updating of situational awareness (SA) within a virtual-reality based 
squad-based unmounted military operation. Specifically, Soldiers entered one of nine Virtual 
Reality (VR) booths that were equipped with a rear-projection screen which displayed virtual 
battlefield imagery to Soldiers. Within the booth, Soldiers were required to use a mock-up of an 
infantry weapon that had integrated interface controls that allowed them to toggle and use a series 
of mission-relevant equipment (such as virtual night-vision goggles, grenades, flares and flash 
bangs). Soldiers were also required to don a helmet and rucksack. Each Soldier was attached to a 
motion tracking system that provided data on posture, position, and viewpoint. Soldiers were also 
linked via radios allowing them to communicate (and the researchers to monitor and record 
discussions). Within this VR simulation, the squads were required to complete three “missions” 
which involved securing a route for a small convoy through a local town. During the scenario, the 
squad had to complete many tasks and deal with several emerging issues (such as an armed fighting 
age male). Between the three missions completed, weather, time of day, and the number of 
casualties were varied. Overall the experimental procedure lasted two days per-squad. Despite the 
ability of the study to pick-up some individual differences in SA, the results were slightly 
dampened by the sheer quantity of SA probes required for statistical significance (see Jones & 
Endsley, 2000). As outlined by the authors “Future studies should focus on achieving a balance 
between unobtrusiveness and reliability of the real-time probe measure.” (p. 343).  
When looking at more-immersive SBT methods; while full-scale mission rehearsal is 
common within military training, it is interesting to note that most military decision-making 
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research does not incorporate such training. There are, of course, exceptions to this. For example, 
Larsen (2001) used a live field exercise to measure the ability of sleep-deprived Soldiers to inhibit 
the reaction to shoot when told not to. In a similar vein, Salmon et al. (2010) observed a live 
operational field trial of a land warfare digital mission support system to observe the efficacy (and 
human-technology integration) of a mission support system (although it should be therefore noted 
that Salmon’s research was not focused on “decision-making” per se, but the overall performance 
of the military when a mission integrated this new system). To put this point in perspective, 
Helsdingen, et al. (2010) used two “field studies” to assess the effect of a critical thinking 
intervention on decision-making. In their own words, such studies are rare, because as noted by 
Helsdingen in the rationale for conducting their own work; the previous work on critical thinking 
and decision-making “had some limitations: they were conducted in simplified training 
environments.” (p. 540). Yet, when examining the methods for this work, both the “simplified” 
and “high-fidelity” training environments were paper and pencil. As stated in their methods “The 
test scenarios were two paper-and-pencil scenarios in which the participants again played the role 
of battle captain and the scenario leader covered all other roles.” (p. 543). Hence, even those studies 
that purport “high-fidelity” often rely on a paper and pencil mission task.  
 
Methodological Considerations for this Study  
 
 Immersion and fidelity offer several benefits for both participants and researchers. 
Simulated environments encourage greater immersion from participants (both cognitively and 
socially) and increase the validity of the method (Witmer & Singer, 1998). Yet they also offer 
several limitations which are critical to consider for the purposes of this research (the investigation 
of individual values on decision-making). Firstly, as outlined by Alison et al. (2013) if SBTs serve 
to replicate the complexity of real-life situations, then the performance within SBTs will be as 
complex as it is in the real world. Furthermore, obtaining detailed individual-level data from SBTs 
often requires participants to enter their decisions and rationale into decision logs (Alison & Crego, 
2008). So, while this method provides an “open book” for participants to reflect on the many 
dynamic and complex decision processes involved in their decision-making (Rosen et al., 2008a, 
2008b) what it misses is the inability to tap into implicit factors that were at play during the 
decision-making that are, often, not available at a conscious level. What this means, is that without 
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prompting, value systems are therefore unlikely to be commented on in a decision log, and even if 
they are commented on, it is viable that the participant may not be able to reflect upon the role of 
this in their decision-making (made more unreliable in that I would be asking them to comment 
on this post hoc and in hindsight).  
Contrary to the ethos of naturalistic research, the few experimental tests of the role of 
sacred values on decision-making have employed the type of experimentally controlled paper and 
pencil tasks reminiscent of the earliest work on traditional and economic models of decision-
making. For example, Hanselmann and Tanner’s (2008) work on the interaction of sacred values 
and decision difficulty involved 84 students completing a paper and pencil questionnaire that 
contained three decision scenarios that centered on manipulated tradeoff type (taboo vs., toxic vs., 
routine). In a similar vein, neuroimaging work on tradeoff type has extensively relied on written 
scenarios and require the participant to make a choice (see e.g., Duc, Hanselmann, Boesiger & 
Tanner, 2013). While such methods offer high experimental control (and high-fidelity measures 
of neurological activity) what they lack is the fidelity and immersion of a critical incident, meaning 
that I must question the degree to which I was able to translate the findings from a series of written 
scenarios to a real-life critical incident (it is also worth noting that none of the research uses 
scenarios that would qualify as “critical” or “major” incidents). Given this, in this chapter I seek 
to develop and test a research methodology that achieves three goals; 
 
1. Requires participants to make relevant critical-incident and military decisions 
2. Provides a degree of “immersion”  
3. Allows high-fidelity measurement of individual-level metrics of performance and 
individual differences in value systems  
 
Method 
Experimental Paradigm 
 
As outlined by Alison et al. (2013) “the credibility of any simulation exercise is measured 
according to the extent to which experienced decision-makers take them seriously and engage as 
they would in actual operational settings (Klein & Woods, 1993)” (p. 258). Fidelity is, therefore, 
the level of similarity between the simulation and the real world. Now, while here I cannot create 
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real-world or virtual physical fidelity (in terms of situating them within a physical environment 
that is similar to a real-life event) I can create cognitive fidelity by presenting them with decisions 
that are directly related to the environments within which they would operate.  This view is much 
closer therefore to psychological fidelity in that it seeks to address the underlying processes 
relevant to decision-making (Kozlowski & DeShon, 2004). Linked to fidelity, is the sense of 
immersion a participant feels within a decision-making environment (Eyre, Crego & Alison, 
2008). Immersion is defined, broadly, as the subjective experience of being in a situation, or an 
environment, when, in reality, they are in another. Kader’s work outlined above is a good example 
of “immersion” given that, while the Soldier was in fact in a research laboratory, everything they 
did, saw, heard, and the environment they operated within, felt like a deployed mission in a foreign 
theater. Immersion is a central facet of SBT and wider NDM research because it reflects the 
participant’s involvement and engrossment in the task at hand (Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Such 
engrossment is essential because highly immersive environments can create a high level of focus 
within participants that can transcend their awareness of the “real” external world (Murray, 1997), 
during which participants treat the exercise as a “real” operation (Crego, 1996). Here, while I 
cannot increase immersion through the visual world (i.e., creating a virtual microworld for them 
to operate within) what I can do is provide a virtual auditory world. While I do not question the 
importance of visual immersion, evidence from phobia-therapy supports the essential role of 
auditory immersion in creating immersion (Brooks, 1999). Furthermore, neurological research has 
found evidence for paired audio-visual activation, in which there is multisensory processing within 
the auditory cortex (see Bizley, Nodal, Bajo, Nelken & King, 2007). Sign language, for example, 
is “heard” in the auditory cortex (Nishimura et al., 1999). What this means, therefore, is that 
auditory stimuli are a central aspect of a multi-sensory experience of “immersion” and hence, 
auditory stimuli alone should provide a degree of immersion within a participant (and immersion 
above and beyond scenarios delivered without audio stimulation).  
Given this, this research sought to develop a series of desk-based scenarios that could create 
both psychological fidelity and immersion. To do this, I relied upon the CDM interviews 
conducted in Chapter 4 and 5. Specifically, the transcripts from the CDM interviews were analyzed 
and used to create a series of “scripts” which served as the basis for a series of scenarios. Each 
script was also further developed with support from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to ensure 
fidelity and realism. As part of this research, SME’s (where possible) included the individual who 
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was subject to the original decision. What this means is that each scenario was created with as 
much realism as possible, and as true as possible to the original decision that was faced by a real 
member of the U.S. Army while they were deployed in Afghanistan or Iraq. However, it is 
important to state that, in anticipation of the inclusion of a mon-military sample (see Chapter 8), 
the scenario scripts themselves were “civilianized” to a degree to ensure that the data collected 
could be compared between military and non-military samples who undertake this research. This 
“civilianization” of the military scenarios maintained the central decision point that was faced by 
the Soldier while presenting the content (and choices) in layman’s terms. As such, the scenarios 
developed here maintain fidelity (in that they represent real least-worst decisions) while ensuring 
high quality, comparable, data will be collected from both samples. In addition to creating military 
scenarios using the CDM transcripts, a series of non-military scenarios were also developed using 
scripts used previously as part of SBT exercises hosted by L. Alison with police officers, members 
of the fire service, and ambulance. After the draft scenario scripts were developed they were 
piloted by 15 undergraduate students at the University of Massachusetts Lowell who were asked 
to indicate their choice (to ensure individual differences emerged), the degree of difficulty each 
scenario posed (to ensure cognitive conflict was being induced), and the believability, realism and 
the degree to which they understood what was going on in the scenario.  
Once these scenario scripts were finalized they were recorded and edited to ensure a degree 
of auditory immersion was created. To achieve this, each scenario was “mapped” to highlight the 
auditory influences that would be heard if this scenario was in the real world. Audio examples of 
these influences were then obtained through either a: open-source examples (e.g., from Youtube), 
or b: recording them in the real-world. These were then integrated into the scenario using audio-
editing software Audacity to create a final, single-track, immersive audio script. Overall 16 
scenarios were developed for this study (seven military scenarios and nine non-military scenarios). 
 
Scenario Design  
 
Adopting methods commonly used in research on value-based decision-making, I sought 
to develop a series of A vs., B scenarios (e.g., Duc et al., 2013). The reason that I adopted a more 
“closed” scenario design vs., a more open interactive scenario (see e.g., van den Heuvel et al., 
2012) was the need for each participant to conduct multiple scenarios. The reason for this is simple; 
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I cannot predict which values a participant is going to hold “sacred” (if any), given this, participants 
will need to be exposed to multiple scenarios that juxtapose multiple different scenarios to increase 
the likelihood that, at one point during the experiment, they will encounter a toxic tradeoff (i.e., a 
decision point which involves multiple sacred values).  Here, rather than present a series of single 
decision point scenarios, however, I decided to employ an iterative 2-step scenario design. This 
was done to allow the researchers (if I so choose) to examine commitment to a course of action 
between two steps (a viable metric of their commitment to a choice of action; and hence decision 
inertia).   
Now, while we cannot fully control the phenomenological experience of the individual as 
they experience each scenario, a series of boundaries were developed to ensure consistency in the 
design of each scenario. Specifically, these were:  
 
 An A or B decision (i.e., a binary choice) 
 Involving a collapsing window of opportunity without being precise about a time 
limited deadline. In all cases, for every second that you delay, there is a risk of the 
situation getting worse.  
 Ability for the situation to be understood by both military and non-military 
personnel.  
 All roughly same amount of time (audio) and offering the same amount of detail 
regarding the situation (Situational Awareness was not a variable being manipulate, 
hence it was controlled throughout the scenarios).  
 
For the two-step A vs., B scenarios individuals were presented with an audio-feed that provides 
them an assessment of the situation and a required action. The participant was then asked to choose 
how likely (on a Likert-scale of -5 “very likely to choose option A” to 5 “very likely to choose 
option B”) they are to choose option A or option B. A 11 point likert scale was adopted as to allow 
the participant to highlight their strength of preference for a choice A or B. This, I felt, allowed for 
a measure of commitment. Based on the work of Power (2016) in each scenario one option will 
represent an approach goal (i.e., a way to make a positive impact on the situation), while the second 
option will represent an avoidance goal (e.g., avoiding further harm). Power’s work with the Police 
identifies that juxtaposing approach and avoidance goals often create cognitive conflict and inertia. 
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Once the individual has made their decision they will be presented with a further input (the “second 
step”) and then asked to re-evaluate the likelihood that they will choose Option A or Option B.  
To put this method in perspective, an example scenario script is presented below. This 
scenario would be delivered via an audio feed, with corresponding audio cues and background 
noise:  
 
“Hi Captain. I have just had some guys from the Special Forces come into the tent. 
They say they have received some intelligence about the location of some 
insurgents. The source of the intelligence is the brother of one of the local 
insurgents and these insurgents are the same ones that have been attacking our 
base and patrols over the past month or so. He says they have a base of operations 
up in the Mountains to the north of here. We are streaming some video footage of 
the area as we speak. I’ll send it over now. The footage is pretty grainy, but there 
is definitely some movement up there. The Special Forces guys think that the 
insurgents will be gone by morning and want to know if you want to start the 
process of launching an airstrike?  
 
After being exposed to this audio input the participant will be asked to choose their course of action 
(-5: I will definitely not deploy air support; 0: I am unsure; 5: I will definitely deploy air support) 
and their confidence level. After the participant has indicated their decision a second inject will 
test their commitment to this course of action. In the example above, if the participant did choose 
to deploy air support (choices 1 – 5) the following inject would be delivered: 
 
“[Call from the commanding officer]. Captain, I have just heard that you are trying 
to launch an airstrike? What the hell are you doing? We are in the command center 
looking at the exact same intelligence as you! Did you not think that they could be 
civilians, they’re probably up there cutting wood or something!”  
 
Again, after being exposed to this audio input the participant will be asked to choose their course 
of action (-5: I will call off the air assault; 0: I am unsure; 5: I will continue to the air assault) and 
their confidence level.  
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 It is important to state that after the participant was exposed to the audio feed they were 
asked to “click onto the next page when you are ready to make a decision.” The reason that the 
decision and the scenario track were hosted on different pages was to ensure that the varying 
lengths of audio input did not affect measures of decision-making and choice selection (see below). 
Furthermore, the use of a two-step, rather than a one-step scenario is to test an individuals’ 
commitment to the choice that was made during the first step. This adds an important variable 
given that a core characteristic of decision inertia is the inability to commit to a choice and 
undertake the behaviors required to execute the action. While decisions cannot be behaviorally 
executed within this paradigm, a two-step scenario offers insight into the participants’ degrees of 
commitment to a choice. However, it is also important to highlight that this two-step method also 
leaves the participant at risk of consistency bias, in which they continue to commit to a choice 
solely because they previously made it (rather than because they are truly “committed” to it). While 
this is an important consideration, given that all choices made in this research paradigm are 
anonymous (i.e., they are not verbalized to a “team,” or the researchers), I believe that I am 
mitigating this effect. Consistency to a prior choice is often driven by the social commitment to a 
choice (i.e., telling others what you are going to do), and it is this social commitment that is the 
barrier to change. Choice anonymity removes and therefore mitigates this issue. 
 
Psychometric Pre-Measures  
 
Based on the hypotheses proposed so far and an analysis of previous literature several 
psychometric pre-measures were incorporated into the study methodology. Specifically, I sought 
to measure Need for Closure (NFC); the self-reported need for maximization and experience and 
an individuals’ value construct. I elaborate on each of these below: 
Need for closure (NFC). NFC is the desire to obtain a definite answer to a topic or 
question, rather than experience confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989, p.14). Hence, NFC 
is the desire for an answer, any answer, rather than confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1990). 
In this study, NFC will be measured via the ‘Need for Cognitive Closure Scale’ (Kruglanski, 
Webster & Klem, 1993). Hence, those who score highly on NFC limit their cognitive processing 
to minimize uncertainty and achieve rapid closure in a decision-making task. The five traits that 
characterize those who score high on NFC are; (i) a desire for order and structure; (ii) discomfort 
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through ambiguity; (iii) decisiveness; (iv) predictability; and (v) close-mindedness (Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994).  
Maximization. Maximization is the need to maximize a situation and is often linked to 
poor outcomes. As outlined in Chapter 2 and 3, effective decision-making in time-sensitive 
situations is reliant on the ability to “satisfice” and choose an alternative that is “good enough” 
(Simon, 1978). Maximizing is, therefore, trying to select the option with the highest expected 
utility. Building on Simon’s work, Schwartz et al. (2002) sought to develop a scale that measured 
the degree to which individuals are hesitant to “satisfice” and instead seek to maximize the 
outcomes of any given situation. Because of the many challenges with maximizing outcomes, 
those who do so experience less happiness, optimism, and life satisfaction, while incurring more 
depression, perfectionism, and regret (Schwartz et al., 2002). While no study has specifically 
examined the role of maximization in the military or critical incident responders, it is viable to 
assume it holds an important role. Furthermore, given the focus on decision inertia in this thesis, 
maximization seems especially pertinent given than self-reported maximizers report greater levels 
of decision avoidance (Parker, De Bruin & Fischoff, 2007). Here I use Schwartz et al.’s (2002) 34-
item measure of tending to maximize, rather than satisfice, which uses a scale anchored at 1 
(completely disagree) and 5 (completely agree). This scale includes items such as “When I watch 
TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the options even while attempting to watch one 
program.” Schwartz et al.,’s (2002) maximization inventory includes three separate types of 
maximization behavior; namely satisficing, decision difficulty and alternative search (see Turner, 
Rim, Betz & Nygren, 2012 for a full outline of the measure). 
Experience. The final factor measured here is experience. Naturalistic decision-making, 
specifically RPD puts a premium on the role of an individual’s experience when making decisions 
during uncertain situations (see Lipshitz et al., 2001; Klein, 1997). Experience aids situation 
assessment, option evaluation, and mental simulation of the potential option outcomes (Lipshitz et 
al., 2001). In this study experience (alongside other demographic variables such as quantity and 
quality of training as well as a measure of interpersonal trust) will be measured via a pre-scenario 
questionnaire.  
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Post-Measures  
 
As part of this study, two important post-measures were taken; both of which were adapted 
from Hanselmann and Tanner (2008). Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) sought to investigate the 
effect of tradeoff type on decision difficulty. To do this they required a measure of both values 
systems and decision difficulty. Hanselmann and Tanner (amongst others) defined decision 
difficulty as “the level of perceived difficulty or ease of selecting among choice options.” (p. 52; 
for a review, see Anderson, 2003). To measure decision difficulty they used a single, and multi-
factor measure. The single-item measure involved the participant answering the question “How 
easy or difficult was it for you to decide? For me, this decision was... (7-point scale ranging from 
1 [very easy] to 7 [very difficult]).” (p. 63). The multi-item measure, on the other hand, involved 
five statements with a 7-point scale (ranging from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree]). The 
five statements used in this scale are;  
 
1. For me, this decision is... (7-point scale ranging from 1 [very easy] to 7 [very difficult]) 
2. I would need more time to decide. 
3. I would not ponder for a long time on this decision.  
4. I feel very ambivalent about this decision. 
5. For this decision, I feel certain which option to choose. 
 
After piloting the decision difficulty scale, several changes were made to increase its 
suitability for this study. Firstly, the items were personalized meaning so “I would not ponder this 
decision…” becomes “I did not ponder this decision…”. Finally, an additional item was added to 
the scale. This item, “I wanted more information before I made my decision” was inserted to 
measure individuals’ tendencies to delay a choice. Here I also used a sliding scale of 0 to 100 to 
increase the fidelity of the measure above a 7 point likert scale. A decision difficulty questionnaire 
was provided after each scenario (16 in total).  
In addition to this, Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) used the sacred values measure (SVM) 
proposed by Tanner, Rfy and Hanselmann (2007). While they provided an updated version of the 
SVM in their experiment, given the sheer length of the study (and the very real risk of participant 
fatigue) I opted for the original 4-item SVM (see Tanner et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 4-question 
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version of the SVM is shown to have good internal consistency (higher than .79) and construct 
validity (Tanner et al., 2007). This version of the SVM asks participants to rate their agreement 
with four statements relating to a given value. For example, with the value “saving lives” the SVM 
would ask participants to “Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about 
saving lives” and present the following four items; 
 
1. My stance on this issue might change over time. 
2. I would not change my opinion, no matter what the costs. 
3. I would have problems making any concessions on this topic 
4. There are principles involved in this topic that we should defend under any 
circumstances. 
 
In this study, each of the scenarios was examined to identify which values related to the options 
on offer. Overall, 11 values were identified (see Table 7), hence, after the participant has completed 
all the pre-test measures, and scenarios, they were asked to complete an 11 SVM relating to the 11 
values involved in this study. 
 
Value 
Avoid blame for my actions  
Act within the law  
Everyone’s right to free will 
Protecting the Life of people under my command  
Protecting the life of a civilian 
Protecting the life of a fellow Soldier  
Ned to exert my authority over others  
Completing the mission  
Pursue a known enemy  
Avoid negative consequences for your action  
Obey the orders of a superior  
 
Table 7: Values measured during the 16 scenarios.  
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Measures of Decision-Making  
 
 The study itself was hosted on the online survey tool Qualtrics to allow the measurement 
of high-fidelity reaction times within the scenario, as well as overall. Hence, for each scenario (in 
addition to their choice preference, the strength of preference, and decision difficulty) the 
following reaction time measures were collected: 
 
1. Amount of time spent listening to the audio input  
2. Amount of time between the end of the audio input and choosing to progress to the 
decision-making phase of the scenario  
3. The amount of time taken to mark the first preference  
4. The number of times the participant changed their preference  
5. The overall time taken to commit to a choice of action  
6. The time between selecting their final choice of action and “committing” (i.e., submitting) 
to a decision 
 
Overall then the designed study exposes participants to a series of forced-choice scenarios 
which require them to navigate both military and non-military scenarios. A series of psychometric 
and demographic pre-tests are collected as is a measure of their value systems. In terms of 
dependent variables, a host of choice, and reaction times are collected as are subjective evaluations 
of decision difficulty. To help the reader visualize the “flow’ of the study, Figure 4 shows the 
outline of the study from informed consent to debrief. Furthermore, for the full experimental script, 
including the scenario scripts, please see Appendix G.  
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Figure 4: Study “flow” from informed consent to debrief.  
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Pilot Study 
Purpose  
 
To test the hypotheses proposed at the start of this chapter the proposed 
experimental method must satisfy several criteria. Specifically, individual differences in 
values, decision-making, decision difficulty and response time must emerge. Hence, before 
using this research methodology with Soldiers and members of the emergency services it 
is important that I conduct a pilot study that allows us to investigate if individual 
differences in performance are detectable within this experimental paradigm. Below I 
outline the methods, results, and implications of this pilot test.  
  
Participants  
 
 Eleven individuals took part in the pilot test of this study. While 18 individuals 
started the study, only these 11 completed it. Furthermore, of these 11, one individual did 
not complete the sacred values measure (one more participants’ SVM scores were excluded 
after the scores indicated a lack of validity; i.e., all questions, for all values were marked 
the same score). While these two participants could not be included in the analysis of 
values, their results were kept because they completed both the NFC and maximization 
scales and the 32 decision points. Of the eleven individuals who took park in this study, 
five had been, or were currently, a member of the Armed Forces. Of these five, four (80%) 
had been deployed to a theater of conflict. Four were Army, and one was Navy. The 
average service length of these five Soldiers was 16.2 years. Of the 5 Soldiers, one 
individual has also served as a member of the emergency services (police). None of the 
non-Soldiers had served in the emergency services. Before I outline the results of this 
study, it is important to state that while only 11 participants took part in a pilot test of this 
study, each participant completes 32 decision points, 16 decision difficulty questionnaires, 
and provided 11 sacred value measures. When viewed in this light, this pilot test involves 
more decision points (352) than many of other full studies that have sought to investigate 
sacred values and decision-making (e.g., Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; 84 participants and 
3 scenarios = 252 decision points). 
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Procedure  
 
Participants were opportunistically sampled through a series of recruitment calls 
that were distributed through the student, and veteran population at the University of 
Massachusetts Lowell. Participants were instructed via the call for recruits (see Appendix 
H) to click on the hyperlink provided in the call for participants. This took the participant 
to the Qualtrics-hosted study from which they read and agreed to the informed consent. 
From here, participants completed the two pre-test measures, 16 scenarios, 16 decision 
difficulty questionnaires and the 11 sacred value measures. All scenarios were randomly 
presented to all participants, however, the order they were presented in was randomized. 
All choice and reaction time data was collected automatically via Qualtrics and was 
available to download by the researcher as an excel spreadsheet.  
 
Results 
 
Overall Decision-Making 
 
  For the following analyses, I focus solely on the amount of time participants took 
in the decision-making phase of each study (i.e., after they had listened to the audio feed 
and clicked that they were “ready to make a decision.”). Furthermore, I adopt a within-
subject design meaning that each decision point is examined independently (n = 352) rather 
than decision-making overall (n = 11). When analyzing the results, and sensitive that the 
study was conducted outside of the laboratory and in the participants’ real world (in which 
more distractions exist), I examined reaction times for any outliers that may be indicative 
of distraction. In line with Ge et al., (2009) when looking at the overall reaction times, any 
reaction time two standard deviations above the overall mean for the group were excluded 
(in this study the threshold was 49.22 seconds). This resulted in a final sample of 345 
decision points. On average, across the scenario, participants took 8.16 seconds to decide 
(SD = 6.65 seconds). When looking at the strength of choice preference, participants on 
average selected an option with medium-high levels of confidence (3.97, SD = 1.52, where 
5 = complete certainty and 0 = unsure). Looking at decision difficulty ( = .682), on 
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average across the entire experiment, participants found the scenarios somewhat difficulty 
(mean difficulty overall = 49.16, SD = 37.47).  
 A series of Pearson’s correlations were run to investigate the relationship between 
reaction time, strength of preference and decision difficulty. Overall, strength of preference 
was not significantly correlated with reaction time (r(11) = .169, p = .620). To run 
correlations with decision difficulty, decision difficulty scores across the 5 items within the 
decision difficulty questionnaire (once correctly reverse coded) were averaged (summing 
was not used due to the presence of missing data in some decision difficulty 
questionnaires). Reaction times for both decisions within each scenario and the strength of 
choice preference for both decisions within each scenario were then summed to provide 16 
items per participant rather than 32. Here, a Pearson’s correlation found that there was not 
a significant correlation between decision difficulty and reaction time (r(11) = -.378, p = 
.252) or decision difficulty and strength of preference (r(11) = .433, p = .184).  
  
Need for closure. Participants’ NFC was measured using 15-item shortened NFC 
scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011; tested here as  = .962 which is much higher 
than the established  of 0.84; see Kruglanski et al., 1997; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). 
The shortened scale achieves similar psychometric scores and correlations as the full scale 
and is suitable for use here given the concerns surrounding participant fatigue and the 
length of the survey. Overall, Pearson’s correlation found that NFC was not correlated with 
decision-making speed (r(11) = .336, p = .313), nor was it correlated with strength of 
preference (r(11) = -.399, p = .224) or decision difficulty (r(11) = -.305, p = .362).  
 
Self-Reported Maximization. Participants’ self-reported maximization was 
recorded using the Schwartz et al. (2002) maximization inventory ( = .747). Overall, and 
unsurprisingly, a Pearson’s correlation showed that participants’ NFC and maximization 
scores did not correlate (r(11) = -.221, p = .513). Here I examine the role of self-reported 
maximization in general as well as the analysis of the specific constructs contained within 
the scale (satisficing,  = .884; decision difficulty,  = .780; and alternative search,  = 
.937). Pearson’s correlation found that those who, overall, score high on the maximization 
scale did not show a stronger strength of preference (r(11) = .399, p = .224). Overall 
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maximization did not significantly correlated with self-reported decision difficulty (r(11) 
= -.149, p = .662).  
 
Sacred Values. The SVM identifies, for each participant, the importance of the 
identified values. Here the Cronbach’s alpha for the SVM was lower than previously 
reported for this scale ( = .384) and would have been significantly higher if the first item 
(“I might change my view on this over time”) was removed ( = .807). To analyze the 
importance of each value, the next sum of score across each of the four items on the SVM 
were summed (after item 1 “I might change my view on this over time” was reverse coded). 
This, for each value, gave participants a score of between four and 28. Ten of the 11 
participants completed the SVM. One more participant was excluded for giving each value 
the same score, across the same variables. The overall importance of the values, in rank 
order of most important to least important, are shown in Table 8. 
 
Value  
SVM 
Score 
(4 – 28) 
Avoid blame for my actions 19.40 
Protecting the life of a civilian 17.33 
Protecting the life of a fellow Soldier 16.36 
Protecting the Life of people under my 
command 14.91 
act within the law 14.64 
The right to free will 14.50 
Pursue a known enemy 14.09 
Completing the mission 14.00 
Need to exert my authority over others 13.80 
Obey the orders of a superior 13.00 
Avoid negative consequences for your action 12.30 
 
Table 8: Value importance, as rated by the SVM.  
 
Previous research that has examined tradeoff type and decision-making has been restricted 
to a few, simple, scenarios. Hanselmann and Tanner (2008) for example, used two 
scenarios with only two values being measured. Here I have 16 scenarios with 32 decision 
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points and 11 different values (multiple of which are often involved in a single decision 
point). The analysis here is therefore exponentially more complex, nor has it been done 
before, providing little in terms of theoretical guidance with which I can follow. Given this, 
a series of basic activities were conducted with a view to achieving the following two 
essential tasks; 
 
 Task 1: Identifying “sacred” values. Individuals differed, not only in the importance 
given to each variable but also with the baseline value score for all items and degrees of 
deviations with which they associated importance. For example, while the mean 
importance of each variable was 14.89 overall, the average within an individual ranged 
from 20.27 to 8.4. What this means then is that denoting a value as “sacred” must be done 
within individuals, rather than between, and hence a value being “sacred” must denote a 
significant deviation in the average importance of all values, to that individual. This will 
prevent the use of overall “thresholds” which would mean that, while for some no values 
are “sacred,” for others, almost all values would be “sacred.”  Hence, here, to denote a 
value as sacred to that individual there score on that variable must be at least one standard 
deviation above the mean score for the other 10 SVM scores. The one standard deviation 
barrier was adopted because it is commonly used within the field to denote a significant 
deviation from the norm and hence, as a classification score (e.g., Clemmons, Walsh, 
DiLillo & Messman-Moore, 2007).  
 
 Task 2: Establishing tradeoff types. The more complicated process is then 
identifying which values are involved in each of the 32 decision points to identify, for each 
person, whether that specific decision involved zero, one or two sacred values (and hence 
was it routine, taboo or toxic). To achieve this, the author of this thesis went through each 
scenario and identified which of the 11 values were directly being traded-off within each 
scenario. The same task was also then conducted by an individual with no experience of 
the scenarios and their contents. They were provided an empty matrix box (identical to that 
shown in Table 9) and provided the audio files for each scenario. They were then asked to 
identify which values were involved in each decision point. The primary author then 
compared the two value matrices. When the two reviewers disagreed, a third reviewer (also 
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blind to the original scenario design) adjudicated. The final value matrix is shown in Table 
9. Overall, the measure of inter-rater reliability (Jaccard’s coefficient) for this task was 
very low (.28). With these two tasks complete I could examine the effect of tradeoff type 
and decision-making.  
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 Scenario 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Protecting the life of people 
under my command                                                                  
Protecting the life of a fellow 
Soldier                                                                  
Protecting the life of a civilian                                                                 
Completing the mission                                                                 
Pursue a known enemy                                                                  
Avoid negative consequences 
for your action                                                                  
avoid blame for my actions                                                                  
act within the law                                                                  
Everyone’s right to free will                                                                 
Ned to exert my authority over 
others                                                                  
Obey the orders of a superior                                                                  
 
 
Table 9: Value matrix showing the individual values at play during the 32 decision points navigated as part of this study.  
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 Looking at participants’ value systems, on average, each participant had 2 sacred 
values (Mode and Median = two, Mean = 1.77 sacred values). Furthermore, the specific 
values which were sacred to the participants were highly varied. No one value, as measured 
by the SVM, was “sacred” to more than 2 participants (18.18%). In addition, only two 
values were not identified as being sacred to at least one participant (“avoid negative 
consequences for your actions” and “pursue a known enemy”).  
With individuals’ sacred and secular values now identified, and the value matrix 
constructed (Table 9) I re-coded decision points as to whether they reflected a taboo, 
routine or toxic tradeoff. For the nine participants left, the 288 decision points manifested 
in 192 routine tradeoffs (no sacred values), 72 taboo tradeoffs (one sacred value) and 24 
toxic tradeoffs (more than one sacred value). A one-way repeat measures MANOVA was 
run with the three tradeoff types (Routine x Taboo x Toxic) as independent variables and 
markers of decision-making as independent variables (decision-making times during the 
situational awareness phase; decision-making times the decision-making phase; and 
decision difficulty). Overall there was a statistically significant effect of tradeoff type on 
performance within the scenario (F(8, 552) = 3.202, p < .001; Wilk's Λ = 0.913, partial η2 
= .044. Given this a series of univariate ANOVAs were run. These found that tradeoff type 
significantly affected timing during the situational awareness phase of the scenario (F(2, 
279) = 5.797, p < .005; Wilk's Λ = 0.450, partial η2 = .33), the amount of time it took them 
to commit to a choice (F(2, 279) = 3.634, p < .05; partial η2 = .025); and self-reported 
decision difficulty (F(2, 279) = 3.221, p < .05; partial η2 = .023). Post hoc analyses (using 
an adjusted Bonferroni test to accommodate the large number of comparisons) found that, 
when looking at the situational awareness phase of a scenario, participants were 
significantly slower for routine tradeoffs (M = 33.72 seconds, SE = 1.26) than taboo 
tradeoffs (M = 26.308, SE = 2.08, p < .05). When looking at decision-making speeds, 
participants were significantly slower to commit to a choice when it involved a toxic 
tradeoff (M = 7.59, SE = 1.85) when compared to a routine tradeoff (M = 2.31, SE = 0.66, 
p < .05). In terms of self-reported decision difficulty, participants reported that taboo 
tradeoffs were harder (M = 54.98, SE = 2.54) than routine tradeoffs (M = 47.52, SE = 1.55, 
p < .05). The mean plots of tradeoff type and situational awareness speed, decision-making 
speed, and choice commitment speed are shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Tradeoff type and situational awareness timing, overall decision timing, and 
choice commitment timing. 
  
Discussion 
 
 It is important to state that the goal of this chapter was not to measure decision-
making nor my theory per se. Instead, this chapter sought to outline the development and 
piloting of an immersive desk based decision-making task that achieved three goals; 
 
1. Requires participants to make relevant critical-incident and military decisions 
2. Provides a degree of “immersion”  
3. Allows high-fidelity measurement of individual-level metrics of performance 
and individual differences in value systems  
 
With these goals in mind, it is arguable that this study then was a success. While the first 
two points are, to a degree, subjective, participant feedback provided informally shows 
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evidence of immersion and many participants shared extremely positive feedback for the 
study and their experience. Moving on to the third objective the results here also show high 
degrees of both individual difference and the influence of value systems. This, coupled 
with the identification of several statistically significant predictors of performance within 
this scenario further support the validity of this method. Below I outline some of the 
important metrics surrounding this study, as well as outline some of the (expected and 
unexpected) preliminary results which are emerged from it.  
 First and foremost, overall, participants’ reaction times implied that they were 
engaging in a deliberate choice. Specifically, the average decision-making time was close 
to 8 seconds with 6 seconds of standard deviations. This, coupled with the relatively high 
average decision difficulty score, implies that on average, participants found the scenarios 
to be challenging and did engage in an active decision-making process. The fact that 
decision-making speeds were significantly affected by tradeoff type further implies that 
participants were engaged in a cognitively active choice process and not selecting arbitrary 
choices. The fact that the average “strength” of preference was also midway (with a 
standard deviation or +/- 2) also implies that participants were not making arbitrary 
choices. Here again, the positive correlation between self-reported decision difficulty and 
both strength of preference (being less sure of hard decisions) and reaction time (making 
slower decisions when choices were harder) all support that participants were engaged in 
the study, making active choices, that they found some scenarios harder than others, and 
that their behavior within the scenarios reflected how hard (or easy) they found a given 
scenario.  
Overall, while the very small sample size precludes us from drawing concrete 
conclusions here and relating my findings to the wider literature on these constructs 
(something I will do in the next chapter) what I can say is that my NFC and maximization 
scales show strong validity (very high Cronbach’s alpha scores for both NFC and 
maximization and each sub-component of the maximization scale) and both scales show 
correlations with performance on the decision-making task in both predicted and 
unpredicted directions. This strongly supports the internal validity of the study developed 
here in that performance within scenarios and their subjective perception of decision 
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difficulty appear to be directly related to individual differences in their NFC and self-
reported maximization.  
 In line with this, there is also evidence here that the SVM is a useful tool for 
understanding participants’ value systems and furthermore, that these value systems can 
be used to predict performance in the decision-making task. First and foremost, while the 
Cronbach’s alpha for the SVM was much lower than in previous efforts to use it (e.g., 
Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Tanner et al., 2007), it is possible that this can be raised to a 
much higher level if certain items are removed (namely item 1). This finding specifically 
warrants further consideration if replication with a much larger sample maintains this 
finding because it gives pause that the measure is so central to the importance of a value 
(i.e., changing one’s mind). Here, because the goal of this chapter was to develop and trial 
the methodology (rather than make concrete assertions surrounding value systems and 
decision-making) the choice was made to use the SVM as is. However, any further use of 
the SVM will use a Cronbach’s alpha analysis to identify if any items should be removed 
from the analysis prior to calculating sacred values.  
A central part of the study is the ability to identify values that are “sacred” and the 
ability to calculate (in hindsight and without reference to the participant’s self-explicit 
awareness) which scenarios involved routine, taboo or toxic tradeoffs. Here then, using the 
SVM to analyze participant’s value systems across 11 critical values I identified as playing 
a role in the 16 2-step scenarios they navigated, I identified which values were sacred. 
Because the previous uses of the SVM are not as complex as my study (in terms of the 
number of values and decision points per participant) I was required to construct a new 
method of identifying how “sacred” a value was. Here then, employing a threshold that has 
commonly been used in social science (e.g., Verdugo & Verdugo, 1989; Witt, Burke, 
Barrick & Mount, 2002), I defined a value as sacred if the participants’ score on the SVM 
for that specific value was one standard deviation above the mean SVM for all 11 values. 
The reason that I employed a within, rather than between subject threshold was a clear 
individual difference in the baseline SVM score per participant (from 20.27 to 8.84). 
Furthermore, when I employed a within-subject threshold for sacred values a consistent 
number of sacred values emerged per participant. Sacred values, in accordance with 
Tetlock (2003), are absolute, and non-exchangeable. Hence it is important that they are 
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rare because if we hold many sacred values then we would be rarely able to make effective 
decisions as all options would violate a sacred value. Here, on the other hand, I identified, 
on average, 2 sacred values per participant. Furthermore, which values were identified as 
“sacred” were often highly diverse, and ranged between participants. In fact, no value was 
viewed as sacred by more than two participants. With this in minds then the SVM (and 
specifically my classification criteria for sacred and secular values) shows clear face 
validity in that it the sacred values it identified were rare and highly individual. This makes 
intuitive sense when I consider that my sacred values (when viewed as a guiding 
mechanism for decision-making) are incredibly personal and capable of predicting 
individual differences in decision-making in the face of least–worst decisions.  
On this last point, my pilot study also showed evidence that value systems, as 
measured by the SVM were directly related to the decision-making of participants within 
this study. By identifying participants value systems, and the values at play within each of 
the 32 decision points I was able, for each participant, to identify the type of tradeoff that 
each scenario represented to them. Now the importance of this cannot be underestimated 
because what this means is that the same scenario can reflect three different types of 
tradeoff for three different participants.  
Let us consider, briefly, the tunnel scenario. Here the audio inject informs the 
participant that there was an explosion in a bridge and they have police officers in a tunnel 
evacuating casualties, however, there is intelligence of a potential second device. They are 
asked if they are going to evacuate the tunnel (saving their officers but leaving the 
civilians), or leave them there (potentially saving the civilians but risking the lives of their 
officers). Now, this scenario has two central values juxtaposed; saving the lives of civilians, 
and saving the lives of people under your command. If, to the individual neither value is 
sacred, this is a simple routine tradeoff (deciding between two values that are not sacred). 
If an individual holds the value of “protect the life of people under my command” then this 
scenario is taboo – meaning that it should, in theory, be relatively easy as they will not 
tradeoff against this sacred value. However, if the individual holds both “saving the lives 
of civilians” and “saving the life of people under my command” then this scenario is toxic 
because both are at play in this scenario.  
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Here then, independent of what the actual scenario itself was, I compared 
participants’ decision-making when they were faced scenarios which to them, were routine, 
taboo or toxic. Here, and despite the issues with sample size (i.e., that toxic tradeoffs were 
far rarer than routine and taboo tradeoffs), I found that participants did struggle to commit 
to courses of action when faced with a toxic tradeoff. Specifically, the time participants 
took between selecting a course of action and “committing” to it (i.e., clicking submit). 
The data here showed that when they were deciding within a toxic tradeoff this 
commitment time was significantly higher (see Figure 5). They also, on average, took 
longer to decide but this was not significant (however I shall revisit this, and all, analyses 
in the next chapters when the sample is much larger). What is also even more interesting, 
is that decision difficulty was not higher for toxic tradeoffs when compared with routine 
and taboo (in fact it was highest for taboo). What this perhaps implies (and again, this shall 
be revisited in the next chapter with a larger sample size and more statistical power) is that 
perhaps there is a psychological defense mechanism at play with toxic tradeoffs in which 
while the choice is harder to make, once the choice is made, post hoc bolstering occurs (see 
Janis & Mann, 1972) to prevent post-decision guilt in response to the need to have 
sacrificed against a sacred value. Such an explanation, if confirmed in the ensuing analyses, 
would be in line with Tetlock’s (2003) original view of sacred values, within which to 
“even to think about certain tradeoffs (less still to make them) is to corrupt and degrade 
one's standing as a moral being in the community.” (Tetlock, 2000, p. 241). Hence, the 
dissociation between reaction times and self-reported decision difficulty demonstrates the 
potential ability of this research methodology to identify important discrepancies between 
implicit and explicit experiences of decision-making.  
  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I outlined the methodological paradigm I will be using to test the 
hypotheses that have emerged from my qualitative data collection and analysis. I outlined 
the rationale behind the design and the efforts I have taken to balance experimental control 
with immersion. I outlined the process through which I developed 16 immersive 2–step 
scenarios and the measures that will be used to measure decision-making styles (NFC, 
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maximization) and value systems. Furthermore, I outlined the results of a pilot test of this 
methodology on 11 individuals which rendered 352 decision points for analysis. In addition 
to this, I outlined, trialed, and then tested a methodology to identify value systems and 
which values are sacred, and secular to them, and henceforth, which scenarios reflect 
routine, taboo and toxic tradeoffs. Here, both individual measures of decision-making style 
and tradeoff type was shown to affect decision-making performance and difficulty. Even 
though several findings support my hypotheses (e.g., that individuals struggle to make 
least-worst decisions when dealing with a toxic tradeoff) I was cautious not to draw any 
theoretical conclusions from this chapter given the small number of participants. However, 
what these significant findings do show is the validity of my method to create, and measure, 
individual differences in decision-making and to identify causal relationships that can 
explain these differences. Given this, in the next chapter I am ready to return to my sample 
of interest; Soldiers. Specifically, I used the experimental method outlined here to 
investigate both predictors of individual difference in military decision-making and to 
provide an experimental test of my theory of sacred values as it pertains to decision inertia 
and the ability to commit to least-worst courses of action.   
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CHAPTER 7: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF MILITARY DECISION-MAKING  
 
It's not hard to make decisions when you know what your values are. 
- Roy Disney 
 
 Over the past six chapters, I have explored the doctrinal and theoretical perspectives 
on how Soldiers “should” make decisions. Furthermore, I have collected, and analyzed, 
qualitative data on Soldiers’ recollections of how they made decisions in critical do or don’t 
situations at war. In doing so I have also outlined how I, based on my analysis of the data, 
believe they make decisions and specifically the role that values and value systems play in 
their decision-making process. In this chapter, and as the culmination of six chapters of 
hypothesizing the factors at the heart of the military decision-making process, I present 
quantitative data that tests how Soldiers make decisions. Specifically, and using the 
experimental paradigm described in the previous chapter, I explore two distinct aspects of 
military decision-making. The first aspect I focus on is the degree to which I can identify 
predictors of “good” decision-makers. I look at known predictors of “good” decision-
making elsewhere (NFC and self-reported maximization) and examine how, if at all, these 
influence military decisions making. The second aspect I focus on is the effect of values 
and value tradeoff types as a theoretical framework to explain when, and why, some 
individuals struggle to commit to high-risk choices.  
 
Individual-level analysis of Military Decision-Making 
 
 In Chapter 2 I outlined the MDMP from both a doctrinal and theoretical standpoint. 
Specifically, I looked at how each of these perspectives says that people should navigate 
the process of option selection. What this chapter did not mention, however, is the science 
behind what makes a “good” decision-maker rather than a “good” decision. What this 
means is that I did not touch upon what I know about who, within a sample of Soldiers, 
would be better able to complete the decision-making process in high-stakes situations and, 
critically, why. Previous research in behavioral decision-making has highlighted how, for 
example, maximizers (rather than satisficers) are more prone to indecision (Parker, be 
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Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007) and that decision avoidance increases as the number and quality 
of options decrease (Dhar, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Furthermore, naturalistic 
research conducted by Alison has found that individual differences in levels of fluid mental 
intelligence (Raven, Court & Raven, 1977), and need for closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993) 
predict the likelihood that an individual, when presented with a least-worst decision, will 
be prone to decision inertia. Given this, it makes intuitive sense that there will be military 
decision-makers who are “better” at making least-worst decisions that others, and that 
psychometric measures can predict improved performance.  
 Identifying predictors of military performance is a central issue in military 
psychology (see Laurence & Matthews, 2012 for a full discussion of this). In fact, it was 
the needs of the Army in World War I which is often viewed as one of the factors that 
drove the creation of what is currently known as “Industrial/Organizational Psychology” 
(see Vinchur & Bryan, 2012). During this time, Hugo Münsterberg conducted a series of 
pioneering studies in support of the selection needs of the United States Army. 
Münsterberg focused on attention and developed a series of studies to identify telephone 
and ship operators who appeared better equipped for the task. Not dissimilar to current 
work in critical incident decision-making, Münsterberg found that telephone operators with 
experience frequently outperformed those without it. Nowadays, even a cursory glance at 
the American Psychology Associations’ journal Military Psychology shows the central 
interest identifying predictors of good performance. For example, in the last three issues 
alone, research has been published which focusses on the importance of cortisol, optimism 
and perseverance in military personnel (Binsch, Wietmarschen & Buick, 2017), well-being 
in drone operators (Armour & Ross, 2017); vitality during training for Special Forces 
(Skare, Hopkins & Solberg, 2017); and self-efficacy, grit and psychological flexibility and 
squad leadership performance (Gilson, Dix & Lochbaum, 2017) just to name a few. Hence, 
the field of Military Psychology, and of course the Armed Forces themselves, have an 
active and prolonged interest in identifying those individuals (and their traits) who can 
consistently and predictively out-perform others in the same situation, given the same task.  
 Despite this investment in predicting performance, relatively little has been done to 
focus on what predicts good decision-making at the individual level. For example, in his 
recent chapter for the Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology, Matthews (2012) 
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highlights a series of “cognitive” (and non-cognitive factors) in Soldier performance 
including, intuition and insight. However too often this work relied on discussions of 
heuristics and biases and discussions of “thinking fast” vs., “thinking slow” (reflecting the 
known differences between System 1 and System 2 thinking; see Kahneman, 2011). The 
non-cognitive factors include character strength which was associated with improved 
outcomes in terms of self-reported bravery, fairness, honesty, persistence, leadership, self-
control, and teamwork (Matthews, Peterson & Kelly, 2006). Here then there was a 
surprising lack of attention paid to the individual styles of personality and decision-making 
that may affect decision-making in the same way I see in non-military samples (e.g., 
Alison, Doran, Long, Power & Long, 2013). Wider yet, researchers often opt to look at 
individual differences in the decision-making process (e.g., building situational awareness) 
rather than individual differences in the cognitive make-up of the individual (e.g., Strater, 
Endsley, Pleban & Matthews, 2001).  
Here then, prior to testing my theory of value systems in the military decision-
making process, I take this opportunity to focus on the role of three different psychometric 
factors as they pertain to individual differences in the ability of Soldiers to make least-
worst decisions. Specifically, and drawing on the findings from critical and major incident 
psychology I focus on the need for closure, self-reported maximization and experience. I 
propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Need for Closure (NFC): NFC is the desire to obtain a definite answer to a topic or 
question, rather than experience confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989, p.14).  
Individuals who score high on NFC limit their cognitive processing and use highly 
selective search patterns to cope with uncertainty and make fast decisions.  
- H1 Individuals who are high in NFC will be more resilient to inertia because 
they will limit their awareness of alternatives and uncertainty (which is high in 
military operations) in favor of selecting any course of action (good or bad). 
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Self-reported maximizing: Maximizers select the option that offers the greatest utility 
(Simon, 1978). On the other hand, satisficers are happy to select an option that is “good 
enough.”  
- H2: Self-reported maximizers will be more likely to experience decision inertia 
because they will be continually attempting (i.e., engaging in redundant 
cognitive deliberation) to find a “better” alternative. 
 
Experience (and demographic information): Naturalistic decision-making, specifically 
RPD puts a premium on the role of an individual’s experience when making decisions 
during uncertain situations (see Lipshitz et al., 2001; Klein, 1997). Experience aids 
situation assessment, option evaluation, and mental simulation of the potential option 
outcomes (Lipshitz et al., 2001).  
- H3: Those with more experience (measured as both years of service and a 
previous deployment to a combat zone), will be better decision-makers and 
more resistant to inertia.  
 
Tradeoff Type and Decision Inertia 
 
 In Chapter 5, I outlined a theory of military decision-making in which the 
emergence of decision inertia was linked to the presence of sacred values within a given 
decision-making scenario. In Chapter 6 I then tested this theory with a small sample of 
participants and found preliminary evidence that when a decision-maker faces a decision 
that involves more than one sacred value they have a harder time committing to a course 
of action. In this study, and using the same method as outlined in Chapter 6 and the same 
participants and same study outlined above I seek to further test this theory of values and 
military decision-making with a sample of Soldiers. Specifically, in this study I 
hypothesize that; 
 
H4: When individuals face decision that involve one sacred value (taboo 
tradeoffs) they will make decisions faster and report lower decision 
difficulty  
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H5: When individuals face decisions that involve two or more sacred values 
(toxic tradeoffs) they will make decisions slower and report higher decision 
difficulty  
 
Method 
 
Participants  
 
Soldiers (n = 39)4 took part in a simulated study of military decision-making 
(outlined in full in Chapter 6). Participants were all currently serving members of the 
United States Armed Forces or enrolled in a formal military college or Reserve Officer 
Training Program (ROTC). Participants were opportunity sampled through an 
electronically distributed call for participants. Most participant (84.9%) were male. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 57 years old (M = 32.66). Participants reflected four 
of the six major branches of the Armed Forces; Air Force (43.59%, n = 17), Army (41.03%, 
n = 16), Marines (10.25%, n = 4) and Navy (5.13%, n = 2). Most participants reported that 
they were in the United States (94.59%, n = 37), two participants were from the United 
Kingdom (5.41%, n = 2).  
 
Procedure 
 
 Participants were invited to take part in an electronic decision-making study which 
would involve them making a series of least-worst decisions (Appendix H). After clicking 
the electronic link provided in the call for participants they would be directed to Qualtrics 
(the website hosting the survey) where they would read, and if in agreement sign, the 
informed consent. Once this was signed they would complete a demographic questionnaire, 
the 15-item shortened NFC scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and Schwartz et al.,’s (2002) 
34-item measure of tendency to maximize rather than satisfice. They would then complete 
the 16 two-step decision-making scenarios outlined in Chapter 6 as well as the modified 
decision difficulty questionnaire (see Chapter 6) and the Sacred Value Measure (SVM). 
                                                 
4 This sample of 39 soldiers includes the 5 soldiers who were included in the “pilot” sample for this study. 
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After completing the study the participants were offered the chance to reflect on which 
scenarios were most difficult to them. They were then thanked for their participation, 
offered more information on the study and provided a debrief form which listed relevant 
helplines and resources in case they suffered any negative consequences from taking part. 
On average the study took just under one hour to complete (M = 54 minutes 51 seconds, 
SD = 23 minutes 58 seconds). 
 
Measures  
 
The following dependent variables were used for this analysis; 
 
1. Situational Awareness Time (SAT): The amount of time it took the participant to 
listen to the audio feed outlining the situation and the decision and declare (by 
progressing onto the next page) that they were “ready” to decide. There are 32 SATs 
per participant.  
2. Choice time (CT): The amount of time it took a participant to “choose” an option. 
This is measured as the amount of time until they recorded their last “click” on an 
option on the page (Qualtrics recorded both first, last and number of page clicks for 
each step of the scenario). There are 32 CTs per participant. 
3. Decision Time (DT): The overall time it took the participant to choose a course of 
action and commit to it by progressing onto the next page and declaring they are 
ready to “commit” to their choice. There are 32 DTs per participant. 
4. Commitment Time (ComT): CT is the time lag between selecting a course of 
action (CT) and committing to it (DT). ComT, therefore, reflects a period of 
indecision between selecting a course of action and committing to it. In terms of 
calculation, simply, ComT = DT – CT. There are 32 ComTs per participant.  
5. Strength of Preference (SP): Each participant rated, on a likert scale of -5 to 5, 
which choice they wanted to take. Given this, a simple metric for the strength of 
preference (1 = weak preference, 5 = strong preference) was created by making all 
choices positive (so -5 becomes 5, -1 becomes 1 etc.,). There are 32 SP scores per 
participant.  
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6. Decision Difficulty (DD): As with Chapter 6, participants filled in a decision 
difficulty measure after completing each scenario. Here, the average score on the 
decision difficulty measure is calculated (after items 3, 4 and 5 are reverse coded) 
allowing an overall decision difficulty score to be assigned to that scenario. There 
are 16 decision difficulty scores per participant.   
 
Hence, in this study 39 participants completed 32 decision points (n = 1248), with each 
participant providing 32 SATs, DTs, CTs, ComTs, SPs, and 16 DDs.  
   
Results 
 
 All participants completed the psychometric and demographic questionnaire. All 
participants but one (97.43%) completed all 32 decision points (one participant did not 
complete the 16th scenario however they were included because they had completed 15 full 
scenarios and decision difficulty questionnaires, they also contacted the researcher to 
outline that the 16th was not completed because of a technology issue, and not an 
unwillingness to continue). All 38 remaining participants also completed the sacred values 
measure. Below I outline the results of their performance and the role of NFC, self-reported 
maximization and experience.  
 
Overall Performance  
 
Overall, participants took between 7.67 seconds and over two minutes (126.39 
seconds, M = 29.79, SD = 16.83) to understand the situation and declare themselves 
“ready” to decide. In terms of then making these decisions, participants took, on average, 
just over 6 seconds to decide (M = 6.62 seconds, SD = 9.38). On average, it took them just 
over 8 seconds to commit to this decision (M = 8.24 seconds, SD = 9.55). The commitment 
time (the gap between choosing and submitting) was as long as 32 seconds, but averaged 
just over 1 second (M = 1.72 seconds, SD = 2.56). Overall, being “undecided” about a 
choice was rare (2.9%) with participants often declaring a choice for preference A or B 
(97.1%). The strength of preference, overall, was very high (M = 3.92, SD = 1.24). In terms 
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of decision difficulty, on average, scenarios were viewed as moderately difficult (M = 
40.34, SD = 21.20).  
 Looking at the correlation of the dependent variables (an important metric when I 
consider more complicated analyses later in this chapter) I can see that there is a high 
degree of collinearity between them. Looking at the amount of time it took them to choose 
a course of action; the longer it took them (unsurprisingly) to commit to and submit a course 
of action (r(39) = .991, p < .0001). Even more interesting is that the longer it took them to 
choose a course of action, the longer it took them to commit to that choice (ComT) once 
they had made it (r(39) = .826, p < .0001). The longer it took them to choose a course of 
action, the longer it then took them commit to it (r(39) = .894, p < .0001). While the 
findings listed above do not tell us a great deal about decision-making, they give us insight 
into the overall validity of the study. Specifically, as participants take longer to commit to 
a course of action the longer it took them to choose and commit to this course of action. 
Hence, I can see here that reaction times collected as part of this study are predictably, and 
in the expected direction.  
 
Military vs., non-military scenarios. As stated in Chapter 6, this study uses two 
different types of decision. Some least-worst decisions are presented within a military 
setting, while others are presented within a non-military setting. Here I examine the effect 
of scenario type of participant performance. A series of t-tests were used to investigate the 
effect of scenario type on performance. In terms of decision-making, there was no 
significant difference in SAT, DT, ComT or CT between military and non-military 
scenarios (p >.05). The mean and mean differences for these comparisons are shown in 
Table 10. However, there was a significant difference between military and non-military 
decisions with regards to self-reported decision difficulty (t(1222) = 11.618, p < .0001) in 
that military scenarios were viewed as harder (M = 47.91, SD = 19.49) than non-military 
scenarios (M = 34.44, SD = 20.59). Furthermore, the difference between strengths of 
preference between military (M = 3.85, SD = 1.277) and non-military (M = 3.97, SD = 
1.21) scenarios was approaching significance, and hence, worthy of mention (t(1238) = -
1.705, p = .088).  
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Military  
(n = 540) 
Non-Military  
(n = 688) 
Mean 
Difference 
SAT 
(seconds) 
30.19 
(SD = 14.18) 
29.48 
(SD = 17.92) 
0.71 
DT 
(seconds) 
7.87 
(SD = 11.00) 
8.53 
(SD = 8.26) 
-0.66 
CT 
(seconds) 
6.46 
(SD = 11.55) 
6.74 
(SD = 7.27) 
-0.28 
ComT 
(seconds) 
1.63 
(SD = 2.27) 
1.78 
(SD = 2.77) 
-0.15 
 
** = p < .001 *** = p < .0001 
 
Table 10: Mean differences between SAT, DT, CT and ComT for military and non-
military scenarios. 
 
Need for Closure. NFC was measured using the 15-item shortened NFC scale (Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2011) which here, had a high Cronbach’s alpha showing it has good internal 
consistency ( = .868). Overall, participants’ NFC levels ranged from 28 to 75 (a full score, 
M = 50.74). To look at the effect of NFC on decision-making, a series of Pearson’s 
correlations were run on the effect of NFC on SAT, DT, CT, ComT, SP and DD. Pearson’s 
correlations showed that NFC was positively correlated with DD (r(39) = .557, p = .0001). 
What this means then is that, as NFC increases, so too did the amount of decision difficulty 
reported by the participant.5  
 The issue with the analysis above however is that it does not factor in the 
hierarchical nature of the data; and hence, it views all 1248 decisions as independent 
(implying there are 1248 unique participants). This is an important consideration given that 
these 1248 decision points stem from 39 individual participants who each bring their own 
random influences onto the scenario (influences which will equally affect all 32 decisions 
that they made). In this sense then the data is hierarchical, and the statistical analysis must 
factor the superordinate level of “participant” into its calculations. Hence, while I am 
                                                 
5 For all significant correlations, scatterplots are provided in Appendix I  to show distribution within the 
sample. 
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interested in the “fixed” effect of NFC, I need to control for the “random” effect of each 
unique participant. Given this, a series of multi-level models (MLMs) were run to test the 
effect of NFC on participants’ decision-making.   
MLM is a suitable methodology given that it is well suited to complex 
surveys/studies, using multistage designs and unequal sampling probabilities (e.g., see 
Rabe-Hesketh & Skondal, 2006). Here, MLM was conducted using the statistical package 
STATA. The reason for this is the known issues with conducting MLM with SPSS 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). In fact, here, as a test, a sample MLM (with real data from 
this study) was conducted on SPSS, STATA and the statistical package HLM. While the 
STATA and HLM results were comparable, the SPSS results were significantly different 
(reporting a significant result of p < .001 while the other packages reported significant 
levels of .44). Given this, STATA was used for all ensuing MLM models. This is an 
important consideration given that, as outlined later, there are significant differences in the 
results of the MLMs when using different statistical packages.  
Here then a two-level MLM was used to estimate the main effects of NFC on SAT, 
DT, CT, ComT, SP, and DD. This MLM was conducted with participants viewed as having 
both random slopes and random intercepts. Using linear MLM with a maximum likelihood 
estimator, the effect of NFC on SAT, CT, DT, and ComT were all non-significant (p > .05). 
However, there was a significant, and negative, effect of NFC on strength of preference in 
which for each one-point increase in the NFC measure accounted for a .024 decrease in the 
overall strength of their preference (p < .001). Furthermore, there was also a significant, 
and positive effect of NFC on decision difficulty, with each unit increase in NFC 
accounting for a .64 increase in reported decision difficulty (p < .0001).  
 Given the above effect of scenario type on strength of preference and decision 
difficulty, and to further explore the effects of NFC on decision-making, scenario type 
(military vs., non-military) was also factored into the model as a fixed effect. This also 
allowed the interaction of NFC and scenario type to be explored within the six DVs. Given 
that overall, there was no significant effect of NFC on SAT, DT, CT, or ComT, these DVs 
were not analyzed. Here, MLM showed that when factoring in both scenario type and NFC 
there was an approaching significant, and significant (and negative) effect of both NFC (β 
= -.121, p = .056) and scenario type NFC (β = -.024, p = .001) on strength of preference. 
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Furthermore, there was also a significant interaction between NFC and scenario type (p = 
.020). Given this, two independent two-level MLMs were run looking at both military and 
non-military scenarios independently. Within non-military scenarios, there was a 
significant positive effect of NFC on decision difficulty, in which each unit increase in 
NFC accounted for a .71 increase in decision difficulty (p < .0001). When looking at the 
military scenarios, however, while the nature of the relationship (and β coefficient) was 
still negative, the relationship was less pronounced, with each unit increase in NFC only 
accounting for a .54 increase in decision difficulty. When looking at the three-level MLM 
model of NFC, scenario type and strength of preference, while the effect of NFC on 
strength of preference was still significant (and negative) while factoring in scenario type 
(β = -.021, p = .007), neither the effect of scenario type was significant, nor was there a 
significant interaction between scenario type and NFC (p > .05).  
 Overall then, when looking at NFC, the data does not support H1 (that those who 
are high in NFC are better decision-makers) because those high in NFC did not decide 
faster, and they did not commit to decisions faster. Instead, those high in NFC found the 
decisions here harder to make, especially when those decisions were in a non-military 
setting.  
 
Self-reported Maximization. The Schwartz et al. (2002) 34-item measure of 
tendency to maximize rather than satisfice was used to assess participants’ need to 
maximize a situation. Here, the overall Cronbach’s alpha for the measure was high ( = 
.847). It was also high for each of the three subcomponents within the measure (Satisficing 
 = .718; Decision Difficulty  = .871; Alternative Search  = .871). Furthermore, each of 
the three subcomponents was significantly and positively correlated with the overall score 
(Satisficing; r(39) = .383, p < .0001: Decision Difficulty; r(39) = .655, p < .0001: 
Alternative Search r(39) = .850, p < .0001). Given this, and the fact that the Cronbach’s 
alpha did not significantly increase with the exclusion from any factors within it, for all 
ensuing analyses the overall score from the 34-item measure was used rather than using 
analyzing each original subcomponent.  
A series of two-level MLMs were run with participant ID as a superordinate level 
factor and maximization as a fixed effect. Here, MLM found that, while still positive, the 
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effect of maximization on SAT, DT, CT, ComT, Strength of preference and DD were all 
non-significant (p > .05).6 Given this, I cannot confidently provide support for H2 (see also 
footnote 4).  
 
Experience. Experience ranged within the participants from 0 years (those enrolled 
in a ROTC) to 36 years (M = 10.5 years). Almost half of the participants (48.71%, n = 19) 
had been deployed to a theater of conflict. To investigate the effect of experience, I 
operationalized this variable in two ways; the first was to view experience in terms of years 
of service, while the second is to view experience as binary relating to whether the Soldier 
has, or has not, been deployed to a theater of conflict. 
In terms of the number of years of experience, Pearson’s correlation found that 
overall years of experience was significantly positively correlated with CT (r(39) = .377, 
p = .018), and DT (r(39) = .364, p < .023). To explore the effect of experience, a series of 
independent samples t-tests showed that there were significant difference between those 
who had been deployed in terms of their SAT (t(1180.41) = -3.265, p = .001), CT (t(801.23) 
= -4.930, p < .0001), DT (t(801.28) = -5.808, p < .0001), ComT (t(773.69) = -4.969, p < 
.0001) and DD (t(1185.57) = -3.776, p < .0001). Differences in strength of preference were 
also approaching significance (t(1194.46) = 1.898, p = .058). The mean differences are 
displayed in Table 11.  Hence, when I operationalize “experience” as a binary variable of 
deployment, Soldiers who have deployed were slower to assess the situation, make a 
choice, commit to that choice, showed a great commitment time (the gap between selecting 
and committing). They also showed weaker strengths of preference and found the decisions 
harder. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 However, it is perhaps worth mentioning that when the same MLMs were run using SPSS, there was a 
significant effect of self-reported maximization on SA, DT, CT, and DD. Meaning that if we used SPSS we 
would be stating that maximization did significantly decrease decision-making speed while increasing 
decision difficulty. While here we shall base our findings on the results from STATA it is important to 
highlight the dependence of these statistical outcomes on the statistical program used.  
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Not 
Deployed    
(n = 602) 
Deployed  
(n = 596) 
Mean 
Difference 
SAT 
(seconds) 
28.07 
(SD = 15.16) 
31.10 
(SD = 16.81) 
-3.23** 
DT 
(seconds) 
6.69 
(SD = 5.08) 
9.87 
(SD = 12.49) 
-3.18*** 
CT 
(seconds) 
5.32 
(SD = 4.84) 
7.98 
(SD = 12.38) 
-2.66*** 
ComT 
(seconds) 
1.36 
(SD = 1.28) 
2.09 
(SD = 3.41) 
-0.73*** 
 
SP 
 
4.04 
(SD = 1.14) 
3.90 
(SD = 1.25) 
0.14 
DD 37.56 
(SD = 20.02) 
42.14 
(SD = 21.86) 
-4.58*** 
 
** = p < .001 *** = p < .0001 
 
Table 11: Mean differences in SAT, DT, CT, ComT, SP and DD between those 
participants who had been deployed to a theater of conflict, and those who had not.  
 
Again, to control for the effect of participant, a series of MLM were run using 
experience as a continuous variable (years of service) and then with deployment as a binary 
variable (three-level and interaction effect was also then modelled). MLM found that, when 
controlling for the random effects of each participant, years of experience had a positive 
effect on SAT, with each year of experience accounting for a .22 second slower SAT (p = 
.005). The effect of experience on CT was also approaching significance (p = .069), with 
each unit increase in experience accounting for a .13 second increase in the amount of time 
it took them to decide upon a course of action. Again, the effect of experience on the 
amount of time it took a participant to submit a decision was also approaching significance 
and positive (β = .167, p = .057). When using a two-level MLM there was no significant 
effect of experience on ComT (β = .034, p = .145), strength of preference (β = -.0013, p = 
.897) or decision difficulty (β = .224, p = .346).  
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When looking at the effect of a deployment using a two-level MLM, there was a 
significant and positive effect of a deployment on SAT (β = .219, p = .031). There was no 
significant effect of a deployment on DT, CT, ComT, SP or DD (p > .05). Given that both 
experience and a deployment have a significant effect on SA, both metrics of experience 
were factored into a two-level MLM, however there was no significant interaction between 
overall experience, a combat deployment, and SAT.  
Overall then I not only reject H3 but have identified the opposite effect to what I 
predicted. Rather than experience increasing decision ability (in terms of time taken to 
choose a course of action and a resistance to inertia), those who had more experience (and 
those who had deployed to a theater of conflict) were slower to assess the situation, to 
choose an option, and to commit to that option. They also showed a general lower 
commitment to their choices and reported that they found the decisions harder to make 
(though these last two effects disappeared when I controlled for the effect of participant).  
 
Sacred Values  
 
 Overall, and as expected based on my analysis from Chapter 5, “protecting the lives 
of people under their command” (M =17.92, SD = 5.75) and “protecting the lives of fellow 
Soldiers” was the most sacred value to my Soldier sample (M =17.5, SD = 4.47). Overall, 
the SVM scores for each of the 11 values measured are shown in Table 12. When assigning 
which values were sacred to an individual, the same method as outlined in Chapter 6 was 
used here, in which a value was determined sacred if the score for that value was 1 standard 
deviation above the average score for all 11 values. Within this sample the average number 
of sacred values per participant was 2 (M = 2.15, SD = 0.71, Mode = 2, Median = 2). Once 
again, sacred values were well dispersed within the sample, with each value, on average, 
being “sacred” to only 7 participants (M = 7.54, SD = 5.86). The value that was most often 
sacred to the participant were “protecting the life of people under my command” which 
was sacred for 48.71% of the sample (n = 19). The next values which were most often 
designated as sacred were “acting within the law” (38.46% of the sample, n = 15) and 
protecting the life of a fellow Soldier (33.33% of the sample, n = 13). Every value was 
designated as sacred for at least one participant. 
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Value  
Average SVM 
Score 
(4 – 28) 
Protecting the life of people under my command  17.92 
Protecting the life of a fellow Soldier  17.50 
Protecting the life of a civilian  17.15 
Everyone’s right to free will  16.81 
Act within the law  16.13 
Completing the mission  14.63 
Obey the orders of a superior  13.94 
Pursue a known enemy  13.55 
Avoid negative consequences for my actions  12.31 
Avoid blame for my actions  11.89 
Need to exert authority over others  10.34 
 
Table 12: Value importance, as rated by the SVM.  
  
 To explore the effect of value strength (in general) on decision-making, for all 
participants I calculated a value strength score (the average value score across all 11 
values). Pearson’s correlation found that, while the overall strength of values did not 
significantly correlate with SAT, CT, or DT (p > .05). Furthermore, those who had 
deployed had higher strengths of values (M = 15.08, SD = 2.88) than those who have not 
deployed (M = 14.37, SD = 4.21). An independent samples t-test showed that this 
relationship was significant (t(1010.95) = -3.324, p = .001). MLM controlling for 
participant as a nested variable found a significant and positive effect of deployment on the 
strength of an individual’s value system (β = .702, p = .001) and experience, with every 
year increase in service length accounting for a .03 increase in overall value system strength 
(β = .028, p = .023).  
 
Tradeoff Type and Decision Inertia 
 
To explore the effects of tradeoff type on decision-making, based on which values 
were sacred to each participant, each participants’ 32 decisions were reclassified as either 
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routine (meaning it involved no sacred values), taboo (meaning it involved one sacred 
value) or toxic (meaning it involved two or more sacred value). Using this new 
classification, I could explore the effect of tradeoff type on decision-making. Overall, 
within the total number of decisions (n = 1216) toxic tradeoffs were the rarest (6.83% n = 
83), while taboo (39.39%, n = 478) and routine (53.78%, n = 654) tradeoffs were far more 
common. This is an important consideration as I move towards nested analysis. Overall, 
across the sample and independent of the participant, toxic tradeoffs do not seem harder to 
make, or indeed harder at all. Specifically, Figure 6 shows the comparison of taboo, toxic 
and routine tradeoffs in terms of SAT, DT, CT, and ComT.  
 
 
Figure 6: Tradeoff type and situational awareness timing, overall decision timing, and 
choice commitment timing. 
  
In Figure 6 then we can see that participants’ SAT was slowest for routine tradeoffs 
(M = 31.04, SD = 17.71) than for taboo (M = 28.53, SD = 14.63) and toxic tradeoffs (M = 
26.59, SD = 13.57). In addition, they were also slower to make and submit decisions for 
routine tradeoffs (CT M = 6.89, SD = 10.15, DT M = 8.56, SD = 10.70) than for taboo (CT 
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M = 6.54, SD = 8.98, DT M = 8.11, SD = 8.35) and toxic tradeoffs (CT M = 5.73, SD = 
6.48, DT M = 7.40, SD = 7.87).  
 To further explore this relationship, while controlling for the effect each individual 
participant, a series of MLM models were run, including tradeoff type as a dependent 
variable while controlling for the random effects of each participant. Here, MLM found 
that the SAT for taboo tradeoffs was significantly slower than routine tradeoffs (β = -2.29, 
p = .019), and the slower SAT for routine tradeoffs, when compared to toxic tradeoffs, was 
also approaching significance (β = -3.39, p = .0.076). When looking at the difference 
between taboo, routine, and toxic tradeoffs in terms of DT, MLM showed that while DT 
for both taboo and (β = -.27) toxic tradeoffs (β = -.59) are faster than routine, this was non-
significant (p > .05). Overall, there was no significant effect between tradeoff type and CT, 
ComT, and strength of preference when controlling for the participant. However, MLM 
found that there was a significant positive relationship between taboo and routine tradeoffs 
in terms of decision difficulty, with taboo tradeoffs being viewed over 4 points more 
difficult than routine tradeoffs (β = 4.76, p < .0001).  
 While the results here do not entirely reject the role of values in predicting decision-
making and decision inertia (we come to this in the next chapter). They do not provide 
support for my theory that tradeoff types can predict indecision and decision difficulty, 
because here, and contrary to my hypotheses, toxic tradeoffs were not judged as 
significantly harder than routine or taboo tradeoffs, nor were participants slower to make 
decisions when facing taboo tradeoffs. That said, I did find an interesting relationship in 
that those who had stronger value systems overall did show higher levels of inertia. 
Furthermore, those that had been deployed showed stronger value systems.  
 
Discussion 
 
Military Decision Making  
 Here then I have shown preliminary evidence for individual markers of “good” 
decision-makers. Now, in this chapter I operationalized “good” as avoidant of inertia, and 
this may explain why so many of the findings appear counter-intuitive (and at the very least 
counter to my expectations). It is widely known, and well reported, for example, that 
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experience aids decision-making in that experts are better able to assess the situation, see 
patterns within it and identify applicable courses of action (see Endsley, 2006). Here, on 
the other hand expertise had the opposite effect in that they were slower. This is an 
important distinction to make because it likely lies in the methodological paradigm I used; 
specifically, I used a very “closed” experimental design in which participants were forced 
to choose between two options (repeatedly) and made decisions, on average, within 6 
seconds. In most of the research that has focused on the role of expertise, experimental 
paradigms are more open allowing them more room to maneuverer the situation, make a 
positive impact and construct their own courses of action. This is an important 
consideration, as by taking this into account I can avoid making overly-hasty claims about 
the negative implications of expertise (something which would go widely against one of 
the most established findings in decision-making research).  
 That said, the experiment above did show a series of individual predictors of 
performance that, within a Soldier sample, related to differing abilities to navigate this 
series of least-worst decisions. First and foremost, and counter to a significant body of 
research, NFC appeared to have a negative effect. NFC - the need to settle for any answer, 
rather than sustaining ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) - is 
hence closely linked with decisiveness and “jumping to conclusions bias” (McKay, 
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2006). It makes sense, therefore, to hypothesize that individuals 
high in NFC should be faster decision-makers due to a lack of wanting to tolerate 
uncertainty by deciding between options. Instead however, I found the reverse, with NFC 
being linked to a slowing of the SA phase of decision-making (the “what is going on 
phase”). They also reported finding decisions more difficult. Despite the high interest in 
both SA and NFC, no research to date (that the author knows of at least) has specifically 
tested the role of NFC on SA and how SA processes differ between those with high and 
low NFC. Yet, despite this, given the definition of NFC above and what is known about its 
wider effect on decision-making, it is counter-intuitive that it should increase the SA phase 
of decision-making. In a similar vein, the findings that those with high NFC reported 
increased decision difficulty and weaker strengths of preference also runs in the face of 
what is the extant knowledge of those high in NFC. What is more interesting still is the fact 
that this appears to also be domain specific, in that the effect of NFC on strength of 
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preference was more pronounced in non-military scenarios than military scenarios. 
Overall, while it is important now to draw too strong conclusions between research findings 
which force a participant to choose between two options and those that afford the 
participant a more active role within the environment (as is common in most NDM 
research), the findings support that NFC still plays an important and unique role in 
decision-making, despite it not being in the predicted direction. 
 The second variable I investigated was self-reported maximization. As reported by 
Parker, Bruine De Bruin and Fischhoff (2007), those who are self-reported maximizers 
have trouble satisficing within a given situation and instead try to maximize the options 
available to them. It is logical then that maximization is strongly associated with decision 
inertia. The results here show promise, but I would recommend further research. The issue 
here is the instability of the results depending on the statistical program used. While 
correlation analysis showed a strong, significant and hypothesized relationship between 
maximization and a general slowing of the decision process, once the hierarchical nature 
of the data was factored in these relationships largely disappeared, however, as outlined in 
footnote 4, when the same analyses were run in SPSS rather than STATA, all effects 
remained significant. This, at the very least warrants further analysis to isolate the unique 
effect of maximization. Regardless, the results here do show that maximization may be an 
important factor in predicting individual differences in decision-making. This is especially 
important given that, to date, no research has explored the utility of self-reported 
maximization as a scale to predict performance in military decision-making tasks.  
 Finally, this study looked at experience, which, as mentioned above, is usually 
strongly associated with good decision-making. As outlined in Chapter 2, isolating and 
understanding the role of experience in expert performance is one of the cornerstones of 
modern NDM research. Here, however, I found that experience has an interesting effect on 
decision-making in that both when I looked at experience as a continuous variable (years 
in service) and as a binary variable (being deployed to a theater of conflict), both were 
linked to a general slowing of the decision-making process. Here again, it would be easy 
to not only reject hypothesis 3 (that those with more experience are more resistant to 
inertia), but to reverse it, however there is an important counter-point to raise. When 
looking at decision inertia, and decision-making in general, it is important to identify that 
Shortland Thesis (2017)  
 165 
there is often an “optimum” time to act, which is not too soon, and not too late. In my 
interviews from Chapter 5 and 6, this was often referred to as “rushing to failure”. Perhaps 
what we are seeing here is a lack of “rushing to failure” which within a time-based forced 
choice experimental paradigm is manifesting as a slowing of the decision-making process 
(specifically their SAT). Further work is needed here to flesh out the degree to which their 
decision-making is slowed vs., more deliberate. Again, as mentioned before this may also 
be a methodological manifestation from “forcing” choice on a passive participant rather 
than allowing them to explore their environment, assess the situation and propose their own 
courses of action, during which, arguably, the positive effects of expertise would come to 
the fore. 
 Despite the reverse effects of several of our variables (NFC and experience) what 
this study has shown is that there are unique correlates of military decision-making which 
can be used to predict individual differences in performance. While each of the factors here 
requires further research to identify both the true extent of their impact and how closely 
they are tied to inertia (vs., a more deliberate and adaptive decision-making strategy), this 
research shows great promise in terms of identifying predictors of performance. To date, 
very little research has sought to isolate the role of NFC and maximization as they pertain 
specifically to military decision-making. Here, at the very least, I have provided a strong 
case for a future focus on these variables.  
 
Sacred Values and Decision Inertia 
 
Once again, the findings here did not support my hypotheses. First and foremost, 
in rejection of H4 and H5, when participants faced tradeoffs that involved only one sacred 
value they did not make decisions faster, nor did they find them easier than decisions with 
no, or two sacred values. In addition to this, when participants faced tradeoffs which 
involved two sacred values they did not report higher decision difficulty, or make decisions 
slower than when they faced one, or no sacred values.  
That said, I did find some support for H5 in that while taboo tradeoffs were viewed 
as more difficult that routine or toxic tradeoffs (the latter being contrary to H5) taboo 
decisions were made faster that routine and toxic decisions. What this implies is that while 
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participants found the decision harder (perhaps due to the presence of a sacred value) they 
could quickly decide upon a course of action. Despite this minor support for Tetlock (2003) 
and my own theory, what is glaring in the analysis is the lack of support for H3 in that toxic 
tradeoffs were not viewed as harder, decisions were not made slower and participants did 
not take longer to commit to a course of action. These findings are inconsistent with the 
majority (albeit small number) of studies that have previously examined tradeoff types and 
decision-making (namely Duc et al., 2013; Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008).  
There is one potential reason for this and it is, unfortunately, methodological. 
Specifically, it is arguable that given the uncertainty inherent in the scenarios (an essential 
part given that they seek to reflect military decision-making) the values involved are also, 
to a degree, uncertain. This, in turn, opens the door for the participant to bring their own 
subjective interpretation of values within the situation to the fore. This is perhaps reflected 
by the low Jaccard’s coefficient reported in Chapter 6 (.28; meaning that the two reviewers 
agreed with each other 28% of the time). What this means is that, perhaps only the 
participant can identify which values are, to them, involved in each decision. This provides 
a potential methodological tweak (the self-nomination of values) which could be used in 
future research. One of the defining aspects of “sacred” values is the degree to which they 
are personal, and hence, externally assigning what values we think are involved in a 
scenario may eliminate the highly personal nature of values. These issues are also 
compounded by the fact that toxic tradeoffs overall were quite rare and not evenly 
distributed throughout the scenarios meaning that, perhaps, the non-random effects of 
certain scenarios could also be compounding the results. Specifically, there were five 
decision points (15.62%) which were not classified as toxic for any participant, and eight 
decision points were classified as “toxic” for only one (25.00%).  
Despite the lack of effect for tradeoff type on overall decision-making, there was a 
very interesting effect of overall value strength, and specifically, how this related to 
experience. Overall, I found that when Soldiers, in general, had stronger value systems 
(here viewed as an overall higher score on the SVM across all values) they were slower to 
commit to their decisions (our metric for inertia). What is especially interesting here is both 
the correlation of value system strength with experience, and the fact that those with high 
value systems showed a slowing of the decision-making process that was not dissimilar to 
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the performance of those with higher experience. The results here show that those 
individuals who have more experience, and especially those who have deployed, seem to 
have a stronger set of values and this, in turn, seems to hinder them from committing to 
decisions. This finding then, and irrespective of our ability to precisely pinpoint the nature 
of values at play within a given scenario in this experiment, does emphasize the importance 
of considering values as an important predictor of decision-making. Furthermore, it 
provides a new lens through which I can consider the role of expertise in naturalistic 
decision-making in that not only does it play an essential role in SA and course of action 
development, but with experience (perhaps) comes a more engrained value system which 
can be relied upon and used to navigate complex least-worst decisions. To better 
understand this role of value systems in both a domain-specific and domain-general 
context, in the next chapter I compare values and decision-making between three unique 
populations; Soldiers, police officers and undergraduate students.  
In Chapter 5 I proposed two general hypotheses about Soldier decision-making 
which, if my theory of values was correct, would have emerged within the data. 
Specifically, I hypothesized that; 
  
1. Value systems predict the occurrence of decision inertia in least-worst 
situations 
2. Choices will be harder to make when they involve two (or more) sacred values.  
 
Here, I provided mixed support for these hypotheses. While I did find some support for the 
link between value systems and inertia, this link was more correlational than complex, with 
overall increases in value systems being linked to a general slowing of the decision-making 
process, rather than it being specifically focused on the types of tradeoffs that exist within 
the decision itself. Hence, while I could not provide support for the effect of tradeoff types 
I did provide support for the view that, overall, value systems are an important 
consideration in military least-worst decision-making.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter sought to provide an experimental test of military decision-making. I 
aimed to identify predictors of individual difference within military samples as well as the 
role of values. While my results did not support my hypotheses in many cases I identified 
several unique relationships between personality factors (NFC and maximization) and 
decision-making. Furthermore, I identified a series of interesting and counter-intuitive 
findings with regards to the effect of experience. By then looking at the underlying value 
systems of the participants I then further expanded on this relationship by identifying an 
inter-relation between experience and value systems. This finding offers great promise and 
in the next chapter I seek to further explore it by integrating two new samples into my 
analysis as comparison points to compare Soldiers’ decision-making and value systems.   
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CHAPTER 8: TINKER, TAILOR, SOLDIER, SPY: COMPARING MILITARY 
AND NON-MILITARY DECISION-MAKING.  
 
There is nothing like a Soldier. 
- Anon, Project Afghan (2012) 
 
 At the start of this thesis I focused on decision inertia; the psychological process of 
actively attempting to choose a course of action but failing to do so. In Chapters 1, 2 and 3 
I sought to outline the concept of inertia, the factors associated with the emergence of 
inertia and why inertia is a real and valid phenomenon that is likely to emerge within the 
military decision-making process. In Chapters 4 and 5 I then sought to identify and explain 
the emergence of inertia within the military decision-making process by collecting data 
from Soldiers about times during which they had faced a least-worst decision (from which 
inertia can commonly emerge; Alison et al., 2015). The issue, however, was that in my 
interviews inertia rarely emerged. When recalling the least-worst decision they faced my 
participants showed that often they remained able to effectively weigh options, identify a 
preferred course of action and commit to it despite the negative consequences that could 
be associated with that course of action. This was counter to my expectations, and based 
on this finding I sought in (Chapters 6 and 7) to understand the process behind this ability 
to – while tolerating uncertainty, potentially negative outcomes, accountability, and blame 
- decide. So, while seeking to explore the processes that underlie choice selection within 
military personnel what I became interested in is what might separate military personnel 
from their non-military counterparts; what I want to explore is whether there is something 
unique within the Soldier sample that leads to a domain-general ability to make least-worst 
decisions. Here then, and as the final experimental chapter of this thesis, I seek to compare 
military decision-makers with non-military decision-makers. In addition, I segregate the 
non-military decision-makers into those who operate in environments like the military (i.e., 
police officers), and those who do not operate in those environments (i.e., student 
participants at a local University).  
 In Chapter 4 I made several assertions about why Soldiers may be more resistant to 
inertia: 
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1. Individuals who enter the Armed Forces have individual differences in 
decision-making styles compared to those who do not join the Armed Forces. 
It is well known that individuals differ in their decision-making styles (e.g., a 
need to maximize, vs., a willingness to satisfice) and that this correlates with 
differing ability to avoid decisions (Parker, De Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007).  
2. Individuals become more resilient to inertia because of extensive training in 
decision-making and develop a domain-general ability to make critical time-
sensitive decisions.  
3. The environment within which decisions are made (namely “at war”) alter the 
degree to which external pressures (such as accountability) are felt, preventing 
such factors from derailing decision-making. Research from social psychology 
has extensively shown that individuals are affected by the situation, and often 
behave in situation-relevant ways (e.g., Zimbardo, 1969). Given this, it is 
possible that the military environment creates social expectations for swift and 
decisive action.  
 
Based on these assertions I was then able to propose the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: If we accept assertion 1 then Soldiers and members of the Emergency services 
will significantly differ on several, relevant, personality and decision-making 
metricizes.  
 
H2: If we accept assertion 2 then Soldiers will outperform members of the 
Emergency services in all least-worst situations because of an improved decision-
making style because training increases resilience to inertia by developing a 
domain-general ability to make critical time-sensitive decisions.  
 
H3: If we accept assertion 3 then members of the emergency services and Soldiers 
will all be more resistant to inertia when making military decisions vs., making 
least-worst decisions in a non-military setting.  
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In addition to this, one untested hypothesis from Chapter 5 remains;  
 
H4: Because Soldiers show less inertia, they have stronger value hierarchy than 
those who become inert (namely members of the emergency services). This means 
that, more often, a decision involves only one sacred value.  
 
It is these remaining hypotheses that I will test in this chapter.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants  
 
In addition to the 39 Soldiers who took part in this study in Chapter 7, two further 
samples were collected. Firstly, a sample of police officers was recruited from the United 
Kingdom. These police officers were offered the opportunity to take part in this study as 
part of a training event being hosted by Prof. Alison. In return for participating in this study, 
officers were offered the opportunity to receive a personalized outline of their decision-
making and how their choices compared with their police counterparts. Overall, 23 police 
officers took part in this study. All police officers were based in the United Kingdom 
(100.00%, n = 27). Just over half of the participants were male (60.89%, n = 14) with the 
remaining 39.11% being female (n = 9). Participants ranged in age from 38 to 54 (M = 44. 
95). It is important to mention that a further 13 members of overall sample reported being 
a police officer, however, these 13 had also served in the United States (n = 10) and United 
Kingdom (n = 3) Armed Forces. Given that the independent variables are relatively stable 
personality factors these individuals were classified as Soldiers (that said I do acknowledge 
the potential “hybridity” of this group). In addition to the police sample a control sample 
of students at the University of Massachusetts Lowell (UML) was recruited for this study. 
Overall 38 students at UML took part in this study. Students were offered course credit in 
return for their participation. Student ages ranged from 19 to 67 (M = 26, 68), but they were 
relatively young overall (Median = 22, Mode = 22). Even though these two additional 
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groups were recruited in diverse ways, and under different circumstances, all participants 
completed the study in the same situation (i.e., independently, away from “the lab”, on 
their own computer and at a time and place of their choosing). Overall then, this study had 
100 participants including 39 Soldiers, 23 members of the police force and 38 
undergraduate students at UML. While I acknowledge that this is not a mixed sample, 
given the fact that these are relatively unique and often hard to access samples (the Soldiers 
and police officers, not the students), the samples were not matched to increase the overall 
“n” of each sample. This was done with a view to increase the overall statistical power of 
any ensuing analysis.  
 
Procedure 
 
As with Chapters 6 and 7, each participant was sent a call for recruitment which 
contained a link to the Qualtrics-hosted study. After clicking the electronic link provided 
in the call for participants they would be directed to Qualtrics (the website hosting the 
survey) where they would read, and if in agreement sign, the informed consent. Once this 
was signed they would complete a demographic questionnaire, the 15-item shortened NFC 
scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and Schwartz et al.’s (2002) 34-item measure of tendency 
to maximize rather than satisfice. They would then complete the 16 two-step decision-
making scenarios outlined in Chapter 6 as well as the modified decision difficulty 
questionnaire (see Chapter 6) and the Sacred Value Measure (SVM). After completing the 
study the participants were offered the chance to reflect on which scenarios were most 
difficult to them. They were then thanked for their participation, offered more information 
on the study and provided a debrief form which listed relevant helplines and resources in 
case they suffered any negative consequences from taking part. On average the study took 
just under one hour to complete (M = 57 minutes 29 seconds, SD = 25 minutes 58 seconds). 
 
Measures  
 
As outlined in chapter seven, this research used the following dependent variables; 
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1. Situational Awareness Time (SAT): The amount of time it took the participant to 
listen to the audio feed outlining the situation and the decision and declare (by 
progressing onto the next page) that they were “ready” to decide. There are 32 SATs 
per participant.  
2. Choice time (CT): The amount of time it took a participant to “choose” an option. 
This is measured as the amount of time until they recorded their last “click” on an 
option on the page (Qualtrics recorded both first, last and number of page clicks for 
each step of the scenario). There are 32 CTs per participant. 
3. Decision Time (DT): The overall time it took the participant to choose a course of 
action and commit to it by progressing onto the next page and declaring they are 
ready to “commit” to their choice. There are 32 DTs per participant. 
4. Commitment Time (ComT): CT is the time lag between selecting a course of 
action (CT) and committing to it (DT). ComT, therefore, reflects a period of 
indecision between selecting a course of action and committing to it. In terms of 
calculation, simply, ComT = DT – CT. There are 32 ComTs per participant.  
5. Strength of Preference (SP): Each participant rated, on a likert scale of -5 to 5, 
which choice they wanted to take. Given this, a simple metric of the strength of 
preference (1 = weak preference, 5 = strong preference) was created by making all 
choices positive (so -5 becomes 5, -1 becomes 1 etc.,). There are 32 SP scores per 
participant.  
6. Decision Difficulty (DD): As with Chapter 6, participants filled in a decision 
difficulty measure after completing each scenario. Here, the average score on the 
decision difficulty measure is calculated (after items 3, 4 and 5 are reverse coded) 
allowing an overall decision difficulty score to be assigned to that scenario. There 
are 16 decision difficulty scores per participant.   
 
In this study, each participant completed 32 decision points (n = 3200) with 1248 decision 
points for the Soldier sample, 736 decision points for the police sample and 1216 decision 
points for the UML student sample. Overall, this provides a dataset of 3200 SATs, DTs, 
CTs, ComTs, SPs, and 1600 DDs (a total of 20,800 unique data points).  
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Results 
 
 Before outlining the results of the four hypotheses, it is important that I look at the 
general trends when all samples are viewed as one. This is especially important as it may 
provide insight into which facets of least-worst decision-making (maximization, NFC etc.,) 
are universal, helping us later build theories that span outside of my myopic focus on 
military decision-making and towards more general theories of decision-making.  
 
Overall Performance  
 
 On average, across the samples, participants took between 7.67 and 128 seconds to 
assess the situation and to declare themselves “ready” to decide (M = 30.17 seconds, SD = 
16.59 seconds). It then took them, on average, 6 seconds (M = 6.80 seconds, SD = 6.89 
seconds) to decide upon a course of action and just over 8 seconds to submit that decision 
(M = 8.37 seconds, SD = 7.34 seconds). The commitment time (the gap between choosing 
and submitting) was up to 33 seconds but averaged just over 1 second (M = 1.57 seconds, 
SD = 1.97 seconds). Overall participants found the scenarios to be relatively difficult (M = 
43.83, SD = 21.43). Again, as seen in Chapter 7, participants were rarely “undecided” on 
a course of action (6.3%), and usually committed (in varying degrees) to option A or B 
(92.6%). The strength of preference, was, on average, high (M = 3.58, SD = 1.49). 
 Looking at the inter-correlation of dependent variables, the longer participants took 
to choose a course of action (CT), the longer they took to decide (DT; r(100) = .968, p < 
.0001) and to commit to it (ComT; r(100) = .370, p < .0001). Decision time (DT) was also 
positively correlated with commitment time (ComT; r(100) = .590, p < .0001). 
Interestingly,  CT was negatively correlated with SP, meaning that the longer they took to 
choose, the less confident they were in their choice (SP; r(100) = -.207, p = .039). Finally, 
SP was negatively correlated with DD, so as decisions became more difficulty, participants 
were less confident in their choices/showed a decreased preference for A or B (r(100) = -
.545, p < .0001). Again, what this shows is that overall there is internal validity within the 
scenarios and DVs in that, as participants found decisions harder to make, their decision-
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making was slowed, they took longer to make a choice, paused more before committing to 
it, and generally showed a weaker preference for that choice.  
 
Need for closure. NFC was measured using the 15-item shortened NFC scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) which here, had a high Cronbach’s alpha showing it has good 
internal consistency ( = .863). Overall, participants’ NFC levels ranged from 28 to 75 (a 
full score, M = 51.18). When viewing decisions points as independent Pearson’s 
correlation found that NFC was not correlated with any decision-related DVs (SAT, CT, 
DT, ComT p > .05). NFC was however significantly negatively correlated with SP (r(100) 
= -.408, p < .0001) and positively correlated with DD  (r(100) = .521, p < .0001). Hence, 
as NFC increased their strength of preference decreased, and the self-reported decision 
difficulty increased. MLM confirmed these findings, showing that as NFC increased, SP 
decreased by .02 for each choice (β = -.027, p < .0001), and that as NFC increased, self-
reported DD increased (β = .58, p < .0001). Hence, overall NFC once again does not 
directly predict decision-making performance in terms of speed or inertia, but it does seem 
related to the overall confidence of the decision-maker, and their perception of decision 
difficulty.  
 
Self-Reported Maximization. The Schwartz et al. (2002) 34-item measure of 
tendency to maximize rather than satisfice was used to assess participants need to maximize 
a situation. Here, the overall Cronbach’s alpha for the measure was high ( = .874). It was 
also high for each of the three subcomponents within the measure (Satisficing  = .753; 
Decision Difficulty  = .859; Alternative Search  = .901).  Furthermore, each of the three 
subcomponents was significantly, and positively correlated with the overall score 
(Satisficing; r(100) = .321, p < .0001: Decision Difficulty; r(100) = .726, p < .0001: 
Alternative Search; r(100) = .883, p < .0001). Given this, the full version of the 
maximization scale was used and no analyses were run using specific subcomponents of 
the measure. Overall, SP was negatively correlated with maximization (r(100) = -.346, p < 
.0001), while maximization was positively correlated with decision difficulty (r(100) = 
.319, p = .0001). MLM confirmed the relationship between maximization and SP, in that 
for every point increase in maximization there is a decrease in the overall strength of 
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preference shown (β = -.014, p < .0001). There is also a significant and positive effect of 
maximization on decision difficulty (β = .262, p < .0001).  
 
Sacred Values. In Chapter 7 I found that the overall strength of someone’s value 
system (the average value score across all 11 values within the SVM) affected their 
decision-making. Overall, when using MLM, I found that value systems are significantly 
negatively associated with the strength of preference (β = .262, p < .0001). Strength of 
Value Systems was not, otherwise, significantly associated with SA, DT, CT, ComT, SP 
or DD.  
 
Overall Findings 
  
Overall then, when looking at the total subject group several interesting findings 
emerge. Firstly, when looking at DVs associated with decision-making (SAT, DT, CT, and 
ComT), while there are many trends within the data that seem related to individual factors 
(NFC and maximization) there is so much inter-individual variation that when the analyses 
control for the random effect of the participant, these differences largely disappear. Instead, 
the effect of NFC and maximization was not reflected in the speed of decision-making, but 
instead appeared to be reflected in confidence and self-reported difficulty, with both NFC 
and maximization increasing decision difficulty, and decreasing strength of preference. 
Experience again showed a similar effect to previous chapters in that while it was correlated 
with CT and DT, when factoring in the participant, the effect of experience most prevalent 
on decision difficulty, with those who have high experience reporting that the decisions 
were harder. While many of these general findings mirror the findings from the analysis of 
just Soldiers (the overall negative effect of NFC, maximization and experience) below I 
begin to parse out the unique factors within each of the samples. Specifically, I test the four 
hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
H1: Soldiers and members of the emergency services will significantly differ on several, 
relevant, personality and decision-making metricizes.  
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Overall, I can provide some support for H1. First and foremost an independent 
samples ANOVA showed that while Soldiers’ NFC scores did not differ from students or 
police officers (F(2, 97) = .893, p > .05), their self-reported maximization scores did (F(2, 
97) = 5.626, p = .005). Specifically, Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that both Soldiers 
(M = 125.97, SD = 17.14, p = .045) and police officers (M = 121.40, SD = 17.14) scored 
significantly lower on maximization than students (M = 136.52, SD = 17.41, p = .006). 
Given that in the overall analysis above self-reported maximization was significantly 
associated with SP and DD, a series of MLMs were run that factored in maximization and 
type of participant (Soldier, police officer or student) with SP. This MLM showed a 
significant interaction between the type of participant and maximization (p < .05). Hence 
a series of independent MLM models were run within each participant type. Here, MLM 
found that the effect of maximization on SP was non-significant for Soldiers (β = -.005, p 
> .05), but it was significant for police officers (β = -.022, p = .001) and students (β = -
.006, p < .0001). While both coefficients were negative (meaning that overall increases in 
maximization caused decreases in SP) the coefficient for the effect of maximization within 
the police sample was larger than within the student sample, meaning the relationship was 
more pronounced within this sample. What this means, therefore, is that maximization has 
a more detrimental effect on decision-making for police officers than students, and that it 
affects both police officers and students more than it affects Soldiers.  
 
H2: Soldiers will outperform members of the emergency services in all least-worst 
situations because of an improved decision-making style 
 
 This study also provided support for H2. Looking at the overall performance of the 
three samples, the Soldier sample was, on average faster in the SAT, CT, DT and ComT 
than the police officers and student sample. Furthermore, they reported higher SP and lower 
DD. The overall comparison of the three groups across SAT, CT, DT and ComT is shown 
in Figure 7. Overall Soldiers had stronger strengths of preference (M = 3.92, SD = 1.23) 
than both police officers (M = 3.13, SD = 1.45) and students (M = 3.59, SD = 1.49) and 
reported that the decisions were easier (M = 40.80, SD = 21.04) for them than the police 
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officers (M = 41.60, SD = 21.87). The students reported that the decisions were, overall, 
much harder (M = 48.35, SD = 21.48). There were no other significant differences.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Soldier, police officers and student performance across 32 decision points.  
 
 MLM with the participant as a random effect and type of participant as a fixed 
effect found that, overall, there was a significant effect of participant type on CT, in that 
police officers were slower to decide (β = 1.37, p = .078) than Soldiers. In addition to this, 
when looking at ComT, students were significantly faster to commit to a choice than 
Soldiers (β = -.398, p = .036). However, student participants’ strength of preference was 
significantly less than the Soldiers (β = -.772, p < .0001) and police officers (β = -.580, p 
= .003), and the increase in reported decision difficulty was significant when factoring in 
the hierarchical nature of the data. Specifically, overall a student respondent was likely to 
have a 7-point increase in decision difficulty for each scenario when compared to a Soldier 
(β = 7.79, p = .006) and a 6-point increase when compared to a police officer (β = 6.88, p 
= .036). Hence, it is clear then that there are unique differences between each of the three 
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samples in their decision-making throughout this study and that, overall, Soldiers did 
outperform their police officer and student counterparts in this decision-making study.  
 
H3: Members of the emergency services and Soldiers will all be more resistant to inertia 
when making military decisions vs., making least-worst decisions in a non-military setting. 
 
Scenario Type: Our study also shows support for H3. Overall, a series of one-sample t-tests 
showed that there was a wealth of differences in SAT, CT, DT, SP and DD when comparing 
performance, across the sample, on military and non-military scenarios. The overall 
performance and mean differences between the scenario types are shown in Table 13. 
Overall then, participants were slower to develop SAT in military scenarios (t(3110) = -
2.796, p = .005). However, they were faster to make a choice (t(3182) = 2.295, p = .005) 
and to submit that choice (t(3178) = 3.162, p = .002) when making a military decision. 
They were not faster to commit to a choice (t(3190.42) = 1.733, p = .083). Participants also 
had weaker preferences for choices when they were facing military scenarios (t(2793.65) 
= 7.96, p < .0001). They also reported military scenarios to be more difficult (t(3000.32) = 
-17.841, p < .0001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict 
 180 
 
 
Non-
Military 
scenarios 
 (n = 1749) 
Military 
Scenarios  
 
(n = 1363) 
Mean 
Difference 
SAT 
(seconds) 
29.44 
(SD = 17.02) 
31.10 
(SD = 16.81) 
-1.66** 
CT 
(seconds) 
7.11 
(SD = 6.89) 
6.39 
(SD = 6.67) 
0.72** 
DT 
(seconds) 
8.73 
(SD = 7.43) 
7.91 
(SD = 7.19) 
0.82** 
ComT 
(seconds) 
1.62 
(SD = 2.15) 
1.50 
(SD = 1.71) 
0.12 
 
SP 
 
3.76 
(SD = 1.39) 
3.34 
(SD = 1.58) 
0. 42*** 
DD 38.11 
(SD = 20.92) 
51.18 
(SD = 19.79) 
-13.07*** 
 
* = p < .05 ** = p < .001 *** = p < .0001 
 
Table 13: Performance on military and non-military scenarios. 
 
 MLM controlling for the random effect of the participant confirmed several of these 
findings showing that SAT was significantly slower for military scenarios (β = 1.7, p = 
.003). Both CT and DT were significantly faster in military scenarios (β = -.69, p = .002 
and β = -.80, p = .001 respectively). MLM found that ComT was approaching significance, 
with participants being faster to commit to a choice when facing military scenarios (β = -
.13, p = .065). Strength of preference was significantly lower for military scenarios (β = -
.43, p < .0001) and military scenarios were viewed as harder, with, overall, there being a 
13-point difference in decision difficulty for military scenarios (β = 13.21, p < .0001). So, 
overall, when people were making military decisions they took longer to assess the 
situation but were faster to make choices, even though they found them more difficult and 
were less sure about their choice.  
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Scenario Type Controlling for Participant Type: MLM found that when controlling for the 
effect of participant type there was still a significant effect of scenario type on SA (β = 
1.70, p = .003), CT (β = -.09, p = .002), and DT (β = -.80, p < .001). Once again, the effect 
of scenario type on ComT was approaching significant when factoring in participant type 
(β = -.12, p < .065). When factoring in participant type, the effect of scenario type on SP 
was also significant (β = -.45, p < .0001), as was the effect of scenario type on DD (β = 
13.20, p < .0001).  
 
Scenario Type x Participant Type: Furthermore, there was also an interaction effect 
between scenario type and participant type on SAT, CT, DT, SP and DD (p < .05). Given 
this, a series of two-level MLM were run within each participant type to explore the unique 
relationships between scenario type and decision-making. Within these comparisons, 
several interesting findings emerged. Firstly, military scenarios only resulted in increased 
SAT times within the police (β = 2.44, p = .0042) and student groups (β = 2.06, p = .033). 
There was no effect of scenario type within the military sample. Furthermore, while both 
students (β = -.076, p = .042) and Soldiers (β = -.76, p = .013) were faster to make a choice 
in military scenarios, this effect was much more pronounced in the military sample (β = -
.76 vs., β = -.076), and non-existent in the police sample, whose CT was no different 
between military and non-military scenarios. Similarly, police participants showed no 
difference in overall DT between military or non-military scenarios whereas both Soldiers 
and students were faster in military scenarios (β = -.78, p = .0138, β = -.92, p = .013 
respectively). When looking at SP, while all groups showed an overall weaker SP for 
military scenarios the effect was much more pronounced in the police (β = -.82, p < .0001) 
and student participants (β = -.50, p < .0001) than in military participants for whom the 
difference was only approaching significance (β = -.12, p > .056). When looking at decision 
difficulty, again, while military scenarios were universally viewed as harder, this was much 
more pronounced with police officers (β = 19.52, p < .0001) and military participants (β = 
13.62, p < .0001) than student participants (β = 8.78, p < .0001). To put this in perspective, 
military scenarios were rated as almost 20 points (on a 100-point scale) harder by police 
participants, and 13 points harder by Soldiers, yet on average they were only viewed as 8 
points harder by students.  
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Performance within each scenario type: Finally, and just as a point of perspective, I 
investigated the performance of the three participant types within the military and non-
military scenarios alone. Here, MLM found that when facing military scenarios there was 
no difference between the groups in terms of their SA, DT, ComT, or DD. However, police 
participants were slower that military to choose a course of action (CT; β = -.58, p = .010). 
Students were also less confident in their choice but did not differ significantly from 
Soldiers in terms of decision-making speeds (SP; β = -.99, p < .0001). When looking 
specifically at non-military scenarios students were slower than Soldiers (β = -.44, p = 
.026) and police officers (ns but β = -.44, p = .056) to commit to the choice after it was 
made (ComT), less confident in their choices than Soldiers (β = 0.606, p < .0001) and 
police officers (β = -.72, p < .0001) and reported decisions as harder than Soldiers (β = 
9.94, p < .001) and police officers (β = 11.61, p = .001). Hence, there are more differences 
between the samples within non-military scenarios than military scenarios.  
 
Overall findings for scenario type: Overall then there are a host of domain-general and 
domain-specific findings when looking at how military and non-military personnel make 
military and non-military decisions. People were slower to get SA during military 
scenarios, but faster to choose and commit to a course of action. This is especially 
interesting given that they were, on average, less committed to a given course of action 
(lower strength of preference) and often found the decision harder. However, scenario 
types did affect each group equally, most notably while military scenarios were viewed 
harder by Soldiers, this did not slow down their decision-making. Police participants, on 
the other hand, were slower to make military decisions. Furthermore, students seemed 
particularly slow to make decisions in the non-military scenarios. They were also less sure 
of their choices. Which is even more interesting when we consider that the students found 
the military scenarios the least challenging of the three. So, while military scenarios did 
change decision-making patterns overall, each participant type was uniquely affected by 
them.   
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H4: Because Soldiers show less inertia, they must have more engrained value systems than 
those who become inert (namely members of the emergency services). 
 
Overall, I provide support for H4. When looking at differences within value 
systems, a one-way ANOVA showed that there are significantly different value strengths 
between the three types of participant (F(2, 97) = 4.891, p = .009), with Soldiers having 
an overall stronger value system (M = 15.39, SD = 4.49) that police officers (M = 12.19, 
SD = 5.61, p < .05). When looking at individual values, there were significant differences 
in scores for the value “protecting life” (F(2, 97) = 3.742, p = .027), “protecting Soldiers” 
(F(2, 97) = 7.123, p = .001), “completing the mission” (F(2, 97) = 3.617, p = .031), 
“pursuing the enemy” (F(2, 97) = 2.952, p = .057), “avoid negative consequences” (F(2, 
97) = 4.362, p = .015), “everyone’s right to free will” (F(2, 97) = 4.369, p = .015), “exerting 
authority” (F(2, 97) = 3.742, p = .027), and the “need to obey orders” (F(2, 97) = 3.742, p 
= .027). Bonferroni post hoc showed that police officers valued protecting life significantly 
less than Soldiers (p < .05) and students (ns, p < .082). Police officers valued protecting 
the lives of Soldiers less than Soldiers (p < .05) and students (p < .05). Soldiers valued 
completing the mission and pursuing the enemy significantly more than police officers (p 
< .05). Finally, police officers valued the right to free will significantly less than students 
(p < .05) and the need to exert authority less than Soldiers (p < .05). The differences 
between the three groups across all 11 values are shown in Figure 8.  
To investigate the unique effect of value system within each of the three groups, a 
series of interaction effects were modelled using two-level MLMs. There was a significant 
interaction between the strength of values and type of participant on decision difficulty (p 
< .05) and strength of preference (p < .0001). Given this, a series of MLMs were run 
independently within each participant type. This found that, with regards to decision 
difficulty, value systems significantly affected ratings of DD in the student sample (β = -
.027, p < .0001), but not in the police officer or, Soldier sample. When looking at the 
relationship between strength of value system and SP within each group, MLM found that 
value systems had no effect on the student or military sample (p > .05), but it did have an 
effect within the police sample (β = -.054, p = .039). What this means then is that students 
with strong value systems show a general lower preference for options while police officers 
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with high value systems show a higher decision difficulty. Irrespective of value system 
strength, Soldiers showed a stronger strength of preference and lower decision difficulty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Mean differences on value scores across 10 values. 
 
Value Systems  
 
In the last two chapters, I have attempted to classify values as “sacred” and 
“secular” based on their relative importance to the decision-maker. Based on the findings 
of the last chapter, and to an extent, the perceived subjectivity of identifying the values at 
play within a given scenario, here I try an objective method of analyzing values.  
In this chapter, instead of tradeoff types, I sought to investigate value systems; that 
is, I wanted to analyze patterns of values that exist and how these patterns of values may 
be linked to differences in decision-making. To achieve this a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was run to sort individuals’ scores on the 11 SVMs into meaningful 
components. PCA was selected here because I am operating a priori, that is, without any 
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theoretical guidance on what patterns of values should emerge. Overall, the ideal number 
of participants is at least 5 times the number of items (O’Rourke, Psych & Hatcher, 2013, 
p. 9). Here I have 11 items and 100 participants, making it appropriate to run a PCA. 
Analysis of the correlation matrix of the 11 items identified perfect collinearity between 
two of the factors (a cause of singular correlation matrices); “protect life” and “obey 
orders”. Given this, these two items were removed from the analysis to allow calculation 
of Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (critical to ensure PCA is a suitable 
analysis method for this data). Once removed, the scale the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure 
of sampling adequacy was .84, well above the recommended value of .6, and within the 
boundaries of “meritorious” (one level below “marvelous” see by Kaiser, 1974a, 1974b). 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was also highly significant (χ2 (36) = 393.201, p < .0001). 
Hence, I can be sure that a PCA is a suitable analysis method.  
An initial factor analysis identified two factors with eigenvalues >1. These two 
factors combined to explain 61.73% of the variance (49.63% and 12.15%) respectively. 
This, coupled with an analysis of the initial scree plot indicated that two-factor solution 
was optimal. When this PCA was run with an oblique rotation method (using Oblimin 
rotation) all variables heavily loaded onto a single factor. Given this, a Varimax rotation 
was used because it redistributes the variance more evenly among the factors, producing 
less complex factors and easier results to interpret (Kass & Tinsley 1979, p. 134). The 
outputs of this PCA are highlighted in Table 14 using the guidelines provided by Comrey 
and Lee (1992; in which >.71 is excellent; .63-.70 is very good; .55-.62 is good; .45-.54 is 
fair; < .44 is poor).  
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Value Factor 1 Factor 2 
Protect Life  0.866 0.131 
Protect Soldiers 0.878 0.173 
Protect Civilians  0.75 0.424 
Complete Mission  0.264 0.716 
Pursue Enemy  0.265 0.701 
Avoid Negative 
Consequences 
0.479 0.517 
Avoid Blame  0.031 0.737 
Act Within the Law  0.269 0.659 
Free Will 0.537 0.521 
 
Note:  Bold italicized values are those that exceed .45 
 
Table 14: Value loadings on a two-factor PCA with Varimax rotation. 
 
Taking only those variables which dominantly loaded onto a single factor (“avoiding 
negative consequences” and “everyone’s right to free will” loaded equally among the two 
whereas “protecting civilians” did not load sufficiently onto either) and adding a semantic 
interpretation to the factors, and the values loaded on them there are two “clusters” that 
appear; Egocentric and Empathetic values. Egocentric values (Factor 2) are those that 
center around the self; “completing the mission”, “pursuing an enemy”, “avoiding blame”, 
and “acting within the law”. Empathetic values (Factor 1) on the other hand are those 
centered around others; “protecting the lives of Soldiers” and “protecting the lives of 
people under your command”.  
 To explore the between-group effects of value systems on decision-making each 
participant was assigned a dominant value system based on their score across the six 
variables (Empathetic: Protecting life, Protecting Soldiers, Egocentric Values; Complete 
mission, pursue enemy, avoid blame, act within the law). Because there are twice as many 
egocentric values as empathetic values, the overall score for each value system was divided 
by the number of values within it (so, 4 for egocentric, and 2 for empathetic). This method 
is adapted from current methods of assigning dominant “types” when constructing 
“typologies” of criminal behavior which often involve uneven variable distributions (see, 
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for example, Salfati & Canter, 2000). Using this method, all participants could be assigned 
to either an “Empathetic” (68%) or “Egocentric” value system (32%). While the 
distribution of value systems was not even within the three participant groups (see Figure 
9), Pearson’s chi-squared showed that this difference was not significant (χ2=3.882, p = 
.141). Looking at overall scores as continuous variables (rather than assigning a binary 
“type”), overall there was a significant difference on Empathetic value scores between 
participant types (F(2, 97) = 6.013,  p = .013) and Bonferroni post hoc revealed that 
Soldiers (M = 17.25, SD = 5.47; p = .006) and students (M = 17.19, SD = 3.46; p = .008) 
both scored significantly higher than police (M = 12.89, SD = 7.08) on their Empathetic 
value score. There was no significant difference between scores on the egocentric value 
system (F(2, 97) = 2.213,  p = .115). This is shown in Figure 9.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Empathetic and Egocentric value systems across participant types 
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Discussion 
 
 In this chapter, I sought to test four assertions that I have made throughout this 
thesis (each one stemming from my qualitative analysis). I wanted to investigate: how, if 
at all, Soldiers had different personalities than police and student counterparts; if Soldiers 
were better decision-makers that police and student counterparts; if overall, everyone was 
a better decision-maker when facing a military situation; and finally, how differences in 
values between groups might affect decision-making. Overall, I found degrees of support 
for all four of my hypotheses. Now, the relationships between the many variables here are 
not simple, and there are a series of within and between group differences and interactions 
which require explaining, but I can, with the data analyzed above, advance the following 
findings; 
 
1. Soldiers do make decisions faster than police officers  
2. Soldiers do have subtle personality differences which impact their ability to 
make decisions  
3. People make faster decisions when in a military scenario  
4. Soldiers do have distinctly different value systems from police officers  
 
We will elaborate on each of these findings (and their complexities) below.  
 
Finding 1: Soldiers do make decisions faster than police officers  
 
 In relation to decision-making speed, my findings show an interesting commonality 
between Soldiers and students in that both are, generally, faster at decision-making than 
their police counterparts. Overall Soldiers were faster to choose a course of action, commit 
to it and showed a stronger preference and lower decision difficulty for their choice. What 
is most interesting about this finding is that it is domain-general meaning that overall, 
across both military and non-military scenarios, Soldiers were faster decision-makers and 
it is not the effect of a domain-specific series of military scenarios. This provides evidence 
for my hypotheses that there is a baseline difference in the willingness to make least-worst 
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choices and to commit to courses of actions. In attempting to explain why this is true 
however there are two possible explanations; the person, or the situation. I explore both 
below.  
 
Finding 2: Personality differences and decision-making  
 
 It is well known that people differ in the way they make decisions and that these 
differences are, to varying degrees, related to a series of individual differences in 
personality, cognitive and decision-making styles (Dewberry, Juanchich & Narendran, 
2013). Here, I focused on three common factors that have been used to predict individual 
differences in decision-making ability; experience (Klein, 1993), need for closure 
(Kruglanski et al., 1998) and self-reported maximization (Turner et al., 2012). While in 
this study each of these factors was related to individual differences in decision-making, 
they present a complex pattern of association. Looking at experience first; experience is 
most often linked to improved decision-making in that it increases the “library” of 
analogies with which one can draw upon (Klein et al., 1998) and generally aids their 
situational awareness (Endsley, 2000). Hence, it should have resulted in improved 
decision-making. Here, however, I found the opposite effect, in that those with more 
experience were slower to make a choice and reported experiencing more difficulty within 
the scenario. One explanation for this is that, as outlined in one of Klein’s earliest studies, 
experience aids our ability “to identify and carry out a course of action without having to 
generate analyses of options” (Klein, 1997, p. 285). Perhaps here then the issue is that I 
was presenting the courses of action to the decision-maker, removing one of the 
fundamental benefits of experience. The increased difficulty may, therefore, reflect 
difficulty because of the inability to identify their own courses of action, rather than the 
difficulty of making the decision between them. 
 The findings for NFC may have a similar explanation. Overall, NFC is associated 
with being able to cognitively close on a solution, rather than searching all available 
opportunities and trying to “maximize”. Time and time again it is linked to fast decision-
making with low uncertainty (e.g., McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 2006). Here, however, 
high NFC was associated with slower decision-making in that those with high NFC scores 
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had weaker preferences for an option and found decisions harder. One potential 
interpretation of this is that, despite finding the decisions harder, the decision-making of 
high NFC participants was not slower than who scored low-NFC - despite the strong 
correlation between DD and overall decision-making speed. This implies then, that while 
high NFC decision-makers were not more decisive in this study (and again, as above, the 
effect of NFC may not emerge within a paradigm that offers no “searching” or “plan 
development” phase), there is evidence at least that, in the face of hard decisions, their 
decision-making is not slowed. This would provide some support for the overall utility of 
NFC in that despite finding choices harder and being less confident, they were not any 
slower to commit to them.  
 Maximization, on the other hand, did act as intended in that those who were higher 
in self-reported maximization found the decisions harder and showed a lower preference 
for their choice. This finding is expected given that overall maximization is associated with 
postponing a choice in favor of finding an alternate (and better) choice. Here, however, 
participants were provided with two choices, neither of which were ideal. However, again 
it is interesting that maximization did not predict decision-making speed, simply perceived 
difficulty and strength of preference. What is also interesting is the finding that 
maximization is domain-specific affecting police and student participants, but not affecting 
Soldiers. Lest not forget that both Soldiers and police scored significantly lower on 
maximization than students. This means that not only are Soldiers less likely to have a need 
to maximize, there is also some evidence that despite a trait level desire to “maximize” a 
situation, Soldiers were better able to “switch off” this need and focus on action. Hence, 
the analysis does show that overall Soldiers differ from non-Soldiers both in the overall 
need to maximize situations, as well as how much this tendency affects their decision-
making.  
 
Finding 3: People make faster decisions when in a military scenario  
 
 One hypothesis I advanced was that people are, generally, more prone to action 
when making military decisions. What this would mean is that there is nothing “special” 
or “unique” about the Soldiers themselves but that, in general, people are more decisive 
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when they are making military decisions. Now, while I have already shown that, Soldiers 
do have distinct personality factors, a series of interesting findings emerged when police 
officers and students made military decisions. Here, and very much in line with social 
psychological perspectives of priming and the impact of “the situation” (e.g., Coleman, 
2004; Zimbardo, 1969), while the SAT was slower for military scenarios, all other decision 
variables were lower (CT, DT, ComT). Contra-logically then, SP was lower and DD was 
higher. This meant that, on average, despite finding scenarios harder participants were 
faster to choose a course of action, showed less commitment delay and were faster to 
submit it. Hence, there is something about a military scenario which makes people less 
inert. The fact that this was confirmed by MLM (during which correlational associations 
frequently became non-significant) reinforces the strength of this effect. What is also 
apparent is that this effect was group-specific, meaning that while the difference was very 
pronounced in the Soldier and student sample, most these findings were not significant for 
the police sample meaning that their performance did not benefit from this military “bump” 
in decision-making speed. This finding, therefore, does support that the simple fact that a 
least-worst decision was presented “in war” gave people a sense of urgency which spurred 
decision-making (despite the scenarios being viewed as more difficulty). This finding then 
supports the wider field of social psychology in that when people are placed in stereotypical 
roles in which any type of action or response is expected of them, they often find 
themselves acting up to that. What is also especially interesting is that the scenarios were 
presented in a random order meaning that this military “prime” was operating directly 
within each scenario and not leaking into their performance in the non-military scenarios.  
 
 
Finding 4: Soldiers do have distinctly different value systems from police officers  
 
 One of the most important points of focus throughout this thesis has been the role 
that values play in preventing inertia, and while in Chapter 7 I did not find support for the 
effect of tradeoff type, here I have strong evidence that value systems are an important 
factor in decision-making. Looking at the overall performance, Soldiers showed an 
increased ability to commit to a course of action in both military and non-military 
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decisions. Soldiers also scored significantly higher, on average, across all 11 values on the 
SVM. Hence it is viable to propose that they have a stronger value system guiding their 
decisions. Furthermore, this increase in value strength was not specifically isolated to the 
“Soldier-centric” values of “protecting Soldiers” or “completing the mission,” but they 
generally outscored their police counterparts on all 11 values. So too did the students 
(except for one; “acting within the law”). When looking back at Tetlock’s (2003) work on 
values and tradeoffs, perhaps what this stronger value system creates is a more poignant 
awareness of the importance of values. In Tetlock’s work (although not confirmed by us in 
Chapter 6) when a sacred value is at play, decisions are faster and easier to make. Perhaps 
here, by having stronger values overall, these values are more poignant, making it easier to 
identify those that are sacred, and hence, choose the option that does not tradeoff against 
it. 
In addition, the Soldiers’ value system is not only stronger, but stronger in relation 
to a specific subset of values. Hence, not only do Soldiers have quantifiably stronger values 
they have qualitatively different value systems. To further explore this relationship a PCA 
was used to investigate “clusters” or groups of values which might reflect an underlying 
“system” or “construct.” A PCA was used to prevent the role of subjectivity which might 
have been seen with other clustering methods such as a smallest space analysis (see Salfati 
& Canter, 1999). This PCA identified two main factors which I interpreted as “Empathetic” 
and “Egocentric” that is, one factor seemed to be related to those values which focused on 
helping others, while the other focused on values associated with the self and avoiding 
blame. When Soldiers scores on these two constructs were compared to police and students, 
Soldiers scored significantly higher on the values associated with empathy (“protecting the 
life of those under my command” and “protecting Soldiers”). Empathy is the emotion of 
being concerned with the welfare of others. Empathy facilitates interpersonal relationships 
and influences people to engage in prosocial and altruistic behaviors (Mencl & May, 2009). 
Empathy comprises of two components cognitive and affective (Hoffman, 1987); 
Cognitive empathy involves thinking about those potentially suffering, and taking their 
perspective, i.e., thinking about another person’s situation. Affective empathy, on the other 
hand, involves feeling compassion and sympathy (Batson, 1990). Empathy has often been 
linked to decision-making (specifically moral decision-making; Pizarro, 2000), with the 
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view that being able to experience empathy should encourage others to think about others 
first and not themselves.  
This view of empathy (putting others before ourselves) is clearly tied with decision 
inertia and least-worst decisions. Although perhaps the link has not yet been made. In 2012, 
as outlined and referenced several times in this thesis, Claudia van den Heuvel and 
colleagues published the results from a simulated terrorist attack in which counter terrorism 
officers oversaw making several critical decisions surrounding when, if at all, to cancel the 
parade. Here, the authors reported that accountability and “save self” priorities “‘derailed’ 
officers from making “save life” decisions. Instead, albeit in a minority of cases, they either 
made errors of omission by failing to make any decision at all or inappropriate choice 
deferrals (by insisting another agency made the decision or that the decision could be made 
later).” (p. 165). Hence here, thinking about the self, and not other people, created a focus 
on anticipatory regret and a lack of action. Recent work by Power and Alison (2017) with 
critical incident responders also highlight how, too often, officers get pre-occupied thinking 
about what will happen to them if they do, or do not, act, rather than prioritizing actions 
that could help save other people. Hence, when looking at value systems and the ability of 
Soldiers to “tolerate” bad outcomes, the role of their value systems might be both domain 
general and domain specific in that when facing a least-worst outcome they effectively 
prioritize empathetic values that are ingrained in them.  
What I am saying here then, is not that a lack of empathy or “thinking about others” 
causes inertia; this is clear from the papers mentioned above. What the findings here 
suggest however is a potential reason as to why Soldiers are not as susceptible to this is 
that their value system is so heavily focused on saving others. Re-visiting Figure 9, I clearly 
cannot say that Soldiers “do not think about themselves” (they scored higher on these 
variable than the police), but the degree of difference between their scores on these 
egocentric variables and the variables surrounding protecting life are larger than their 
police counterparts, it is perhaps this critical difference between the self and others, 
between Soldier and police officers, that may hold the key to understanding the difference 
in their propensity to become inert.  
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Conclusion 
 
Since Chapter 4 I have known that there is something different about Soldiers. 
Despite using the same prompt many other researchers have used, and asking them to recall 
the exact type of situation that creates decision inertia, they appeared resilient. In this 
chapter, I sought to identify what it was about them that made them “unique” and more 
tolerant to least-worst outcomes. I identified many things; firstly, they are different. They 
have less of a tendency to maximize and the need for maximization doesn’t seem to affect 
them the same way it does police officers and students. Secondly, military environments 
seem to impose on people a “temporary” resilience to inertia and results in a domain 
general increase in decision-making. Finally, I identified that Soldiers have stronger values. 
Specifically, when looking at their value system they placed more importance on 
empathetic values. This, I argue helps them not get stuck in the redundant deliberation that 
occurs in critical incidents in which someone becomes preoccupied with anticipatory regret 
and the potential blame that may bestow them if a negative outcome occurs.   
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CHAPTER 9: THERE AND BACK AGAIN: VALUES, INERTIA AND 
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING.  
 
I am glad you are here with me. Here at the end of all things 
- Frodo Baggins (in J.R.R. Tolkien, The Return of the King) 
 
The etiology of this thesis lies within a single paper. In fact, it stems from a single 
figure within that paper. Figure 10 shows the original publication of the SAFE-T model as 
outlined by van den Heuvel, Alison and Crego (2012). When this paper was published, I 
was working as a social scientist with the Defense Science and Technology Laboratory 
(DSTL) working on issues of military performance, a large part of which was centered on 
decision-making (e.g., Klein, 1993). However, what struck me most about this article, and 
the SAFE-T model in general, was its incredible relevance for military decision-making. 
At a time when perspectives were either entirely recognitional (e.g., RPD) or multiattribute 
(doctrinal and rational), the SAFE-T model offered a knowledge gathering framework to 
not only unpack the decision-making process, but to model the effects of the many 
pressures that exist within the military decision-making environment. Furthermore, given 
that a central aspect of the SAFE-T model is identifying how, when and why decision-
making becomes derailed, it provided a theoretical warrant with which we could explore 
the manifestation of decision inertia within military decision-making.  
It was with this thought that this thesis started; the theoretical and practical utility 
of the SAFE-T model as a framework to consider military decision-making. However, this 
thesis evolved from this idea. While I did identify the role of many factors listed in the 
SAFE-T model (accountability, exogenous and endogenous uncertainty), what I did not 
find was the same level of inertia within military decision-makers. Hence, while I still feel 
that the SAFE-T model is a relevant and useful theory, what it does not do is explain why 
military decision-makers demonstrated an increased ability (at least in comparison to 
studies of police decision-making in least-worst situations; e.g., Alison et al., 2006; Power 
& Alison, 2017) to commit to a course of action when the likely consequences are negative. 
Given this, I sought to provide a theoretical framework that may explain the process of, 
and individual differences in, committing to least-worst choices. Based on the findings 
from the qualitative analysis I centered on the role of values. Here, and moving away from 
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the naturalistic perspectives I emphasized in the early chapters of this research, I started to 
examine the role of values in the lab. Furthermore, I compared values both within military 
personnel and between military and non-military personnel to provide empirical support to 
the qualitative observation about the improved ability of Soldiers to make these types of 
least-worst choice.  
 
 
 
Figure 10: The SAFE-T model (recreated, with permission, from van den Heuvel, Alison 
& Crego, 2012). 
 
Despite the evolution of this thesis away from simply “testing” the relevance of the 
SAFE-T model, what this thesis has always centered on is the need to expand our 
perspective of military decision-making and to better conceptualize and study the 
ecological niche within which these decisions are made. In this chapter then I reflect on 
this aspect. I begin by looking back at the history of thinking surrounding military decision-
making, and how I have contributed to that. In addition, I talk about my work on values 
and what this adds to our understanding of military decision-making. In addition, I go wider 
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still and discuss the contributions of this work to the wider field of decision-making. In 
addition to this I highlight some of the important future directions that this research can 
take as well as some of the methodological flaws that should be addressed going forward. 
Finally, I reflect on decision-making overall, and what this work can add to our 
understanding of how least-worst decisions are made, or not made.  
 
How Military Decisions are Made  
 
 When reflecting on the contribution of this research to our understanding of how 
military decisions are made, it is perhaps prudent to re-visit Gary Klein’s (1989) original 
article on the subject in which, he argued, the military needed to move away from analytical 
decision-making. In his words (p. 56); 
 
“It is time to admit that the theories and ideals of decision-making we have 
held over the past 25 years are inadequate and misleading, having produced 
unused decision aids, ineffective decision training programs and 
inappropriate doctrine… The strategies sound good, but in practice they are 
often disappointing. They do not work under time pressure because they take 
too long. Even when there is enough time, they require much work and lack 
flexibility for handling rapidly changing field conditions… The point for this 
article is that there are different ways to make decisions, analytical ways and 
recognitional ways, and that must understand the strengths and limits of both 
in order to improve military decision-making.” 
 
Klein observed platoon leaders and battle commanders (at a series of training events) and 
found that “85 percent of the decisions were made in less than 1 minute” (p. 58). From his 
estimations, “experienced decision-makers handle approximately 50 to 80 percent of 
decisions using recognitional strategies without any effort to contrast two or more options. 
If we include all decision points, routine plus non-routine the portion of RPDs goes much 
higher, more than 90 percent” (p. 59). It is clear then that most decisions being made were 
multiattribute and did not involve the comparison of multiple courses of action (as is 
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outlined in military doctrine). In fact, as Klein reports when he told Soldiers he was 
studying decision-making, some of whom replied that they had “never made any 
decisions!” As Klein notes “what he meant was that he never constructed two or more 
options and then struggled to choose the best one” (p.58). The reader may see the parallels 
here with some of my own conversations with Soldiers in which they felt like they had 
never made a decision (see page 95 of this thesis). Now, before we move forward to the 
present day, it is important that we outline some of the finer points of Klein’s argument; 
specially as they pertain to the importance of multiattribute decision-making. Despite the 
over-representation of RPD decisions in the military (as high as 90 percent), Klein still 
maintained the importance of considering both strategies. As he states, “the point… is that 
there are different ways to make decisions, analytical ways and recognitional ways, and 
that we must understand the strengths and limitations of both to improve military decision-
making” (p. 57). Hence, in Gary Klein’s view, while there was an absolute need for there 
to be a refocusing of training and doctrine to emphasize recognitional methods, this was 
not do be done in lieu of multiattribute methods. There simply needed to be a balance 
between the two as both have strengths and weaknesses.  
 From here then there has been a significant push towards developing this 
recognitional ability (sometimes referred to as “intuition” see, for example, Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004). As Mike Matthews outlines in his “vision” for training intuition in 
Soldiers in 2030 in which “to use Klein’s naturalistic decision-making terms, our fictional 
recruit is building a sophisticated and detailed inventory of experiences-as real as those he 
will later build through real world missions- that will allow him to (bloodlessly, as General 
Scales would say) response quickly, accurately, and effectively when his boots hit the 
ground in some faraway land.” (p. 67). The importance of Klein’s work in developing such 
intuition is clear. The issue however, as is often the case with scientific findings, is that 
over time the nuances of this paper have become lost (for another example of this diluting 
of theoretical theory over time see Gill & Corner, 2017) and perhaps the scales have swung 
too far away from multiattribute decision-making. Well, not multiattribute decision-
making per se (which we outline the issues of in Chapter 2), at least the idea that people 
make decisions at all. While this may not be far from the truth (as Klein 2011 notes, “we 
contrast options in perhaps 5-10 percent of cases” p. 87), it is our presupposition that 
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denigrating the process of choice entirely is theoretically damaging for our understanding 
of military decision-making, as well as problematic if we are not training Soldiers to make 
effective choices when the time comes (even if it is only 5% of the time). This is especially 
true if (as my interviews support), those 5% of choices are what Taleb (2008) would call 
“black swans” in that they are rare, unpredictable, high-risk, and very high consequence. 
If so, then it is when decision-makers most need to make decisions, that their intuition is 
often not enough.  
 The first contribution of this thesis is to re-emphasize the importance of choice 
within a military context. Now, at first this might sound like a calling card to bring back 
multiattribute decision-making; it is not. While we maintain that members of the military 
do make choices, these choices are not those that can be explained with multiattribute 
theory (for the many reasons outlined in Chapter 2 and 3). Instead we posit that members 
of the military make least-worst choices, and these choices do require a process of option 
evaluation and eventually “choosing” a “better” choice. However, from a theoretical 
standpoint, what this thesis contributed is the importance of considering the ecological 
niche within which such decisions are made. While multiattribute perspectives view 
decisions as the outcome of a comparison of the merits of the available options, the data 
here provides a far richer and far more complex picture (like naturalistic decision-making 
in general). Here our data highlights the importance of exogenous and endogenous 
uncertainty, trust, anticipatory regret, role confusion. Hence, and as stated earlier in this 
chapter, this thesis strongly supports the relevance of the SAFE-T model as a knowledge 
generating platform for military decision-making as it pertains to the detrimental effect of 
these many external and internal pressures on the process of decision-making. 
Psychological research has extensively tested the presumptions of RPD (e.g., experience 
and situational awareness) in military decision-making (e.g., Baber, Fulthorpe & 
Houghton, 2010; Millitello, Sushereba, Branlat, Bean & Finomore, 2015). Others have 
focused on the role of uncertainty and time pressure on military decision-making (Ahituv, 
Igbaria & Sella, 1998) but many of the factors within the SAFE-T model remain 
unexplored. For example, no research (besides the qualitative data presented here) has 
examined the role of inter or within-team trust, accountability or anticipatory regret on 
military decision-making. Our data supports that these are important factors and further 
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work needs to experimentally manipulate such factors (either lab-based, or naturalistically 
within ISLEs) to measure their impact. Such research will have important implications not 
only for understanding decision-making, but also informing organizational policies such 
as the degree of accountability we place on Soldiers during war.  
 
Good Decision-Makers vs., Good Decision-Making 
 
 The second contribution of this thesis is to elucidate the individual differences that 
exist both within Soldiers and between Soldiers and other individuals who make critical 
least-worst decisions. Let us first look at what makes a good military decision-maker. As 
stated in Chapter 7, “predicting” who will make good decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty, high-stakes and time pressure is a central concern for military selection. Here 
we found several factors that were associated with an increased ability to commit to least-
worst courses of action. The issue, however, is that despite the importance of this, most of 
the “factors” we look at are closely tied to RPD (experience) and hence are “developed” 
rather than “innate.” As stated prior, the “cognitive” factors highlighted in the Oxford 
Handbook of Military Psychology include intuition and insight and are centered on 
heuristics, biases and discussions of “thinking fast” vs., “thinking slow” (see Kahneman, 
2003). Here, we took a far more cognitive approach, focusing on measurable individual 
differences that are shown to predict wider decision-making. The first factor we focused 
on was NFC; an epistemic motivation for a firm answer and an aversion to ambiguity 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). They also are more likely to 
“jump to conclusions” (McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 2006). People with high NFC 
process less information before committing to a choice and generally generate fewer 
hypotheses to account for the data (Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1987). Overall then, those in 
NFC should be better decision-makers in least-worst situations, because of a willingness 
to generate a choice and commit to it rather than tolerating the uncertainty of option 
comparison. Here, however, we did not find this. In neither Chapter 7, or 8 did we find 
evidence that NFC was linked to decision-making performance in any way. Those high in 
NFC and those low in NFC, within both police, Soldier and civilian populations made 
decisions at the same speed. Instead, the effect of NFC was more prominent in the reported 
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decision difficulty and the strength of preference shown. However, rather than showing an 
easier experience, or more commitment to a choice, those high in NFC showed weaker 
preferences and reported lower preferences to their choices overall.  
 There are several potential reasons for this contra-logical finding regarding NFC. 
First and foremost, there are a series of on-going discussions about the validity of on-going 
NFC measures, and specifically the fact that it should be treated as multifactorial (rather 
than a single unified factor; see Kruglanski et al., 1997). In fact, the full version of the NFC 
scale included five independent facets: ‘desire for predictability’ (8 items), ‘need for order’ 
(10 items), ‘discomfort with ambiguity’ (9 items), ‘decisiveness’ (7 items), and ‘closed-
mindedness’ (8 items). The issue however, is that studies have found that these five facets 
are not all positively related. For example, Shiloh, Koren and Zakay (2001) found that 
certain facets of the NFC scale were associated with perceived decision difficulty, while 
others were not. This, they argued “indicate that the association between individual 
differences in need for closure and decision representations is complex, and support the 
position that this construct too should be treated as multi-dimensional” (p. 707). In fact, in 
their study several of the sub-scores had opposite influences on perceived decision 
difficulty, in that two subscales contributed negatively to decision difficulty (‘decisiveness’ 
and ‘closed-mindedness’), while three others (‘preference for order’, ‘discomfort with 
ambiguity’, and ‘preference for predictability’) were all positively associated with decision 
difficulty. Shiloh et al.’s findings may therefore, potentially, shed light on our own. Here 
we used the 15-item shortened version of the NFC scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel 
(2011). Roets and Van Hiel developed this shortened version by extracting the three highest 
loading factors from each of the five facets and while there 15-item version shows strong 
correlation with the full 42 item version (.95), the model itself only explained 23.10% of 
the variance. What this mean here is that our measure is perhaps NFC “light” in that while 
it correlates, overall, with NFC it does not allow for the full expansion and analysis of these 
unique subsets and the multifactorial nature of NFC. It is viable therefore that our 
relationship between NFC and decision difficulty is driven by certain subsets within the 
NFC scale. Hence, before we make any strong claims about the reverse-effect of NFC 
within military decision-making, it is important that this research is repeated with the full 
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42 item scale so that we can effectively isolate the unique influence of each of the five 
facets within this multifactorial construct.  
 The second factor we examined was self-reported maximization. Building on 
Simon’s (1955, 1956) work in this area Schwartz et al. (2002) developed the “self-reported 
maximizers scale” to measure individual tendencies in efforts to maximize rather than 
satisfice. Previous research shows that people who report a strong desire to “maximize” a 
situation (i.e., find the ideal outcome) have worse life outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007). Here, I found that maximization did predict individual differences in decision-
making. Specifically, those who scored higher in maximization found the decisions harder 
to make and, overall, reported a lower strength of preference for a choice. Hence, 
maximization conformed the expected findings; that when they were not able to maximize 
a situation (i.e., because the two choices were presented to them) individuals found the 
decisions harder to make. It is important to state that maximization (nor NFC) was 
associated with any behavioral differences (i.e., slower decision-making) but overall, both 
those who scored highly in both factors found the decisions harder, and showed a lower 
preference for their choices.  
 Finally, we looked at experience. NDM research has often highlighted that experts 
are decision-makers than novices because they generate experience-based hypotheses 
(Klein, 1997; Lipshitz, Klein, Oransanu, & Salas, 2001). Under time pressure specifically, 
experts outperform novices because they make more efficient decisions because of their 
larger reserve of hypotheses stored in long-term memory (Stokes & Raby, 1989). 
Specifically, Pascual and Henderson (1997) found that experts were better at prioritizing 
decision tasks and Patel et al. (2014) found that experienced medics were better at detecting 
errors. Here then, we assumed our experienced decision-makers would outperform 
novices. Interestingly however, the opposite occurred. When we looked both within the 
Soldier sample, and between the Soldier and police sample we found that as experience 
increased so too did decision time and decision difficulty. So, experienced decision-makers 
found the choices harder and took more time to make them; the opposite of our hypotheses. 
However, there are several important factors that should be considered when we draw 
inferences from these findings. Firstly, in their research with police decision-makers, 
Alison, Doran, Long, Power and Humphrey (2013) found no effect of experience on 
Shortland Thesis (2017)  
 203 
hypothesis generation and how decision-makers handled time pressure. Now our findings 
our not suggesting that more experienced decision-makers are “worse” at decision-making. 
Like Alison et al., (2013) what our dependent variables lack is a metric of “quality”. Instead 
we simply showed that they found the choices harder and were slower to make decisions. 
When examining why this may be there is a strong methodological component which 
should be considered. The effect of experience within NDM is rooted within their “library” 
of experiences which aids situational awareness (Endsley, 2000), option generation, and 
visualization (Lipshitz et al., 2001). None of which were required in this study. 
Specifically, decision-makers were provided with situational awareness within a “closed” 
scenario, and the options were provided to them. Hence there was no tasks within which 
experience usually distinguishes experts from novices. This, it is arguable, may have 
mitigated the positive effect of experience which is so-often seen in wider naturalistic 
research (see Alison & Crego, 2008). Hence, when you remove the process of situational 
awareness and hypothesis generation from the decision-making process, it is viable that we 
did not generate a platform from which experts could distinguish cognitively themselves 
from novices. When looking then at why they were in fact slower (and did not perform the 
same), Klein (1989) found that more experienced decision-makers took longer in the 
situational awareness phase of decision-making (to use a military parlance from our 
interviews; novices are more likely to “rush to failure”). So, there is precedent. Hence, what 
we may be seeing here is more “poise” in our expert decision-makers, whose experience is 
not helping them generate options, but is instead providing them more context to 
understand the implications of their decisions and the many variables at play.  
 
Least-Worst Decision-Making and Decision Inertia   
 
 As stated at the start of this chapter, a principal premise of this thesis was to explore 
the psychological manifestation of decision inertia as it pertains to the military decision-
making process. However, our early interviews showed an incredible resistance to inertia 
within the Soldiers we interviewed (or at least their recollection gave no indication of 
inertia). Experimentally I was then able to demonstrate that, when faced with a least-worst 
option, Soldiers did show an increased ability to commit to a choice. As with any scientific 
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enquiry, our goal then became to identify why? What is it about those who enter the Armed 
Forces that enables them to commit to choices when it counts. Now, there are several 
possible explanations. One is personality; many of the Soldiers we interviewed expressed 
they had a “decisive personality.” For example, one of our interviewees recalled;   
 
I’m a pretty confident guy and I think military officers in general are pretty 
“Type A” and I think that you know you don’t get to where you’re at unless 
you’re successful and have some amount of confidence. So, I was 90% sure 
that...going up there with the QRF [Quick Reaction Force] was the right 
choice and I was 110% sure that getting the hell out of there was the right 
choice. 
 
In support of this view, there is evidence (found here and elsewhere) that those who enter 
the military are different. Jackson and colleagues (2012) used a longitudinal sample of 
German males who either did, or did not enter the military and found that those who did 
enter the military were lower in agreeableness, neuroticism and openness to experience 
during high school. In a similar vein, Klee and Renner (2016) found in a sample of 236 
Soldiers that they were higher in emotional stability and lower in openness and 
agreeableness than civilians. In addition, Jackson and colleagues found that military 
training itself lowered levels of agreeableness (meaning that people who enter the military 
are different from those who do not, and are changed further by the process of military 
training). While here we do not have longitudinal data to determine which factors are a 
cause, or effect, or entering the military, we did find that our Soldier sample had lower 
levels of the need to maximize than their student counterparts. However, in terms of 
personality there were few differences between our Soldiers and the police sample; 
meaning that while it is possible that these personality differences separate those who 
choose high-risk occupations (police, fire, military) and those who do not, they perhaps do 
not separate those who excel at making critical decisions within such occupations.  
 In addition to focusing on the personality/decision-making style predictors, this 
thesis sought to identify additional theoretical explanations for this phenomenon. Based on 
our analysis of the interviews we conducted we developed an emerging theory about the 
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importance of values and while our specific theory about value tradeoff types did not 
receive empirical support when tested (potentially this stemmed, at least in part, from a 
range of methodological issues; see Chapter 7), Chapter 8 showed the importance of value 
systems; Soldiers were faster decision-makers and had stronger value systems than their 
police and student counterparts. Furthermore, we found that Soldiers scored significantly 
higher on the values that associated with the “empathy” subset of the 11 values we tested. 
With this data, we could confirm our fourth hypothesis “Soldiers show less inertia, they 
must have more engrained value systems than those who become inert (namely members 
of the emergency services).” However, to fully explain the role of values we need to draw 
upon both sets of data; the quantitative data we have on Soldiers’ value systems and 
decision-making, and the qualitative data we collected and analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
The “Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck” 
 
 As the final chapters of this Ph.D. are being written there is a current best-seller on 
the New York Times list holds a surprising overlap with the underlying ethos of this thesis 
(despite its less-than scientific phraseology). Mark Manson (2016) released a book titled 
“The Subtle Art of Not Giving a F*ck”7 within which he provides a modern commentary 
on issues surrounding happiness and self-worth. In the opening sections of this book is a 
sentiment that, to me, sums up my reflections the hundreds of hours of interviews 
conducted with Soldiers and, crucially, why they are better at accepting least-worst options; 
 
The desire for more positive experience is itself a negative experience. And, 
paradoxically, the acceptance of one’s negative experience is itself a 
positive experience. (p. 7). 
 
To rephrase Monson; the quest for a positive outcome creates a negative outcome, while 
the acceptance of a negative outcome creates a positive outcome. This is what the 
                                                 
7 While I apologize for the vulgarity of the language this is, unfortunately, the language of choice of the 
author. It does not reflect the views of this author, nor does it imply, in any way, that Soldiers “do not give 
a F*ck.” As we shall see, this is not the case; nor the argument of Monson (2016).   
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Philosopher Alan Watts referred to as a “Backwards Law” referring to the fact that the 
quest for one thing can create the opposite outcome (in effect it is the opposite of a self-
fulfilling prophesy; in that the belief that something is the case creates that eventuality). 
Putting this in perspective it provides a nice frame of reference for our emerging 
understanding of military decision-making. What the Soldiers in this study seemed able to 
do was to accept a negative outcome and act. On the other hand, and from a detailed 
analysis of Power’s (2016) work, and L. Alison’s wider work in this area; it is the efforts 
of others to make a positive out of a potentially negative situation that creates a negative.  
Now, let us dig deeper, because it is important that we emphasize that what 
differentiates Soldiers is not the fact that they “do not give a f*ck” (this could not be further 
from the truth). In Monson’s work, he outlines several subtleties to “not giving a f*ck” 
because, as he outlines “there is a name for a person who finds no emotion in anything: a 
psychopath. [and] why would you want to emulate a psychopath?” (p. 13). Firstly, “not 
giving a f*ck” does not mean being indifferent (i.e., caring about nothing). Secondly, and 
this is critical, “not giving a f*ck” about adversity means caring about something more 
important than adversity. Let us put these two subtleties together with our data. From a 
qualitative standpoint, Soldiers demonstrated a willingness and ability to tolerate the 
adversity of a bad outcome to make a critical least-worst decision because they cared about 
something more than this adversity. That is, they held values that trumped any adversity 
they would experience because of their decision. In the Police sample, it is viable to 
propose from the work of Power (2016), that perhaps they were unable to decide because 
they did not care about anything enough to tolerate the adversity of a bad choice. To back 
this up with our data, Soldiers scored significantly higher than police officers on empathetic 
values, from this we can perhaps extrapolate that there is a significant differentiation to 
them between adversity (negative consequences, blame) and other values (saving soldiers, 
and others). Now, while here we have applied our data to a “popular psychology” model 
of values and decision-making, the underlying ethos is the same; Soldiers seem to value 
the welfare of others over negative consequences to themselves. It is clear, that to begin to 
apply this finding, significant future research is required to better understand this 
relationship (and specifically look within scenarios when egocentric and empathetic values 
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are clashing) but it offers significant promise to support the role of values as a central factor 
in individual differences. 
 
Widening the lens of “option comparison” 
 
 In the first chapters of this thesis I outlined the history of decision-making and how 
the field has moved from the rational-comparison of options through to a pattern-matching 
model. What the SAFE-T model added to this was the importance of the environment in 
decision-making and how factors present within the decision-making environment can 
derail decision making. However, what the latter chapters of this thesis have added to this 
picture is that there is, perhaps, an additional aspect that needs to be considered when 
attempting to understand the way in which critical least-worst decisions are made; intrinsic 
value systems. We are not saying that value systems are the only “intrinsic” factor; but here 
we have extensively focused on the role that they play. The importance of considering such 
systems is that only factors within the individual have the potential to explain individual 
differences in least-worst decision-making and specifically why some individuals find 
certain decisions hard, while others do not. Looking at the SAFE-T Model for example, 
levels of uncertainty may be the same, accountability may be the same, as will anticipatory 
regret; yet some individuals will still find it easier to decide than others. Hence there is an 
additional variable (or set of variables) that are influencing the decision-making process. 
Here, we looked to values as an explanatory variable in that whether a decision is hard, or 
not, is the interaction of the options available (multiattribute), the decision-making 
environment (SAFE-T), and the internal evaluation of the consequences of each value (e.g., 
Tetlock).  Hence, what we have sought to add here is the importance of not simply looking 
at what makes critical-incident and military decisions hard, but what makes a specific 
decision hard for that specific individual, and easy for another. In this sense, we have 
sought to expand the role of the individual and what they bring to a decision (outside of 
experience). 
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Methodological Considerations  
 
 Throughout this thesis, we have highlighted many methodological considerations 
that should be factored into our analysis. Briefly; we identified the issues of post hoc 
bolstering in our interviews, the issues of “forcing” choice within our SBT and the potential 
issues with using STATA (rather than SPSS) for the statistical analysis. There is, perhaps, 
one methodological issue that warrants an over-arching commentary and that is the 
coupling of “inertia” and “slower” decisions. Specifically, our metric of “inertia” in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 was “slower” decisions. However, it is essential that we re-emphasize 
that delays (in the region of a few seconds) is not necessarily “inertia” especially if several 
of the decisions are not time-critical (e.g., the decision to send a student home does not 
have to be made that second). In these instances, it is important that further SBT (or even 
live-exercise research) “opens up” the experimental design to provide an opportunity for 
true inertia to emerge (i.e., not taking time critical action). Given this then, when looking 
at our results, it may be prudent to view that while several factors (NFC, maximization, 
experience, and values) do affect decision-making, whether (and how) these directly affect 
inertia needs to be explored in a more open environment. Despite this, at the very least, this 
thesis has identified several factors which, to date, have never been explored in relation to 
military decision-making. This research should therefore be viewed as a warrant to widen 
the scope with which we look at military decision-making. In addition, and without making 
reference to inertia, this research showed quantifiable differences in the performance of 
Soldiers and police officers in our study. These differences need to be explored because 
(as identified in Chapter 3), if we can isolate the reasons for which Soldiers do outperform 
police officers we can begin to use such knowledge to support training and decisions 
surrounding recruitment and leadership.  
 In addition, we can extend this limitation to add some warrant to our comparison 
of military and non-military decisions because it is viable to propose that, because of the 
nature of military operations, these vested in the individual a need to act that was above 
and beyond that of the non-military scenarios. While some of the non-military scenarios 
absolutely required immediate action (e.g., saving a child from a tunnel), others did not 
(e.g., sending a student home from a study abroad program). Given this, future research 
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might need to be more specific to flesh out any unique effect of military situations by 
presenting equally time-urgent military and non-military scenarios.  
 Finally, and in terms of future research, it is essential that longitudinal research is 
employed. In line with Jackson et al., (2002), such research would play an important role 
in isolating what it is about being “in the military” that manifests in these between sample-
differences. Such work would also benefit from being able to follow individuals within the 
military, allowing the identification of relationships between least-worst decision making 
outcomes such as promotion and performance. In this sense, least-worst decision making 
(or more simply wider NFC and maximization) should be operationalized the same way 
that on-going research uses “grit” as a predictor of performance and longevity (see 
Laurence & Matthews, 2012). 
 
Overall Conclusions 
 
This thesis started with the simple presupposition that neither doctrinal methods 
nor RPD sufficiently explained how decisions were made in the field. With a dearth of 
research outside of these perspectives to draw on, I looked to the psychological literature 
on how people make decisions in critical incidents and the parallels that apply between 
these two contexts. From here, we sought to expand the theoretical frame with which we 
view military decision making to factor in a series of exogenous and endogenous factors 
that present within the military decision-making environment and (anecdotally) affect 
decision making. We also specifically focused on decision inertia as an outcome of making 
decisions when these factors are present. By sitting with Soldiers who had made critical 
least-worst decisions and conducting CDM interviews we were able to confirm that, as 
predicted, within the critical incident literature, many of these factors are present within 
military decision-making and they do affect the decision-makers’ calculus. That said, 
inertia was far less prevalent than predicted. Given this, we sought to understand, from a 
theoretical perspective, the way in which Soldiers made least-worst decisions. By doing 
so, perhaps we could isolate what prevented them from suffering from inertia. Our 
theoretical exploration brought me to the importance of values and the role that values play 
as a moderator in the process of comparing options; namely, when an option involves a 
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sacred value, it is immediately prioritized above the other (unless the second option also 
involves a sacred value). From here we framed the process of least-worst decision making 
as a process of value tradeoffs and developed a series of testable hypotheses. By developing 
an immersive SBT that measured values and forced participants to choose between two 
least-worst options, I then set about testing these hypotheses both within a Soldier sample, 
and between Soldiers, police officers and students. These experiments both confirmed and 
rejected our expectations; reinforcing the importance of values and considering individual 
differences in several psychometric scores, but questioning our simple value tradeoff 
model.  
Overall, reflecting on the interviews I conducted and drawing on the data I 
collected, the value systems of Soldiers is a central component of least-worst decision 
making. They demonstrated (qualitatively) an improved ability to prioritize values within 
least-worst choices, and (quantitatively) an increased importance on empathetic values that 
focused on others. These findings are merely preliminary, and of course our understanding 
is limited by the experimental paradigm we developed, but this thesis presents a strong case 
for future research to integrate what is known elsewhere about value systems and decision-
making (Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008; Tanner et al., 2007), and how Soldiers make critical 
least-worst decisions in conditions of incredible psychological and physiological pressure. 
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Konstruktion und erste Validierung eines Messinstrumentes [Sacred Value 
Measure (SVM): Construction and first validation of an instrument to assess sacred 
values]. Manuscript submitted for publication.  
Taw, J. M. (2012). Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations, New 
York: Columbia University Press.  
Taylor, M. K., Reis, J. P., Sausen, K. P., Padilla, G. A., Markham, A. E., Potterat, E. G., et 
al. (2008). Trait anxiety and salivary cortisol during free living and military stress. 
Aviation Space and Environmental Medicine. 79(2), 129-35. 
Tetlock, P. E. (2003). Thinking the unthinkable: sacred values and taboo cognitions. Trends 
in Cognitive Science, 7(7), 320 - 324.  
Tetlock, P. E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution 
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(3), 388–398. 
Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O. V., Elson, S. B., Green, M. C., Lerner, J. S. (2000). The 
psychology of the unthinkable: taboo tradeoffs, forbidden base rates, and heretical 
counterfactuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(5), 853–870.  
Conflict 
 238 
Thompson, M., Ellis, R., & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural Theory. Boulder: Westview 
Press.  
Thunholm, P. (2005). Planning under time pressure: An attempt toward a prescriptive 
model of military tactical decision-making. In H. Montgomery, R. Lipshitz, & B. 
Brehmer (Eds.), How professionals make decisions (pp. 43–56). London: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. 
Thunholm, P. (2007). Militär genomförandeledning – Vad händer när det oväntade 
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Appendix A: Recruitment Advertisement  
 
[To be sent via email from the University of Massachusetts Lowell Veteran Services]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you ever experience indecision when operating as a member of the 
United States Armed Forces?  
 
If so, you can help us understand how and why indecision occurs during 
military operations. 
 
 
We are looking for individuals who have served as members of the United States Armed Forces (Army, 
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, as well as reservists) to participate in a research study 
conducted here at the University of Massachusetts Lowell. Specifically we are looking to understand the 
situations within which decision-makers can spend too much time considering the options available too 
them, potentially leading to inaction. This is a phenomenon known as “decision inertia” which can often 
occur in high-stakes, complex environments where an individual must choose between two or more options 
and where both of those options are difficult.  
 
What will you have to do? 
Participants will be asked to discuss one event from their time operating on deployment when they had to 
choose between one or more options and spent a lot of time thinking about all the possible outcomes.  This 
interview will be conducted here at Umass Lowell  and will take 1-2 hours. The information provided 
in the interviews will remain anonymous 
 
How will you participation help the United States Armed Forces?  
The results of your interview, and interviews we conduct with other members of the United States Armed 
Forces will be used to develop training aides aimed at reducing Soldier indecision. These will be integrated 
into future training to help training for future members of the Armed Forces.  
 
What do I do if I am interested in participating? 
If you would like to be involved in this study, and/or would like any more information on the research, 
what it entails and how we aim to use it to support future training of the United Stated Armed Forces, 
please email Neil_shortland@uml.edu, or call at 978-934-4045.  
 
 
We look forward to hearing from you! 
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 Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM 
 
Study Title: Decision-making on Deployment: The presence of decision inertia during least-worst 
decisions  
Name of Researcher: Neil Shortland (neil_shortland@uml.edu), Prof. John Horgan 
(John_horgan@uml.edu) and Professor Laurence Alison (l.j.alison@liverpool.ac.uk) 
Research Institutions: This research is funded by the Umass Lowell Office of the Vice Provost 
for Research and will support a Doctoral thesis overseen by the University of Liverpool.  
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project aimed at investigating how decisions are 
made in adverse conditions. It will involve an interview in which you will be asked to discuss a 
situation whereby you had to make a decision in which all outcomes were potentially negative. 
Here is some information to help you decide whether or not to take part. Please take time to read 
the following information carefully and discuss it with friends and the researcher if you wish. Ask 
if there is anything you do not understand or if you would like more information. Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
1. There is likely no direct benefit to you from taking part in the study. However, information 
obtained during the course of the study may help us to increase our understanding of how 
difficult and complex decisions are made in adverse environments.  
2. Your participation is completely voluntary and if you choose to participate you are free to 
withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. There is a slight risk that asking you to 
recall events during your deployment may cause you stress or discomfort, therefore, you 
are free to skip any question or questions you do not want to answer and can stop the 
interview at any time without any negative consequences to you or to your educational 
standing or any services you may receive at UMass Lowell. 
3. The interview will take approximately 2 hours to complete and with your permission we 
would like to audio-record the conversation to ensure that data analysis is as accurate as 
possible.  If you do not want to be audio-recorded hand written notes will be taken.  This 
study will involve you discussing (at an unclassified level) a situation you encountered, 
when on deployed service, in which you had to choose between two or more options, where 
both of those options were difficult. With your permission, your responses will be audio 
recorded, your interview will transcribed by the researcher and made anonymous. The 
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audio file will then be deleted. The information you provide will be completely 
confidential. No personal data about you will be disclosed to anyone outside of the research 
team.  
4. The collective results of this interview, and the others conducted will be made available to 
all participants via Neil Shortland (neil_shortland@uml.edu). All audio recordings will be 
deleted prior to the end of this project (July 2015).  
5. Complaints should be addressed to the UMass Lowell IRB at irb@uml.edu or call 978-
934-3452.  Information provided should include the study name or description (so that it 
can be identified), the principal investigator or student investigator or researcher, and the 
substance of the complaint.  
WHO CAN TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? 
You are only eligible to take part in the study if you have been a member of the United States 
Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force) and have been on at least one deployment. 
If you have any questions about this study or your eligibility for it then please do not hesitate to 
ask the lead researcher, Mr. Neil Shortland (email: neil_shortland@uml.edu Tel: 8144044948) 
This project is being supervised by Professor John Horgan (john_Horgan@uml.edu) and Professor 
Laurence Alison (L.J.Alison@liv.ac.uk) 
The University of Massachusetts Lowell Counseling Service can be contacted at: 
Email: counseling@uml.edu 
Phone: 978-934-4331  
The University of Massachusetts Lowell Veteran Services can be contacted at: 
Email: veterans@uml.edu 
Phone: 978-934-3031 
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Appendix C: Informed Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Study Title: Decision-making on Deployment: The presence of decision inertia during least-worst decisions  
Name of Researcher: Neil Shortland (neil_shortland@uml.edu), Prof. John Horgan (John_horgan@uml.edu) and 
Professor Laurence Alison (l.j.alison@liverpool.ac.uk) 
 
 
 
Please tick boxes          Yes   No 
 
1. I confirm that I am 18 years of age or older and have read and understood the information   ☐ ☐  
     sheet for the above study. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time.  ☐ ☐ 
3. I understand that none of my personal details will be recorded and that all responses   ☐ ☐ 
will be made anonymous prior to analysis and publication of any data. 
4. I understand that I will be asked to discuss a situation that occurred as part of my role as a   ☐ ☐ 
    member of the United States Armed Forces and it may cause me stress or discomfort. 
5. I understand that to take part in the study I must be currently (or have been in the past)  ☐ ☐ 
    a member of the United States Armed Forces and that I have been on deployed duty at least once. 
6. I understand that data supplied by me can be removed at my request at any time after my   ☐ ☐ 
    participation by contacting neil_shortland@uml.edu. 
7. I understand that this discussion must be at the unclassified level and I must not provide any  ☐ ☐ 
     information that is classified or sensitive.  
8. I agree to take part in the study.        ☐ ☐ 
9. I agree to be audio-recorded for the interview.        ☐ ☐ 
 
 
 
This form is to be read before the interview. At the start of the interview you will be asked to verbally confirm that 
you agree to all of the statements above.  
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Appendix D: Gatekeeper contact script 
 
Email and Phone/Face-to-Face Script for Gatekeepers  
 
Email Script 
 
Dear [Gatekeeper name] 
 
I am requesting your help to support recruitment efforts for an on-going research project 
titled ” Decision-making on Deployment: The presence of decision inertia during least-
worst decisions”. This research is funded by the Umass Lowell Office of the Vice 
Provost for Research and is conducted in partnership with researchers from the 
University of Liverpool.  
 
Specifically we are looking for individuals who have served, or are currently serving as 
members of the United States Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
Coast Guard, as well as reservists) to speak about their experiences of making decisions 
during military operations.  
 
To support recruitment for this study we are hoping to share our call for participants with 
current or former members of the Armed Forces in the Boston area. To achieve this we 
would be very grateful if you could forward the call for participants (attached as a pdf to 
this email) to any veteran or active service members that you are aware of. If an 
individual is interested in participating the call for participants asks that they contact us 
so that we can provide them with more information regarding the study, the requirements 
for participants and answer any questions they may have about the research.  
 
We would like to emphasizethat the information provide by participants will be 
completely confidential. No personal data will be disclosed to anyone outside of the 
research team.  
 
If you would like any more information about this study or what it entails please not 
hesitate to contact us. 
 
Many thanks and best wishes, 
 
Neil  Shortland 
 
Senior Research Associate 
Center for Terrorism & Security Studies 
University of Massachusetts Lowell 
School of Criminology & Justice Studies 
113 Wilder street, Rm 433.  
Lowell, MA 01854-3060 
Email: neil_shortland@uml.edu 
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Phone: 978-934-4045 
 
Phone/Face-to-Face Script 
 
 
Dear [Gatekeeper name], many thanks for speaking with me.  
 
I am requesting your help to support recruitment efforts for an on-going research project 
titled ” Decision-making on Deployment: The presence of decision inertia during least-
worst decisions”. This research is funded by the Umass Lowell Office of the Vice 
Provost for Research and is conducted in partnership with researchers from the 
University of Liverpool.  
 
Specifically we are looking for individuals who have served, or are currently serving as 
members of the United States Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
Coast Guard, as well as reservists) to speak about their experiences of making decisions 
during military operations.  
 
To support recruitment for this study we are hoping to share our call for participants with 
current or former members of the Armed Forces in the Boston area. To achieve this we 
would be very grateful if you could forward the call for participants (that will be emailed 
to you, with your permission, after this phone call) to any veteran or active service 
members that you are aware of. If an individual is interested in participating the call for 
participants asks that they contact us so that we can provide them with more information 
regarding the study, the requirements for participants and answer any questions they may 
have about the research.  
 
I would like to emphasizethat the information provide by participants will be completely 
confidential. No personal data will be disclosed to anyone outside of the research team.  
 
At this time I would like to ask if you have any questions regarding the research, our 
sample pool, the procedure or data protection? (answer yes/no: if yes – provide answers 
and further detail). 
 
Based on what you have heard above, are you happy to help with our recruitment efforts 
by forwarding our call for participants? (if so this will be provided to them via email after 
the conclusion of the phone call). 
 
Many thanks and best wishes, 
 
Neil 
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Appendix E: Semi-Structured Interview Script 
 
1. PREAMBLE  
 
To build rapport and to occur while offering the participant coffee/tea/water 
 
Prompts: 
 Tell me a little about your background? 
 How long have you been at Umass Lowell? 
 What is your major? Why did you decide on that major? 
 What do you plan to do when you finish the interview? 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTIONS AND INFORMATION ON STUDY/INTERVIEW  
 
 Ensure that everything on the information sheet was understood  
 Ask if they have any further questions, or would like any point elaborated  
 Collect (pre-signed) participant consent form  
 Provide informal context – my background, origins in the UK Ministry Of Defense, 
experience of working as a embedded scientist and how these experiences formed the basis 
of my research and this study.  
 Based on the context given above provide informal outline of the research, how long the 
interview will take, what it will involve and how it will be used.  
 
 
3. VERBAL BRIEFING  
 
“Thank you for coming. This interview will last no more than 2 hours, and is entirely voluntary 
and you can withdraw at any time. This interview is in support of a research project sponsored by 
the UML Dean’s Office for Research, and will form the basis of my PhD thesis on military 
decision-making. My hope is that this research will help inform how difficult and complex 
decisions are made in adverse environments. In particular, I am interested in a concept called 
decision inertia. We already know that where individuals must choose between two or more 
options and where both of those options are difficult there is often a tendency to spend too much 
time considering each option and this can lead to inaction. By way of example, an by reference to 
a non-military scenario consider the option of inoculating a child against a respiratory illness where 
there is a reasonable chance that the vaccination will result in a heart condition. However, a failure 
to inoculate could lead to the respiratory illness and death. What makes these decisions especially 
difficult is that both options are potentially bad, in both cases it is difficult to predict what will 
happen if you inoculate or not and it is a situation in which there are significant risks. So, I am 
going to be asking you in a moment to spend some time thinking about a decision that you had to 
make, as a Soldier, and in which you had to choose between one or more options and in which you 
spent a lot of time thinking about all the possible outcomes. Commonly, this requires you to spend 
a fair bit of time thinking about a suitable decision, so please do not feel rushed.” 
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4. PRE-SWEEP 1  
 
 Check that the above sentence is clear, and ask if they have any questions based on what 
was stated above, offer further examples of least-worst decisions (planned in advance). 
 Remind participant that they can still withdraw their data both now, and after the fact. If 
they decide that they are actually unhappy – I can erase the tape at any time after the 
interview.  
 Reassure them that any names, dates, locations etc., will be made anonymous when I am 
transcribing, and none of it will be reported in any research papers.  
 
5. SWEEP 1: INCIDENT SELECTION 
 
Sweep 1 Prompt:  
 Based on what we’ve discussed above, could I now ask you to think of a suitable situation 
that you have faced. Please, take your time… there is no rush.  
 
Sweep 1 Outcome:  
 Participant offers (and/or describes in full) a situation that they have faced in which they 
felt they had to make a least-worst decision AND they felt experienced decision inertia. 
 
Outcome Response: 
 Provide positive reinforcement, express interest in this case, and reinforce its utility here. 
 Ask to be taken through this scenario in as much detail as possible  
 If sweep 1 lasted a significant amount of time (e.g. <30 minutes) offer a short break/welfare 
check.   
 
 
6. SWEEP 2: CONSTRUCTING A TIMELINE 
 
 
Sweep 2 Prompt: 
 What we have found in the past to be very helpful is to ask interviewee’s to construct a 
time line. This helps flesh out the key decision points, the key events, and the key people.  
 Present the participants with a selection of sample time lines (see Crandall et al., p. 74). 
 Discuss example, highlight that they have mapped out key events, people and decisions – 
emphasises that the specific timing is not important (in minutes, hours, even days) – we 
are mainly looking to identify the order of events.  
 Present participants with a white board, and pens. 
 Emphasizethat the goal of this is to help unpick the situation  
 Encourage them, if they are comfortable doing so, to talk the interviewer through the 
timeline as they are generating it.  
 Reinforce that they can take their time and draw a timeline in a way that makes sense to 
them – there is no format - mistakes can easily be erased (provide them with board eraser). 
 
- The interviewer is not to interrupt this process. All comments/questions (unless prompted by the 
participant) must remain until the participant has finished constructing their timeline -  
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Sweep 2 Outcome:  
 Participant presents a timeline of the key situation.  
 
Outcome Response: 
 Provide positive reinforcement, express interest in this case, and reinforce its utility here. 
 Follow up with any gaps/areas that you do not fully understand/would value elaboration 
upon.  
 If sweep 2 lasted a significant amount of time (e.g. <30 minutes) offer a short break/welfare 
check.   
 
 
7. SWEEP 3: DEEPENING 
 
 
Sweep 3 Script: 
 
“So, we are now going to go into a fair bit of detail around the particular issues I am especially 
interested. As I said at the very beginning one of the key issues that I am looking at and exploring 
is this concept of how people choose between difficult options. I obviously don’t want to put words 
into your mouth and I have got a sense already, of course what the key decisions and options were, 
but just to be sure that you and I are on the same page, please could you clarity what the key 
decisions were, and what the options were that you found difficult to choose between.”  
 
 Repeat your interpretation of the event back to them – highlighting what you perceived 
them to perceive as the key decisions and options available to them.  
 
Sweep 3 Prompt: 
 Acknowledge that they have now gone through the event twice, in extensive detail but state 
that the goal of the following questions are to help us understand what they were thinking 
at each of the key decisions/events in their timeline. 
 Show them the aide memoire that you have on the desk – state that this is to help you both 
discuss the event from a series of perspectives, including their goals and priorities, their 
options, and assessments.  
 
Aide Memoir Prompts: 
 
Cues:    What were you hearing/thinking/noticing during this situation? 
Information   What information did you use in making a decision or judgment? 
    How and where did you get this information, and from whom? 
    What did you do with this information? 
Did you discard any information that you received? 
Analogs   Did this situation remind you of any previous experiences you have had?  
   What were the parallels you drew between the situation and others? 
Standard Operating  Did this case fit a standard scenario? 
Procedures   Is this the type of event you were  trained to deal with? 
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Goals and Priorities  What were your specific goals and objectives at this time?  
   What was the most important thing for you to accomplish at this point? 
Options   What other courses of action were considered? 
   What courses of action were not considered, and why?  
   Was there a rule that you were following in choosing this option? 
Experience  What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making 
this decision? 
Assessment If you were asked to describe the situation to someone else at that point, 
how would you describe it?   
Mental models  Did you imagine the possible consequences of this/these action(s)? 
 Did you create some sort of picture in your head? 
   Did you imagine the events and how they would unfold? 
   How close was your imagined outcome to the actual outcome? 
Decision-making  What let you know that this was the right thing to do at this point in the 
incident? 
 How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
Did you think about it for too long? 
Were you ever worried about the time it was taking to make the 
decision?  
How long did it take to actually make this decision?  
Guidance   Did you seek any guidance at this (or any) point in the decision? 
    How did you know to trust the guidance you got? 
Feelings   How did making this decision-make you feel? 
    How did you feel about potentially making the wrong choice? 
 
 
Sweep 3 Outcome:  
 Participant provides an in-depth insight into the process of their decision-making within 
this given case.  
 
 
Outcome Response: 
 Provide positive reinforcement, express interest in this case, and reinforce its utility here. 
 If sweep 3 lasted a significant amount of time (e.g. <30 minutes) offer a short break/welfare 
check.   
 
    
8. SWEEP 4 ‘WHAT IFS’: 
 
Sweep 4 Prompt: 
 There is one final phase; it will not take longer than 15 minutes. There are only four 
questions.  
 The goal of this section is to look back in hindsight, and evaluate possible hypothetical 
scenarios  
 
Sweep 4 Aide Memoire: 
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Expert-novice-contrasts If a novice had been in charge at this particular point in the incident, 
what type of error might they have made, and why? 
 If you had encountered this decision earlier/ later in your tour (or in 
another subsequent/earlier tour) what would you have done differently? 
Hypotheticals If (key feature) of the situation had been different, what impact would 
that have had on your decision/assessment/actions/feelings? 
Experience What training might have offered you an advantage in this situation? 
Aids What knowledge, information, or tools’ technologies could have 
helped? 
  
 
Sweep 4 Outcome:  
 Participant provides hindsight and hypothetical views on the situation 
 
Sweep 4 Outcome Response  
 Inform them that there are no more questions, and thank them for going through the 
situation in such detail with you.  
 Ask if they have any questions for you, or if there is anything they would like to say/add 
that they have not said above.  
 
9. REINTEGRATION/DEBRIEF 
 
Reintegration Prompts (will ideally follow on from conversations started in the 
‘PREAMBLE’, but viable cues include): 
 Discuss future day/week plans 
 Discuss upcoming events/exams/deadlines that they may have as part of their role as a 
student at UML 
 Discuss how they are enjoying this semester and the classes they have taken  
 
 
Debrief Script: 
 
“Ok, that is officially the end of the interview, I really appreciate the amount of time you have 
given over this. But before you go, I genuinely want to thank you for giving up your time, you 
have given me a lot of time, and it is been incredibly helpful for my research. When the research 
is complete, and if you are interested, I would like to share with you a copy of the results.  This 
can take some time, and I have, many more interview to conduct but if you can give me your email 
I can send you any output from this project.  
 
Here is a participant information debrief sheet – please take it away. If there is anything you want 
to ask, please ask. Context relevant things – what are you up to for the rest of the day? Link to 
something they said earlier.“ 
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Appendix F: Participant Debrief Form 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF FORM 
 
We sincerely thank you for taking the time to be involved in this project. The information we have collected here, coupled with 
that we collect from other members of the Untied States Armed Forces will be highly beneficial for future efforts to develop 
better decision-making training for Soldiers.  
Whilst this research is not designed to include a re-living of trauma, there is a possibility that some adverse effects may occur 
as a result of completing this. Possible symptoms to look out for include: 
- Changes in emotions such as feeling sad, anxious, disconnected, irritated, guilt, shame, self-blame 
- Difficulty relating to other 
- An increase in substance use 
- Changes in sleeping i.e. nightmares, difficulty falling asleep, difficulty staying asleep 
- Changes in eating habit i.e. eating more than usual or loss of appetite 
- Avoidance of places, thoughts and feelings 
- A lack of interest in activities 
- Feeling detached or emotionally numb 
- Feeling hopeless about a future 
- Reduced concentration 
- Feeling easily startled 
- Suicidal thoughts or feelings 
- Feeling alienated 
- Physical aches and pains 
If you feel that you have adversely suffered as part of taking part in this research please seek support from the following 
services:  
SAVE PROGRAM (Boston based) - 1-888-844-2838  
Veterans Crisis Line (Boston based) - 1-800-273-8255 or text 838255 – with online chat here - 
http://www.veteranscrisisline.net/ChatTermsOfService.aspx 
The Soldiers Project (United States based) - (877) 576-5343 
Dept. of Veterans Affairs Hotline (Staffed 24/7 with Mental Health professionals) - 800-273-8255 
Real Warriors Live Chat (Staffed 24/7 with trained health consultants) – 866-966-1020 
The PTSD Coach App (app to help identify and learn about PTSD symptoms) – available here 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/PTSDcoach.asp or via the iTunes Store) 
 
If you have any questions about this study or your eligibility for it then please do not hesitate to ask the lead researcher, Mr. 
Neil Shortland (email: neil_shortland@uml.edu Tel: 8144044948) 
This project is being supervised by Professor Alison who can be contacted upon L.J.Alison@liv.ac.uk 
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Appendix G: Experimental Paradigm  
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
  
You are being invited to take part in a voluntary research project being conducted by Professor 
Laurence Alison, James Forest and Neil Shortland, MSc., researchers from the Department of 
Criminology and Justice Studies at the University of Massachusetts Lowell and the University of 
Liverpool.  The purpose of this research is to investigate decision-making in high-stakes 
environments. 
  
If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete some survey questions and rate them as 
to your level of agreement.  After this, you will be provided with a series of short scenarios 
which require you to choose between two options. Scenarios will be delivered via audio input. 
This experiment should take between 30 and 45 minutes.  
  
This study is confidential meaning that no one, outside of the project team, will know whether or 
not you participated or what you responded to any question. All questions are optional.   You are 
free to stop at any time or skip any questions that might make you feel uncomfortable.  Your 
participation is entirely voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time with no 
consequences.  
  
There are no direct benefits to participating in this research.  There is the potential risk that some 
of the scenarios may make you feel uncomfortable. If the study makes you uncomfortable, we 
recommend that you contact the UMass Lowell Counseling Services for assistance at 978-934-
4331 or use their anonymous mental health screening tool at 
http://screening.mentalhealthscreening.org/RIVERHAWK.  
 
If you decide to participate and complete in this study online, at the end of the survey you can 
opt to will be entered into a drawing to win one of five $50 Amazon gift cards (40 GBP). When 
you click to do this, you will be taken to separate survey to fill in your name and contact 
information. This information is in no way connected to the answers you gave as part of the 
research study. Once data collection has ended, participants' email addresses will be randomized 
and numbered. A random number generator will then be used to identify 5 numbers. These gift 
cards will then be purchased and emailed to the “winning” email addresses. 
  
If you are enrolled in CRIM 3430/CRIM 4960 at the University of Massachusetts Lowell you 
will can also receive 3% extra credit to your final grade for completing this study as well as 
being eligible to enter the draw for a amazon gift card. At the end of the survey you can opt to do 
this by also going to the separate survey.  
 
The Researchers and Professors teaching the above named classes will not download and/or 
receive the list of who participated in the research study until they have completed calculating 
grades. Then your Professor will adjust your grade up by 3%.  
 
If you have any question feel free to contact Neil_Shortland@uml.edu or at 978-934-4045.  
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PARTICIPANT ACKNOWLEDGMENT:  
  
By continuing to the survey portion of the study, you are indicating that you understand 
the potential risks and/or discomforts that have been described in this document and by the 
researcher.  By continuing, you are indicating that you have read this document, had the 
opportunity to discuss any concerns and ask questions about the research, and understand 
the risks and consequences from participating in this study. 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE(S) 
 
1. Printed Name: Neil Shortland         Date:   19/10/16 
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Socio-demographic questionnaire 
 
 
Gender  
 
 Male 
 Female 
 
Age _____ 
 
Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Armed Forces? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Reserve Officer Training Corps? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
If yes, which branch  
 
 Army 
 Marine 
 Air Force  
 Navy  
 Coast Guard 
 
If yes, how many years have you/did you served in the Armed Forces ____ 
 
Are you, or have you ever been enrolled as a member of the Reserve Officer Training Corps?  
 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Have you ever been on deployed to a theater of conflict (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq)?  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
How many years have you been in the Armed Forces_________ 
What is (was) your rank ______________ 
 
 
Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Emergency services? 
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 Yes 
 No 
 
If yes, which branch  
 
 Police 
 Fire Service 
 Ambulance Service  
 
If yes, how many years have you/did you served in the Emergency services ____ 
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Need for closure scale 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with 
each according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale.  
 
1.........strongly disagree  
2....moderately disagree  
3...........slightly disagree  
4................slightly agree  
5.........moderately agree  
6..............strongly agree  
 
nfc403 I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
nfc504 I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
nfc106 I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
nfc408 I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in 
my life. 
nfc509 I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group 
believes. 
nfc211 I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
nfc312  When I have made a decision, I feel relieved 
nfc313 When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
nfc315  I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a 
problem immediately. 
nfc225 I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
nfc430 I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
nfc132 I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
nfc133 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
nfc540 I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
nfc241 I dislike unpredictable situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maximization inventory 
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INSTRUCTIONS: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree with each 
according to your beliefs and experiences. Please respond according to the following scale.   
 
1.........strongly disagree  
2....moderately disagree  
3...........slightly disagree  
4................slightly agree  
5.........moderately agree  
6..............strongly agree  
 
 
Question 
Score (1-
6) 
I usually try to find a couple of good options and then choose between them.   
At some point you need to make a decision about things.   
In life I try to make the most of whatever path I take.   
There are usually several good options in a decision situation.   
I try to gain plenty of information before I make a decision, but then I go ahead and 
make it.   
Good things can happen even when things don’t go right at first.   
I can’t possibly know everything before making a decision.   
All decisions have pros and cons.   
I know that if I make a mistake in a decision that I can go “back to the drawing 
board.”   
I accept that life often has uncertainty.   
I usually have a hard time making even simple decisions.    
I am usually worried about making a wrong decision.    
I often wonder why decisions can’t be more easy.    
I often put off making a difficult decision until a deadline.    
I often experience buyer’s remorse.    
I often think about changing my mind after I have already made my decision.    
The hardest part of making a decision is knowing I will have to leave the item I 
didn’t choose behind.    
I often change my mind several times before making a decision.    
It’s hard for me to choose between two good alternatives.    
Sometimes I procrastinate in deciding even if I have a good idea of what decision I 
will make.    
I find myself often faced with difficult decisions.    
I do not agonize over decisions.    
I can’t come to a decision unless I have carefully considered all of my options.    
I take time to read the whole menu when dining out.   
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I will continue shopping for an item until it reaches all of my criteria.   
I usually continue to search for an item until it reaches my expectations.    
When shopping, I plan on spending a lot of time looking for something.   
When shopping, if I can’t find exactly what I’m looking for, I will continue to 
search for it.    
I find myself going to many different stores before finding the thing I want.   
When shopping for something, I don’t mind spending several hours looking for it.   
I take the time to consider all alternatives before making a decision.   
When I see something that I want, I always try to find the best deal before 
purchasing it.    
If a store doesn’t have exactly what I’m shopping for, then I will go somewhere 
else.   
I just won’t make a decision until I am comfortable with the process.   
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Instructions  
 
In the next section you will be presented with 16 scenarios. Some are military focused, others are 
dilemmas faced by Police, Fire, Ambulance services, and even University Professors. Each 
scenario will involve two decision points. After you have made your first decision the scenario 
will evolve and you will be presented with a second decision.  
 
Both decisions are independent and decisions cannot be changed once they have been made.   
 
The audio feeds for each decision point will not play automatically.  Please press the play button 
when you are ready to hear the audio input. 
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Emergency Room Scenario 
 
Hi Sir, we have a situation. I am with a family here in the emergency room. They say their 4-year 
old son fell off the back of a hobby horse onto a stone flooring and cracked his head open. He 
vomited and passed out and an hour later he died in surgery. We haven’t yet been able to 
establish a cause of death. The mother wants to hug her son’s dead body? Can I let her do that or 
will it compromise forensics! What do you want me to say?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Absolutely not    I am unsure      Yes, let her.  
 
Second step:  
 
Sir. They also have their daughter (Eleanor) who is 5 with them also. The dad is asking if he can 
take the daughter Eleanor home. Given I'm not 100% sure on cause of death of their son can I 
risk letting them take their other child home? 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Absolutely not    I am unsure      Yes, let her.  
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Island Scenario: 
 
“Hi Captain. So I am here with the Commander of the Afghan National Army. He’s pretty 
frantic. He says that an Afghan patrol just got in a large firefight with a small group of insurgents 
in the middle of the local city. He says two of his men were killed and 2 were injured. He’s also 
telling me that they think they saw one of Al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders during the fight. They said 
that the insurgents fled after during the confrontation and are currently held up on a small island 
in the Euphrates river. It’s getting dark here and the Afghan Commander wants your permission 
to launch an immediate assault on the island. Shall I give them the go ahead?”  
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No.      I am unsure      Yes  
 
Second step: 
 
 
“Captain. The Afghans were repelled again. 3 more died. They want us to send the Marines in 
with them before it gets too dark to do anything. Do you want us to launch a joint assault with 
them?” 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No.      I am unsure      Yes 
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Tunnel Scenario 
 
Hi Commander, there has been an explosion in Merseyside tunnel we have deployed the Police 
and Fire Services there now to help with evacuations and casualties. The problem is that we’re 
hearing rumors that there is a secondary bomb in the tunnel which could go off at any time. We 
don’t have a lot more information on the source, except the security services say it is a “credible 
threat.” Do you want to call the officers out of the tunnel? 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Keep them in there   I am unsure     Extract  
 
 
Second Step:  
 
 
“Sir, one of the officers is refusing to come out of the tunnel. He says he is with an 8 year old girl 
who is trapped. Her mums dead but she's only pinned in by some metal. He needs some pedal 
cutters to get her out and he won’t come out until he’s got those cutters. Some of the other 
officers have volunteered to go back with the cutters. Shall I let them go?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Order him to leave her   I am unsure    Send in the petal cutters 
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Doctor and Patient 
 
Dr. Jackie here. We have a problem in the Children’s ward. One of the children here is diagnosed 
with cancer and the doctors have prescribed chemotherapy and radiation. The issue is that the 
mother is opposed to Western medicine and believes that prayer will cure the disease. The father 
wants his daughter to receive the treatment, but he doesn’t have legal custody. Without the 
treatment, the chances of survival for this girl are basically zero. What shall we do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Give the treatment    I am unsure    Follow mothers wishes 
 
 
Second step: 
 
The family lawyer has just arrived and seen what we are doing. He is absolutely livid at the 
situation and threatens to sue us if we do not change our course of action. What do you want to 
do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5  
 
Change our plan     I am unsure     stick with the plan  
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Chamberlan Scenario 
 
My Chamberlan if you would just like to take a seat?  
 
I’m not fucking sitting down, I want to know why the fuck I was arrested at half past fucking 8 
in the morning when all you had to do was wait 30, 35 minutes until the end of the school run. 3 
kids. 3 fucking kids. YOU ARRESTED ME INFRONT OF MY KIDS. How dare you do that?  
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Outline reasons for his arrest  I am unsure      Continue  
 
Second step: 
 
It’s a disgrace, I’m a fireman. People know me. Then you come, start taking me computer out. 
Everybody knows what that means don’t they? Couldn’t you have just waited? I am making a 
complaint. I want this down, and noted, that you have just made a humiliating fucking idiot out 
of me in front of everybody.  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Take his complaint     I am unsure      Do not 
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Mountain fire scenario 
 
 
Sarge, Private First Class Billings here. I am here with some Special Forces guys. They say they 
have intelligence about the base of operations for the local insurgents who have been targeting 
our base with missiles over the past month. The intel comes from an insurgents’ brother. He says 
they have a base of operations at about 11000 feet in some nearby mountains. We’ve got UAV 
footage of the area. It’s pretty grainy, but there is definitely some movement up there. They are 
likely to move by morning, so the window is time limited. They are saying this is our chance. Do 
you want me to mobilize air support?”  
 
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No.      I am unsure      Yes 
 
 
Second step: 
 
 
[Call from Squad Commander]. I’ve just heard from PFC Billings. What the hell are you doing. 
We are looking at the exact same intelligence as you! Undo your decision right now  
 
Are you going to halt the aid raid?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Yes.      I am unsure      No 
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Negotiation 
 
Hi Captain, we have a bit of a situation. I am downtown and there is a kid on top of a building. 
It’s about 15 floors high. He has been up there for a few hours, but now he is threatening to jump 
if we don’t move our perimeter further up the street. I don’t want to aggravate him, but moving 
the perimeter could threaten public safety. What do you want me to do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Keep the cordons    I am unsure     Move the cordons  
 
Second step: 
 
Captain, he is now demanding that we bring him a pizza? What should we do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No pizza     I am unsure     Bring him a pizza  
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Rescue Mission 
 
Captain, we have just heard from our guys in the field, they were being dropped by helicopter at 
a landing sight up in the mountains and they came under heavy fire. They aborted the landing but 
one of the officers fell out of the helicopter in all the confusion. The status of Soldier is 
unknown. The helicopter has landed in a safe spot on the valley floor but is requesting that they 
immediately turn around and go back to the landing zone to retrieve their Soldier.” 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Do not launch mission  I am unsure     Launch mission 
 
 
Second Step:  
 
“We have received a satellite feed from the ground that shows the Landing Zone where the 
Soldier was last seen. The footage is unclear but appears to show him in and amongst a lot of 
enemy Soldiers. We cannot confirm if he is free and fighting, captured, or has since been killed. 
The other guys still want to go after him. What do you want to do?”  
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Don’t let them go    I am unsure      Let them go  
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Terrorist on a train 
 
Hi Captain, we are down at the subway station, we have a potential incident involving a chemical 
weapon on an underground train. From our intel, we have a terrorist at the East side. Looking at 
our options we can either go in the East and tackle the perpetrator head-on; or we can go in the 
West, leave him where he is and start evacuating civilians. What do you want me to do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Evacuate civilians     I am unsure     Go after the terrorist  
 
Second step 
 
Captain, further intelligence has told us that we have a couple of firefighters in there with him. 
They have subdued the terrorist but the chemical weapon has been released. Should we prioritise 
getting him out of there or focus on evacuating the contaminated civilians first?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Get the terrorist      I am unsure     Evacuate civilians  
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Tank Scenario 
 
“Captain, I think we have a problem. We are heading North to support a large assault on a city. 
The thing is, I think we got our routes mixed and this route is not really suitable for our tanks and 
we are getting a lot of enemy contact. Vehicles are falling through bridges; it’s a mess. We are a 
major piece of tomorrows battle but its night time, we barely have enough radios and half these 
guys have never seen a firefight before. Quite frankly we have no idea what lies ahead of us. We 
can turn back, but we won’t make it to city in time to help the battle. What do you want us to 
do?”  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Turn back.     I am unsure    Keep going 
 
Second Step:  
 
Captain. It’s Lt. Col. Bieverson. I’m in charge of tomorrow’s battle. What are you doing? How 
am I supposed to launch an assault on a city After what you have just ordered! Amend this 
situation right now!  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Turn back.     I am unsure     Keep going 
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Study Abroad dilemma 
 
Hi Professor, it is Professor Tawny. I am in Portugal on a study abroad program, but we have 
had an incident. Last night one of the students had too much to drink and knocked a bottle of 
wine off the roof of the accommodation. Luckily it didn’t hit anyone, but this could have been a 
very serious incident. I have found out that the student has depression, and has been having a lot 
of other issues at home. Protocol says I should send him home but I am really worried about the 
negative effects for him in the long run if he is expelled from the trip and fails the course. I don’t 
know if his confidence can handle the hit. What do you think we should do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Send him home       I am unsure     Let him stay  
 
Second step:  
 
Hi Professor, we let him stay on the explicit instruction that he didn’t drink again. However, last 
night at the group dinner I saw him having a complimentary glass of wine on arrival. I am 
worried about this escalating, but we are only a few days from finishing the trip. Is it worth 
sending him home – or should we turn a blind eye and let him stay until the end of the trip?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Let him stay      I am unsure    Send him home  
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Killbox Scenario: 
 
Captain, we have a situation. We have a group of our Soldiers in the field and they have been 
spotted by a local Taliban network. They think there are about 1000 fighters coming their way. 
Their escape route is clear, but they think that they could stay and coordinate an airstrike which 
could eliminate a large chunk of the Taliban network. Do you want them to stay, or should I 
order them to head back to base? 
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5  
 
Head back to base.   I am unsure      Stay   
 
Second step: 
 
Captain. They stayed and are planning the airstrike but they think their escape route has been cut 
off. They want us to launch the airstrike even if we do not have confirmation that they have 
escaped and are a safe distance away? What do you want to do? 
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Don’t launch     I am unsure      Strike  
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Copeland 
 
Interviewer: Ok, Mr. Copeland, if you can just take a seat, this is a urgent safety interview that.. 
Mr. Copeland: Right, you’ve got 30 fucking seconds, you’ve got 30 seconds to tell me why I’m 
here and that’s it. Otherwise you’ll be looking at the back of my fucking head for the rest of the 
fucking interview. You understand me?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Explain reasons for arrest  I am unsure      Continue  
 
 
Second step:  
 
Interviewer: Yeah, well let me just explain to you the nature of the interview first of all if I may? 
Mr. Copeland: No. You got 30 seconds to tell me why I’m here, and I’m counting. You got 
20….  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Explain reasons for arrest  I am unsure      Continue  
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Mountain rescue 
 
Captain. We have about 28 men up in the Valley, we are being fired at from all angles, and, 
while intelligence is pretty rough right now, our estimate is up to 200 Taliban-guys in the area. 
We are low on ammunition and we’ve been fighting up there for a good few hours now. We 
really need you and your men to go up there and help us. We know this will leave your base 
unmanned for a few hours, but will you help? 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No.      I am unsure      Yes  
 
 
Second Step:  
 
Captain. The Taliban have been repelled and the Platoon is safe. The guys are tired and pretty 
shaken up but there were only a few minor shrapnel injuries to report. The Captain up here wants 
us to pursue the enemy into the Valley. They want a body count. What do you want me to do? 
Shall I tell the troops to get ready to go into the Valley, or shall we disobey him and head back to 
the base? 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Head back to the base.  I am unsure    Pursue the enemy  
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Into the Wild 
 
Captain. We gained intelligence on a potential Taliban stronghold. We have been here for about 
30 minutes and there are shots being fired from the compound. We haven’t seen any known 
insurgents, but I’m pretty sure they are baddies. We could escape, but I think we should strike 
this target while we can. Will you authorize air support? 
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
No air support    I am unsure     Provide air support  
 
 
 
Second Step:  
 
Lt. Col. I’ve just heard from our German team in the field too. They were scouting a Taliban 
leader and have been spotted. They think a convoy of about 14 trucks, all with insurgents, are 
circling their area trying to find them. They may still be able to escape but the insurgents are 
getting closer. They need air support, but we can’t support both requests. What do you want to 
do?  
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Germans    I am unsure       Americans  
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Mehsud  
 
Interviewer: [outlines caution]. Do you understand? 
Mehsud: Yes I understand but I do not give it any meaning of credit.    
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Continue with Interview   I am unsure     Repeat caution 
 
 
Second step: 
 
Interviewer: [outlines reason for arrest].  
Mehsud: I don’t respect you. I don’t respect your law. I don’t respect anything about your 
society. It means nothing to me.  Why do you have the right to ask me questions? You are 
corrupt. Cancerous. You have no dignity. 
Interviewer: Mr. Mehsud, are you not willing to talk to me? It is your right to not talk to me.  
Mehsud: Answer me this. Do you drink alcohol?  
 
 
5 ------------------------------------------------- 0 ------------------------------------------------- 5 
 
Continue as planned  I am unsure     Answer the question 
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Decision Difficulty Questionnaire  
 
(used after each scenario) 
 
These decisions were very difficult 
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
I would need more time to decide  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
I didn’t ponder for a long time on these decisions  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
I feel ambivalent about these decisions  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
For these decisions, I feel certain which option to choose  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
 
 
I wanted more information before I made my choices  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 
 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
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Sacred Values Measurement 
 
 (original; Tanner, 2007) 
 
 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements about [insert value 
here] 
 
1. My stance on this issue might change over time  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree    
 
2. I would not change my opinion, no matter what the costs  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree    
 
3. I would have problems making concessions on this topic  
 
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree    
 
 
4. There are principles involved in this topic that we should defend under any 
circumstances  
 
1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree    
 
 
Values  
 
1. Protecting the life of people under my command  
 
2. Protecting the life of a fellow Soldier  
 
3. Protecting the life of a civilian  
 
4. Completing the mission  
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5. Capturing, or killing, a known enemy  
 
6. Avoid blame for my actions  
 
7. Avoiding negative repercussions for my actions  
 
8. Acting within the law  
 
9. Obey the orders of a superior   
 
10. Everyone’s right to free will 
 
11. Need to exert my authority over others  
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PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF FORM 
 
We sincerely thank you for taking the time to be involved in this project. The information we have 
collected here, coupled with that we collect from other members of the Untied States Armed Forces will 
be highly beneficial for future efforts to develop better decision-making training for Soldiers.  
Whilst this research is not designed to include a re-living of trauma, there is a possibility that some adverse 
effects may occur as a result of completing this. Possible symptoms to look out for include: 
- Changes in emotions such as feeling sad, anxious, disconnected, irritated, guilt, shame, self-blame 
- Difficulty relating to other 
- An increase in substance use 
- Changes in sleeping i.e. nightmares, difficulty falling asleep, difficulty staying asleep 
- Changes in eating habit i.e. eating more than usual or loss of appetite 
- Avoidance of places, thoughts and feelings 
- A lack of interest in activities 
- Feeling detached or emotionally numb 
- Feeling hopeless about a future 
- Reduced concentration 
- Feeling easily startled 
- Suicidal thoughts or feelings 
- Feeling alienated 
- Physical aches and pains 
If you feel that you have adversely suffered as part of taking part in this research please seek support 
from the following services:  
SAVE PROGRAM (Boston based) - 1-888-844-2838  
Veterans Crisis Line (Boston based) - 1-800-273-8255 or text 838255 – with online chat here - 
http://www.veteranscrisisline.net/ChatTermsOfService.aspx 
The Soldiers Project (United States based) - (877) 576-5343 
Dept. of Veterans Affairs Hotline (Staffed 24/7 with Mental Health professionals) - 800-273-
8255 
Real Warriors Live Chat (Staffed 24/7 with trained health consultants) – 866-966-1020 
The PTSD Coach App (app to help identify and learn about PTSD symptoms) – available here 
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/PTSDcoach.asp or via the iTunes Store) 
 
If you have any questions about this study or your eligibility for it then please do not hesitate to ask the 
lead researcher, Mr. Neil Shortland (email: neil_shortland@uml.edu Tel: 8144044948) 
This project is being supervised by Professor Alison who can be contacted upon L.J.Alison@liv.ac.uk 
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Appendix H: Call for Recruitment  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can you make hard choices?  
 
Then you can help us understand decision-making in 
extreme environments 
 
Study Outline: We are looking for members (and veterans) of the Armed Forces, Emergency 
service personnel and civilians (18 years of age or over), to complete a series of scenarios that 
involve you making hard choices in military, police, and even workplace situations.  
  
The study will take 30 – 45 minutes and will involve you navigating 16 challenging 
scenarios.  
 
What will I get for participating? Online participants will enter a prize draw to win 1 of 5 $50 
amazon gift cards. In-person participants (conducted at the University of Massachusetts Lowell) 
will be paid $10 for their participation.  
 
How your participation helps? The results of this research could be used to help select and train 
members of the United States Armed Forces.  
 
What do I do if I want more information? If you would like any more information on the 
research, what it entails and how we aim to use it to support the United Stated Armed Forces, 
please email neil_shortland@uml.edu, or call at  
978-934-4045.  
 
To take part in this study online click on the link below  
 
https://livpsych.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_0xioWJWfGO3Y85v 
 
 
To take part in this study in-person email neil_shortland@uml.edu 
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Appendix H: Scatterplot distributions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scatterplot of Need for Closure and Self-Reported Decision Difficulty for Soldier 
Participants (from Chapter 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of Experience and Choice Time for Soldier Participants (from Chapter 7).  
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Figure 3: Scatterplot of Experience and Decision Time for Soldier Participants (from Chapter 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatterplot of Need for Closure and Strength of Preference (from Chapter 8). 
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of Self-Reported Decision Difficulty and Need for Closure (from Chapter 
8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Scatterplot of Self-Reported Decision Difficulty and Maximization (from Chapter 8).  
 
 
 
Conflict 
 286 
S
tr
en
g
th
 o
f 
P
re
fe
re
n
ce
 
Maximization
0
1
2
3
4
5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Scatterplot of Strength of Preference and Maximization (from Chapter 8).  
 
